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ABS'rRl\CT 
The project considers blo main aspects of self-modelling: (a) the use 
of self-modelling in laboratory and field settings; (b) a theoretical 
framework, based on both cognitive and behavioural factors, "hich 
attempts to explain self-modelling phenomena. Five studies are described, 
each of which contributes directly or indirectly to the proposition that 
cognitive factors may be involved in self-modelling. In each study, 
self-modelling is compared with a control condition(s). In the 'self-
modelling condition the sub~ect watches his/her own behaviour (and/or 
" 
its consequences) directly as it happens (or as it is) by means of a 
mirror, a mirrcr-r~om or through a video system. Each study involves a 
socially (and physically) maladaptive behaviour. Of the five studies, 
three involve cigarette smoking behaviour; one involves overeating 
(or ove~~ight); and another involves eyeblinking behaviour. In each 
instance, the subject's cognitions about the behaviour concerned (and/or 
its consequences) are taking as central to understanding self-modelling' • 
. '
In one of the studies involving cigarette smoking behaviour, the subjects' 
cognitionsabout the habit were directly manipulated by exposing them to 
information that was either consistent or inconsistent with their 
existing attitudes tocigar!'tte smoking. The overweight study'involved 
female subjects who were all members of a private slimming club so that 
their cognitions would tend to be anti-fatness. The eyeblink study 
involved the extinction of conditioned'ey~blink resp?nse. In each study, 
it was found that self-modelling reduced the behaviour concerned 
relative to the control condition(s). Evidence from the existing 
literature is considered in relation to the new findings; and of 
particular'concern is the role of cognitive factors in self-modelling. 
The present r'escarch provides evidence that (1) self-modelling can, be 
used to influence human behaviour; and (2) that cognitive processes 
mediate sel~-model1ing phenomena. 
.. ... 
.. 
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PREFACE 
There exists burgeoning literature on behaviour modification techniques. 
However, virtually all of these techniques have neglected the importance 
of the client's cognitions about his behaviour as well as himself in 
any treatment programme. Instead, the primary concern has been the 
manipulation of his external environment. The neglect of the client's 
cognitive variables may largely be attributed to the environmentalistic 
or behaviouristic nature of existing behaviour modification procedures. 
These procedures are essentially an extension of general experimental 
psychology, so that the tendency has been towards a search for and 
'" 
manipulation of external contingencies for the modification of 
undesirable behaviours. 
Procedures based upon behaviouristic principles generally do not 
consider the client's cognitions about not only himself or his 
behaviour, but also about the treatment programme itself as of any 
importance in behaviour change. That is to say, such procedures do not 
take into account the manner in which the person so manipulated perceives 
himself, his behaviour, or indeed, the controlling variables; neither 
do they acknowledge the person's reasons for the change (or n"o change) 
in his behaviour. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that 
consideration of the client's cognitions is likely to lead to fuller 
understanding of behaviour in general, and also the development of more 
effective treatment techniques. 
Of major concern in this project is the development and use of self-
modelling as a behaviour modification technique. This technique, 
i 
heretofore virtually unapplied, derives from modelling principles, and 
is offered as an alternative to traditional behavioural methods such as 
aversive or operant procedures. Self-modelling takes the person's 
awareness of his ,undesirable behaviour (and/or its consequences) and 
his negative emotional evaluation of the behaviour as a predictor of 
success. Thus, in self-modelling, special emphasis is placed upon the 
person's cognitions about his behaviour as well as himself'. This is 
because, in behaviour change, the person's conception of his behaviour 
or himself (or both) is presumed to be a more influential factor than 
external variables. This means that cognitive factors must form an 
integral part of any treatment programme. Self-modelling attempts to 
achieve this by arranging the client's environment such that the 
" 
behaviour concerned (and/or its consequences) is made (perceptually) 
salient to him. In other words, unlike traditional behavioural 
procedures, self-modelling aims at manipulating the client's cognitive 
processes, as opposed to his external environment, in order to alter 
his behaviour in the desired direction. The procedure exploits the 
client's own behaviour to produce cognitive orientation. Thus it is 
reasonable to postulate that behaviour change through self-modelling 
is likely to be maintained over time. 
Although self-modelling is a new behaviour modification technique, it 
is likely. to take an important place in clinical practice in view of 
its apparent usefulness, and its simplicity and economy. These benefits, 
and others, are clearly demonstrated.by the five studies described in 
chapters three to six of this project. 
The present author's interest in self-modelling and its clinical 
application originated in a case study in which he used 'non-directive' 
11 
contingent imitation to modify a severe self-mutilating behaviour in a 
severely mentally sub-normal girl. This study is described in detail 
below. 
CONTINGENT IMITATION AS AN ON-WARD BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION TECI~IIQUE: 
A CASE STUDY 
Contingent imitation and self-modelling are two of the recent develop-
ments in the concept of imitation. Both concepts derive,from 
Bandura's (1969, 1971,-1977) social learning theory, and are being 
increasingly investigated as behaviour modification techniques. 
Contingent imitation (or being imitated) has been employed to alter the 
behaviours of mentally sub-normal individuals. For instance, Kauffman 
et al (1975, 1976, 1977', 1978) have reported the successful use of 
this procedure in the modification of such undesirable behaviours as 
tongue protrusion, spelling errors, and sloppy eating in mentally 
retarded children. Similarly, Wheman (1976) has employed this technique 
as a self-help skills training programme with mentally retarded adults. 
The present report describes briefly an investigation into the use of 
'non-directive' contingent imitation in the modification of self-
mutilating behaviour. This type of behaviour is fairly common amongst 
mentally sub-normal individuals (especially children). The difficulties 
posed by this kind of, behaviour problem for the people involved in the 
care, training and treatment of such individuals cannot be overestimated. 
This study involved a nine-year-old institutionalised severely mentally 
sub-normal girl (Marie). }hrie's self-mutilating'behaviour consisted of 
banging her head as hard as possible on the floor, against the wall or 
iii 
any available hard object such as furniture; and hi.tting her face or 
stomach with her fists. Baseline observations revealed that on the 
I<hole Marie spent about 75-80% of her waking time in self-mutilating 
behaviour. The behaviour was so severe that she had to wear protective 
clothes even in bed. Without these protective measures, she could open 
large areas of her face and bruise her already hardened knuckles. 11hen 
the study began Marie had been in the institution for about 2~ years. 
During this period, all attempts to control her self-mutilating 
behaviour including drugs and various behaviour modification procedures 
had apparently failed to alter her behaviour in any significant ·manner. 
In spite of all the protective measures taken, Marie's face and other 
parts of her body were badly disfigured (scarred) and her knuckles 
hardened as a consequence of her severe self-mutilating behaviour. 
The study was carried out on the ward (or villa) where 
Marie was a resident. It involved the nurse imitating Marie's self-
mutilating behaviour as closely as possible (i.e. hitting his face with 
his fists, banging his head on the floor, etc.) but without actually 
hurting himself. During a treatment session, the imitator maintained 
as much eye-contact as possible with Marie (even while imitating her)" 
but avoided any form of tactile contact with her. Marie's self-
mutilating behaviour during treatment sessions was recorded. Treatment 
consisted of twenty 30-minute sessions spread over a period of 27 days. 
A record of Marie's self-mutilating behaviour outside of sessions (i.e. 
at other periods of the day) was also' kept over a period of 22 days. 
These observations, made by the imitator and independent observers 
(inter-observer reliability = 85%), were carried out in the same manner 
as baseline observations (i.e. IS-minute random observations). Twenty. 
such observations were made daily (see Graph I over page). 
iv 
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Graph I represents Marie's self-mutilating behaviour per minute 
observed during baseline period, treatment sessions and outside of 
treatment sessions. As indicated by this graph, not only was Marie's 
self-mutilating behaviour excessively high.in frequency during the 
baseline period, but it also fluctuated a great deal, ranging between 
2.20 and 20.60 self-mutilating behaviour per minute. However, it 
began to decline steadily from the fourth session of treatment on>Tards. 
During sessions 7-16 inclusive, virtually no self-mutilating behaviour 
occurred. However, during sessions 17 and 18 the mean frequency of 
self-mutilating behaviour per minute was 2.06 and 2.80 respectively; 
but this dropped to zero during the last three treatment sessions. The 
decline in Marie's self-mutilating behaviour during treatment sessions 
was apparent in other situations during the same period as indicated by 
the graph.· 
By the end of the study all the wounds and scars on Marie's face had 
almost disappeared completely; and temperamentally she was more cheer-
ful and friendly towards the imitator ·and other staff on the ward than 
she was during the baseline period, and at the beginning of the 
treatment. 
Follow-up observations of Marie's self-mutilating behaviour were carried 
out by an independent observer eight weeks after treatment. Nine 
15-minute observations were maqe over a period of eleven days. These 
observations \~ere carried out at different periods of the day (as shown 
in Graph II over page) and across situations. 
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Graph 11 indicates that during this period, the frequency of Marie's 
self-mutilating behaviour had increased (and fluctuated) considerably 
relative to the treatment period. Nonetheless, it was still lower 
during this period, even though treatment had discontinued. Comparison 
between Graph I and Graph 11 indicates the mean frequency of Marie's 
self-mutilating behaviour during the following periods: (a) baseline 
period; (b) treatment period; and (c) follow-up period to be 9.6; 
1.7; and 5 respectively. This means that at follow-up (i.e. eight 
weeks after treatment) the frequency of Marie's self-mutila~ing behaviour 
was still significantly (about SO%) lower than during the baseline period. 
In order to determine the relative long-term effect of contingent 
imitation on Marie's behaviour, longitudinal follow-up observationS of 
her self-mutilating behaviour were carried out. In all 24 lS-minute 
observations, spread over a period of four months, were made by 
independent observers; and as in Graph 11, these observations were 
made at different periods of the day. However, because of the extreme 
fluctuations in Marie's self-mutilating behaviour (as indicated by 
baseline data) and also because these fluctuations seemed to be unrelated 
to any clear external contingencies, these observations, unlike the 
eight-week follow-up observations (Graph 11), were confined to a 
relatively controlled situation. That is, Marie was observed only when 
she was in her Group-Room with other children and staff in her 
Group (The Bambis). The rationale for this was relative ease and 
reliability of the observations, in that·it eliminated the problems of 
following Marie around the ward in order to observe her behaviour. The 
results of these observations are·shown in Graph III (see over page). 
viii 

Graph III indicates that the effect of the treatment was clearly apparent 
throughout the month. following treatment. However, after the initial low 
levels of self-mutilating behaviour during this period, the rate of 
Marie's self-mitilation began to rise and fluctuate sharply. It can be 
seen that the mean frequency of her self-mutilating behaviour rose from 
zero to 47 per minute during the four-month period. The mean frequency 
of self-mutilation was 3.5, 15.3 and 26 per minute for April, May and 
July respectively. Thus, during this period (April-July), Marie's mean 
frequency of self-mutilating behaviour in the group situation rose from 
3.5 to 26 per minute. This is far above the baseline level of 9.6 per 
minute and represents an increase of over 100%. 
'. 
As mentioned previously, Marie's self-mutilating behaviour had proved 
resistant to all the behavioural procedures (and drugs) which had been 
used in attempts to control it. However, contingent imitation appeared 
to have been relatively effective in reducing that behaviour. Comparisons 
between Graphs I, 11 and III·reveal that Marie's behaviour improved 
significantly during the treatment period. This change in her behaviour 
was still apparent during the first month after treatment. Similarly, 
data from eight-week follow-up observations in different situations 
(Graph 11) indicate that, overall, the level of Marie's self-mutilation 
was significantly lower during that period than during the baseline 
period. Thus, in the circumstances of this study, contingent imitation 
appeared to have been a useful treatment technique at least in the 
short term. Perhaps if the treatment had been carried out for a longer 
period of time its long term efficacy might have been realised. 
The findings of this preliminary investigation indicate that contingent 
imitation (or being imitated) can be used asa technique for the 
x 
·', 
treatment of self-mutilating behaviour (as well as other maladaptive 
behaviours) in mentally sub-normal individuals where traditional treat-
ment procedures are undesirable (e.g. aversive procedures) or have 
failed or have achieved only a limited success (e.g. operant techniques). 
This procedure would seem to warrant further systematic investigations 
considering its benefits both in terms of economy and ease of application. 
In other ~tords, the technique is simple and can easily be acquired and 
applied by parents, nurses, teachers and anyone involved.in the training 
and care of mentally sub-normal individuals without the involvement 6f 
expensive paramedical personnel or apparatus. As such it may have a 
place in behaviour modification alongside self-modelling which also is 
a continuously modelled individual centred modelling approach. The 
present project is a modification and extensio~ of this procedure to 
" other forms of maladaptive behaviours in 'normal' adults, and an 
perspectives. 
. .• 
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CHAPTER ONE 
IMITATION AND SELF-MODELLING: AN OVERVIEW 
SUMMARY 
The chapte~ discusses developments in the concept .of imitation, mainly 
ove~ the past 40 years. The lite~ature highlights the p~ocesses th~ough 
which imitation has passed both in terms of its definition and effects. 
Even though there is· now· less concern about its definition conside~able 
effo~ts are being made towa~ds understanding of its effects and their 
interpretations. The cttr~ent trend has been for greater emphasis on the 
" practical application of imitation as a treatment as well as a training 
technique. Consequently a variety of terms and p~ocedures have derived 
f~om the concept. This emphasis se~veS as a useful guide to contemporary 
investigations into human imitation. Classifl.cations of theoretical 
conceptualisations of imitation a~e discussed, and the difficulties 
inherent in such theoretical p~opositions are emphasised. This chapter 
examines in some depth those theoretical positions ~Ihich a~e pertinent to 
the present project, and also offe~s app~aisal. of particular instances. 
Taking as its starting point the 'nature-nurture' debat.e, the chapter 
proceeds on to describe other important historical perspectives, and 
finally considers contemporary theories of imitation. These include 
I'iagetian theory, reinforcement theory, affective theory and social 
lea~ning theory. All these theoretical positions are noted for their 
emphasis on the role of the model in an imitation situation and his/her 
effects on the observe~. Their apparent failure to recognise the use 
0:1; the model as the observer of his/her own behaviour is emphasised; so 
is their failure to accord cognitive factors thei~ due role in the 
-5-
effects of imitation on both the model and the observer. Recent 
developments in imitation including such concepts as 'being imitated' 
and 'self-modelling' are also discussed. 
", -
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1. 1 INTRODUCTION 
Imitation as a psychological phenomenon has had a long and controversial 
history. Historically, the controversy was over whether or not imitative 
behaviour is an innate propensity. However, a number of explanations 
have developed over'tIle-past century to account for imitation both in 
men and animals. This chapter traces the history of imitation and 
describes some of the major theories or explanations (both historical 
" 
and contemporary) that have been put forward in attempts to understand 
the phenomenon - imitation. 
While many historical approaches to imitation "ere mainly biological 
in nature, contemporary theorists have addressed themselves to various 
aspects of imitation. Basically, these concern (1) the relative 
importance of externally administered reinforcement in human imitative 
behaviour (e .• g. Miller & Dollard, 1941), (2) the importance of the role 
of the relationship existing between the model and the observer in 
imitation (Mo>rrer, 1950, 1960), (3) the importance of cognitive level 
of the observer in imitation (Piaget, 1962), and (4) the relevance of 
the distinction between acquisition and performance (Bandura, 1969, 1971). 
These theoretical approaches will be detailed later. 
-7-
However, important as they are in understanding imitation as a relatively 
multi facet psychological phenomenon, these approaches tend to overlook 
one important aspect of imitation. In other words, as it will become 
clear later in this chapter·, these theorists and their followers tend to 
depict imitation as a one-way process. In other words, in their various 
attempts to explain ·the dynamics of imitation, they tend to concentrate 
chiefly on the observer to the almost complete exclusion of the model. 
It appears that these theorists and investigators do not give due 
consideration to the effects imitation may have on the (human) model. 
This aspect of imitation and its theoretical explanation are the major 
purpose of this project. However, while most theorists and investigators 
stress the facilitatory or disinhibitory effects of imitation (usually 
" 
on the observer), this project will examine the inhibito~l effects of 
imitation on the behaviour of the 'imitated', namely, the model. 
1. 2 NATIVISTIC THEORY 
Early attempts to account for the occurrence of imitative behaviour in 
man generally attributed such actions to innate factors. This nativistic 
conceptualisation assumes that humans imitate because it is their 
biological nature to do so. For instance, Compayre (1896) described 
imitation as: "A kind of natural hypnotism which irresistl.bly suggests 
imitative movements. it attracts and seduces the mature man and with 
even greater reason the child. • •• imitation is really nothing more 
than the tendency to welcome the suggestions of others" (in Guilluame, 
1971, p. 62). This view of imitation as the result of innate propensity 
was shared by theorists such as Mo.rgan (1896), Tarde (1903), and 
McDougall (1908). 
-8~ 
Tarde (1903) for instance, also claimed that all human beings possess 
a strong and natural predisposition to emulate the actions of others. 
He further believed that prolonged interaction between two people would 
·lead to increasing reciprocal imitation. This kind of imitative 
influence even extends to nations. He regarded imitation as playing 
a crucial role in the transmission of culture and knowledge between 
generations and societies .- "society is imitation." (p. 74) •. 
Most theorists reject the nativistic explanation of imitation for the 
following reasons: (1) it ignores the commonplace fact that exposure 
to the actions of others often leads us to avoid rather than emulate 
them; for instance, witnesses to horrific murders or accidents often 
" 
avoid situations which are likely to remind them of such experiences 
let alone emulate the murderers or the victims; (2) the innate 
approach provides no information about variables such as reinforcement 
(which might influence the occurrence of imitation), the manner in ~,hich 
a particular model is chosen for emulation, and the type of behaviour 
\'1hich an individual will actually imitate. As Piaget (1962) has 
pointed out, nativistic approaches,fail to understand that imitation is 
merely a process, and not in itself a motivating state. 
1. 3 ASSOCIATIVE CLASSICAL' CONDITIONING THEORIES 
Around the second decade of the century, other theorists put forward 
alternative explanations, the 'associative classical conditioning 
theories'. (e.g. Humphrey, 1921; Allport, 1924; and Holt, 1931). These 
attempted to explain imitative behaviour in terms of associative 
learning principles. In the associative conditioning formulation, the 
temporal association between modelled stimuli and the observer's 
-9-
matching response was considered to be a sufficient condition. for the 
occurrence of imitation. 
In Holt's (1931) formulation, for instance, when an adult copies the 
response of a child (e.g. cooing) the latter tends to repeat the 
reiterated behaviour. As this circular associative sequence continues, 
the adult's behaviour becomes an increasingly effective eliciting 
stimulus for the child's response. Thus if the adult performs a 
response that is novel for the child, the child will tend to copy it. 
This view, as we shall see soon, is similar not only to the secoridary ' .. 
reinforcement concept of relatively more modern 'affective theories' 
(e.g. Mowrer, 1950, 1960; Aronfreed, 1969), but also to Piaget's (1962) 
, 
description of imitation process as one in which the observer's (a 
child's) spontaneous behaviours serve initially as stimuli for matching 
responses by the model (an adult) in alternating imitative sequences. 
The associative learning approach viewed imitation as a learning process 
instead of an innate propensity. However, besides being circular, it 
fails to explain adequately the psychological dynamics governing the 
acquisition of novel responses during the model-observer interaction •. 
Also it does not explain why the observer does not imitate every response 
or act made by the model during the interaction. Nonetheless, as 
mentioned already, it appears that the associative classical conditioning 
theories underlie a number of modern theories of imitation, since modern 
explanations of imitation are inclined to depict it as a learning 
process. 
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1.4 MODERN APPROACHES TO IMITATION 
Some modern writers seem to believe that the potential to imitate is 
acquired through the process of instrumental learning instead of 
classical conditioning (e,.g. Miller & Dollard, 1941'; Mowrer, 1950, 
19601 Guillaume,. 1971). Others such as Piaget (1962), scott (1968) 
tend to adopt an eclectic position and hold the view that both genetic 
make-up and learning may combine to determine the individual's general 
ability to imitate. 
Expectedly, the lack of concensus among early theorists as well as among 
modern writers about the nature and mechanisms of imita~ion has given 
rise to a number of terms and concepts in attempts to account for 
imitative behaviour both in men and animals. They include such terms 
as "copying" or "matched-dependent" behaviour (Miller & Dollard, 1941), 
"identification" (Mowrer, 1950), "social facilitation", "behavioural 
contagion", "allelomimesis" (Thorpe, 1956; Zajonc, 1965; Scott, 1968), 
"modelling" or "observational learning" (Bandura & Walters, 1963; 
Bandura, 1969). Although all these terms attempt seemingly to describe 
the same phenomenon (imitation) they differ somehow in content: namely, 
each appears to account for a different kind of imitative behaviour. 
However, they all imply either motoric or verbal performance of 
specific acts or sounds that are similar to those performed previously 
by a model. 
,As far as human imitative behaviour is concerned, 'four major theoretical 
propositions account for the different types of imitative behaviour; 
Piagetian, reinforcement, affective, and social learning. Table 1 
summarises their essential features but these will be discussed in 
more detail. 
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TABLE 1 
A Swrunary of Current Imitation Theories 
THEORETICAL POSITION GENERAL PROPOSITION 
1- piagetian/ Stresses the importance of the interaction 
developmental between level of cognitive development and 
imitation. 
2. Reinforcement conceptualises imitation (mainly motoric) 
(e.g. Miller as being contingent upon rewards and 
& Dollard) punishments. 
. 
" 
3. Affective Stresses the important role emotional 
(e,. g. Mowrer) attachment plays in imitative behaviour, 
especially in children (and even in animals 
such as talking birds). 
4. Social Learning Emphasises the distinction between 
(e,. g. Bandura) acquisition and performance in imitative 
behaviour; while acquisition - symbolic 
representation of the modelled behaviour -
is independent of reinforcement, 
performance of the behaviour is contingent, 
upon reinforcement. 
It also distinguishes between diffE',rent 
effects of imitation: 
-
(i) inhibitory/disin.~ibitory effects; 
(H) response facilitating effects; and 
(Hi) observational learning effects. 
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1.5 PIAGETIAN APPROACH TO IMITATION 
Piaget (1962) appraaches the prablem .of imitatian fram a cagnitive 
develapmental perspective, and emphasises cagnitive develapmental 
factars. Intelligence is regarded as an adaptive pracess in which the 
child must canstantly respond ta new events in a fashian made passible 
by his existing cagnitive structures .or schemata.' Because cagnitive 
schemata are a result .of the child's changing enviranment, canflict is 
eminent. Ta re salve it, the child must either madify his cagnitive 
structures (.or schemata), .or else modify the ne\'l events (.or stimuli) 
that his environment impinges upan him. Piaget uses the term 
'accammadatian' ta describe this pracess .of reshuffling (.or changing) 
cagnitive structures I and he depicts imitatian as accammadatian in its 
purest farm. The camplementary pracess in this framewark, 'assimilatian', 
refers ta the changing .of external stimuli .or events in .order ta match 
'the existing schemata (.or c.ognitive strUctures). Thus, far Piaget, 
'assimilatian' in its purest farm is play. Further, acc.ording ta 
pi,aget, an intelligent (.or stable) balance between assimilatian and 
accammadatian results in adaptation. Hawever, he claims that if there 
is a primacy .of accammadatian aver assimilatian, the activity (of the, 
child) tends ta became imitatian. , Thus, imitatian, as viewed by Piaget, 
is simply a cantinuatian .of the effart at accammadation which is closely 
linked with the act '.of intelligence. 
Piaget makes it quite clear that the prablem of imitatian is closely 
cannected with that of 'cagnitive representatian' which invalves the 
image or the internal representation .of' .objects .or acts. The basic 
theme .of Piaget;,' s theary .of imitatian is that the kinds .of external 
events (.or acts) that result in accommadation differ with age (or 
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cognitive level); thus the kinds of acts or responses a child is 
capable of imitating, as well as the kinds of rewards and incentives 
the child will respond to, depend largely (if not wholly) on ti1e level 
of his cognitive development: namely, a child cannot imitate, at least 
not successfully, what he cannot comprehend. However, Piaget has 
offered a caveat that: ..... although imitation all<ays depends on 
intelligence it is in no way identical with it" (1962, p. 85). 
1.6 CONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT THEORIES AND IMITATION 
A large body of research on imitation has been conducted along the 
theoretical gUidelines of operant conditioning principles (e.g. Miller 
"-
& Dollard, 1941; Skinner, 1957; Lovaas et a1, 1966; Lovaas & Newsom, 1976; 
Resenbaum & Arenson, 1968; Gewirtz, 1971). These theories assume that 
the occurrence of imitation is contingent upon reinforcement of imitative 
behaviour. Miller & Dollard were the leading exponents of this· view. 
According to Miller & Dollard; the necessary conditions for learning 
through imitation include a motivated subject who is positively 
reinforced for matching the correct responses of a model during a series 
of initially random trial-and-error responses. Within this framework, 
imitation is conceptualised as the consequence of external rewards or 
punishments; in other words, whether or not a certain response is 
imitated is dependent upon the likelihood of the reward or punishment 
following the response. If the response is externally reinforced (if· 
the behaviour is followed by rewards), the behaviour is said to be of 
a high probability of being imitated by an observer. Reinforcement 
stUdies based on operant principles such as those of Miller & Dollard 
and their followers do not give enough consideration to affective, 
cognitive, or competence (or intrinsic) factors in their account of 
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imitative behaviour in humans. Instead, they tend to follow the 
classical RI+S+R2 paradigm: where RI denotes response (or random 
imitation) and S denotes reinforcement for RI, while R2 denotes further 
.imitative behaviour resulting from S. 
Miller & Dollard' s (1941) \10rk has been a major influence on reinforce-
ment theory interpretation of imitative behaviour. The basic assumption 
of these theorists' work is that imitation is purely an instrumental 
means of obtaining external rewards. However, a more recent revision 
of Miller & Dollardis view (e.g. Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968; Gewirtz, 
1971) considers imitative behaviour to be a simple discrimination 
learning phenomenon. That is, the observer learns from the model what 
'-. 
responses are likely to lead to rewards and what are likely to incur 
punishments, thus using the model's behaviour to guide his own 
subsequent behaviour. 
1.7 AFFECTIVE THEORY OF IMITATION 
Mowrer (1950, 1960) has put forward explanations of imitation which 
s.uggest that an essential motive for imitation is to regain or 
re-establish emotional reinforcement contingencies that were salient 
during the original exposure to the model. According to Howrer, two 
forms of imitative learning are distinguished in terms of whether the 
observer is reinforced directly or vicariously. In the former case, 
the model performs a response and at the same time rewards the observer. 
Through contiguous association of the model's behaviour with rewarding 
experiences, the responses gradually acquire positive value for the 
observer; stimulus generalisation enables the observer to later produce 
self-rewarding feedback experiences simply by reproducing, as closely 
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as possible, the model's positively valenced behaviour. The model not 
only exhibits the response, but also experiences the reinforcing 
consequences. In this later formulation of imitation, it is assumed 
that the observer, in turn', experiences vicariously the sensory 
concomitants of the model's ',behaviour and also imitates his gratification 
or discomfort. As a consequence of this 'higher-order' vicarious 
conditioning, the observer will be predisposed to'reproduce the matching 
responses for the attendant positive sensory feedback. 
Mowrer's secondary reinforcement formulation of imitation has much in 
common with Miller & Dollard's (1941) interpretation of imitation. 
However, Aronfreed (1969) has advanced an affective theory ,.hich shares 
'-, 
some Common elements with Bandura's social learning theory (and 
piagetian theory). According to Aronfreed, for observationaf learning 
to occur, cognitive representation on the part of the observer during 
the period of observation or exposure is a necessary prerequisite. 
This is similar to Bandura's (1977) notion of 'attention' as one of the 
main processes through which 'acquisition' (and performance) occurs. 
Mowrer's secondary reinforcement' approach suggests that reinfo:r:cing 
models should be imitated more than non-reinforcing models, and that 
rewarded responses by models should be imitated more ,than non-rewarded 
responses. Even though the ,affective theory has guided a number of 
stUdies (e,.g. Hewett, 1965; Lovaas, et al, 1966; Lovaas&Newsom, 1976; 
Paskal, 1969), other investigators have expressed some misgivings about 
the importance of affect in. the acquisition of imitative behaviour. 
Foss (1964) in a study with myna birds found no evidence to support the 
affective interpretation of imitation. Similarly, findings of 
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curare-conditioning experiments in which animals are ske1eta11y 
immob1ised during aversive conditioning or extinction seem to contradict 
the affective interpretation of imitation. For instance, Black (1958) 
and Solomon & Turner (1962) have demonstrated the occurrence of 
learning phenomena in the absence of skeletal responding and its 
correlated proprioceptive feedback. Furthermore, results of 
deafferentiation studies (Taub et a1, 1965) also show that responses 
can be acquired, performed discriminately and extinguished even though 
sensory somatic feedback is surgically abolished by limb deafferentiation. 
Such studies would seem to suggest that acquisition, integration ·and 
inhibition of responses can be achieved through central mechanisms 
independently of peripheral sensory feedback. Hence, from animal studies, 
" 
it would appear that affect, at best, be only r.egarded as a faci1itative 
rather than a necessary condition for imitation. This is not necessarily 
the case in human imitation. Evidence suggests that in humans there 
exists a positive relationship between attraction between two people 
and their reciprocal imitation (e.g. Baron, 1970; Byrne, 1961, 1971, 
Kauffman eta1, 1979; Roberts et a1, 1981; Tiegerman & Primavera, 
1981). 
Aronfreed's (1969) position is that observational learning, or learning 
of model's responses, does not take place in an emotional vacuum, but 
rather the learning of such responses and their subsequent reproduction 
by the observer are influenced by the emotional circumstances in which 
the responses are initially performed. In other words, responses which 
have a positive emotional value for the observer are more likely to be 
imitated. One of the major contributions made by affective theories 
such as Mowrer's and Aronfreed's towards our understanding of imitation, 
at least in humans, is the fact that they place special importance on 
the role affective or cognitive factors play in imitation. 
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1.8 SOCIAL LEARNING INTERPRETATION OF IMITATION 
One of the major theoretical contributions to understanding of imitative 
behaviour in humans, especially in 3 to 5 year old children, is 
Bandura's "social learning theory" (Bandura, 1962, 1965, 1969, 1971a, 
1971b, 1973, 1977). Like Aronfreed's (1969) affective theory, social 
learning theory considers that cognitive (or symbolic) factors play a 
paramount role in imitation. Its major theoretical significance· is the 
clear distinction it makes between 'acquisition' and 'performance'. 
Bandura (1969) describes 'acquisition' (or learning) as the syIDbolic 
encoding or representation of modelled response, and performance as 
being the actual motoric reproduction of the modelled act, and considers 
the main vehicles of the former to be language (or verbal encoding) and 
visual imagery. 
Traditionally, as mentioned previously, imitation has been vie~led as 
involving at least two individuals: a model and an observer. According 
to this view, an individual (an observer) observes the responses or 
behaviour of another person (a model) and learns or copies the behaviour 
of that other. Whether or not the observer interiorises or reproduces 
the model's behaviour is dependent upon the reinforcement contingencies 
associated with that behaviour. 
However, unlike the reinforcement theories and the affective theories 
described above, Bandura believes that acquisition and performance are 
governed by different sets of variables. Acquisition is considered to 
be influenced by such factors as temporal continguity (between the 
model's response and the observer's perception of.the response), such 
, 
observer-characteristics as attention, motivation, perceptual ability 
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and retention. It is not necessarily dependent upon the reinforcement 
contingencies operating during exposure to the model. Performance, on 
the other hand, is believed to be under the control of environmental 
reinforcement contingencies (such as rewards or punishments). The 
reproduction of a modelled act is never perfect since the observer 
selects, in the acquisition phase, only certain aspects of the modelled 
act. The observer's selection from the modelled 'act is determined by 
the level of his motivation, attention, and so forth. Similarly, how 
close imitation is to the modelled act depends principally on the degree 
of retention of the stimulus sequences by the observer. However', once 
acquired, the cognitive representation of the modelled act can be 
retrieved later to, guide the reproduction of the original act. Thus, 
" 
according to Bandura (1969), acquisition is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for the occurrence of imitation (or performance); 
\ 
and 'acquisition' and 'performance' are governed separately by two 
distinct sets of variables. 
Bandura distinguishes amo,ngst different kinds of modelling influences: 
(1) 'observational (or vicarious) " learning effects; (2)' inhibition' 
and 'disinhibition' effects; and (3) 'social facilitation' effects. 
He uses the term 'observational' or 'vicarious learning' to refer to 
situations where the observer acquires novel responses which were not 
already in the observer's behaviour repertoire. This is somehow akin 
to Miller & Dollard's (1941) 'matched-dependent learning'. On the 
other hand, the other two mOdelling effects ('inhibition'/'disinhibition' 
and 'social facilitation') become important only insofar as the necessary 
responses are already in the observer's behaviour repertoire. Thus 
inhibition occurs as a result of witnessing the modelled behaviour 
punished. In contrast, disinhibition occurs "hen the modelled act is 
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rewarded or passes with impunity although the act is usually 
punished. 
Bandura (1977) outlined four main processes through which 'acquisition' 
. and 'performance' occur: (1) attention, (2) retention, (3) motor 
reproduction, and (4) motivation. He considers attention as a crucial 
factor in acquisition, in that the observer must·attend to the modelled 
responses in order to differentiate the distinctive sequences or features· 
of the modelled behaviour. Attention itself is influenced by such 
stimulus characteristics as intensity, vividness, and novelty, arid such 
characteristics of the model as sex, age, social status, attractiveness, 
and competence. Observer characteristics such as self-esteem, sex, age, 
, 
dependency, social status and reinforcement history are also involved. 
As far as retention is concerned, Bandura (1969) lays special emphasis 
on two symbolic mechanisms:· verbal coding and visual imagery. Motor 
reproduction is important in his later formulation because physical 
capabilities are required of the observer in order to perform a modelled 
act. Important as this may be in the imitation of motor responses, it 
is not necessary for the imitation of such cognitive phenomena as 
beliefs, attitudes and ideas. 
In the social learning framework, rewards or punishments are presumed 
to be important factors affecting motivation. However, the role of 
reinforcement contingencies is not as simple as in the 'reinforcement' 
conceptualisation of imitation (e .• g. Miller & Dollard, 1941; Skinner, 
1957). Bandura recognises self-reinforcement and intrinsic rewards (or 
'competence') as playing a crucial role in imitation. 
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1. 9 - SOME THEORETICAL" IMPLICATIONS 
This section compares the major modern theories described above: 
(a) Piagetian, (b) reinforcement, (c) affective, and (d) social 
learning. Four main issues of disagreement among these theories have 
been briefly mentioned already: to recapitulate, these concern 
(1) the importance of cognitive level of the observer in imitation; 
(2) the relative importance of externally administered reinforcement 
and intrinsic or self-reinforcement in human imitative behaviour; 
(3) the importance of the model-observer relationship; and (4) the 
relevance of the distinction between acquisition and performance. 
(a) Cognitive (Developmental) Level and Imitation 
Naturally, a person's physical abilities determine what (motor) acts he 
can perform. However, the importance of cognitive sophistication in 
imitation has been an issue for disagreement. Piagetian. theory 
postulates that a child's existing schemata play an important role in 
determining the extent of responses he is capable of imitating. Although 
this may seem obvious at face value, social learning theory (Bandura,. 
1971a), in contrast, stresses the effects of modelling on the type of 
cognitive functioning often described by Piagetian theorists. 
In spite of these two seemi,ngly opposite views about the nature of the 
relationship between cognitive level and imitation, evidence from animal 
studies as well as human infants seems to suggest the existence of a 
relationship between the observer's capabilities and the complexity of 
his imitative behaviour. For instance, the higher the observer's 
, 
ability to form an ,internal representation either in the form of language 
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or visual imagery, the higher his ability for delayed imitation or 
observational learning would be. 
Aronfreed (1969) in his review on imitation concluded that: "there does 
not appear to be a clear demonstration of true observational learning 
among rats" (p. 237). However, other investigators suggest that delayed 
imitation may be found in'cats (e.g. Herbert and ,Harsh, 1944: John et al, 
1968). Yet others have clearly demonstrated the existence of the ability 
for observational learning in higher primates (e.g. Hayes & Hayes,· 
1952; Koohler, 1925: Harlow, 1959; GarQ~er & Gardner, 1969). ,This 
ability has also been reported to exist in dolphins (Tayler & Saayroan, 
1973). 
Human infants during the first few months of life, lack the cognitive-
abilities necessary for true observational learning or delayed imitation 
even though they are capable of reflex imraediate imitation (Guillaume, 
1971; Valentine, 1930; Piaget, 1962; Parton, 1976). For instance 
Valentine (1930) and piaget (1962) observed that there is clear 
evidence of specific forms of imitation before 2 months of life; the 
earliest being imitation of sound making developing into more and more 
close imitation of tile actual words spoken. They also observed that 
smiles and laughter are imitated before 3 ·months of life. It would· 
appear that a major important change in human imitation involves the 
transition from the ability to eng:age in only simple (or reflex) 
immediate forms of imitation to the cognitive ability for delayed 
imitation. Developmental evidence suggests that this transition is 
completed by the second year of life (Piaget, 1962). That there exists 
a relationship between the level of cognitive development and the type 
or quality of imitative behaviour an organism is capable of is attested 
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by such workers as Bruner (1964), Fenson & Ramsay( 1981). Besides, 
Bandura's (1969, 1977) own emphasis on the importance of attention and 
symbolic encoding for the acquisition of complex (modelled) responses 
gives further support to the role cognitive level plays in imitation. 
The more sophisticated an organism's coding mechanisms - langUage or 
,imagery,- the greater his capacity for the imitation of complex responses 
would be. Thus, the disagreement between Piagetian theory'and social 
learning theory on the cognitive level - imitation relationship may, at 
best, be described as academic. 
(b) Contingent Reinforaementand'Imitation 
"-
Operant conditioning theorists such as Miller & Dollard (1941), Skinner 
(1957), Lovaas et al (1966), Gewirtz & Slingle (1968), Gewirtz (1971) place 
more importance on the influence of contingent reinforcement on imitative 
behaviour than any other theorists. They claim that even in the absence 
of overt external reward for imitation, the "he er similarity to a model 
or his mere presence becomes a secondary reinforcer eliciting L~itative 
behaviour in the observer. However, as already discussed, although social 
learning theory agrees with the reinforcement theorists' viewpoint that 
performance (or overt imitative response) is influenced directly or 
indirectly by reinforcement contingencies (which may be immediate or 
anticipated), there is disagreement bet"een the two theories on the role 
of contingent reinforcement in acquisition. Social learning theory sees 
contingent reinforcement only in a directive role in that it merely 
heightens the observer's attention to those features of the modelled act 
that have a high probability of leading to re"ards. 'Affective 
theorists such as Mowrer (1'960) and Aronfreed (1968) differ from the 
contingent reinforcement theorists in this respect. They tend to regard 
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the secondary reinforcement potential of the affective relationship 
between the observer and the model as the most influential factor in 
imitation. 
Of all the modern theories of imitation, competence theories seem to 
hold the most contradictory view on the reinforcement issue. Evidence 
provided by such investigators as Butler (1958), Kohlberg (1969) and 
Bruner (1972) all suggest that a substantial part of imitation is due 
to intrinsic motivation. Competence theorists argue that it is naive 
to try to offer external reinforcement principle as a be-all-and~end-all 
explanation for all types of imitative behaviour, or for imitation in 
all kinds of organisms. In other words, the importance of reinforcement 
" in imitative behaviour will vary from one individual to another, and 
even for the same individual, from one activity to another. 
(a) Affective ModeL-Observer'ReZationship 
Affective theories regard the emotional relationship between the model 
and the observer as of paramount importance for the occurrence of 
imitation. As previously mentioned, Mowrer (1960) advanced a general 
theory in which affect mediates imitative learning. And following 
Mowrer, Aronfreed (1969) has suggested that responses which have 
positive emotional value for the observer are more likely to be imitated. 
This theory has stimulated various research (e,_g. Aronfreed, 1968; 
Baron, 1970; Fouts,1975; Thelen et al, 1975). Such studies have 
generally reported, for instance, that observer's attraction for the 
model tended to increase imitation, and also that similarity between 
the model and the observer led to an increase in imitation. In a study 
based on Byrne's (1971) theory of attraction, Thelen et al (1975) 
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reported that adult confederates who imitated the subjects (children) 
were preferred (by the subjects) over their non-imitating counterparts. 
In other words, being imitated increased attraction towards the imitator. 
They also reported that being imitated resulted in reciprocal imitation. 
Such effects have also been found in adult subjects. A number of 
similar studies support these findings (e .• g. Bates, 19751 Thelen et al, 
1976, 1977, Kauffman et al, 19781 Roberts et al, 1981). 
The basic concept underlying affective theories is the psychoanalytic 
concept of 'identification'. This concept implies the existence of a 
special form of imitation rooted in significant others in the life of 
the imitator (child). However, some theorists have argued that imitation 
and identification, like Bandura'S"'"acquisition-performance distinction, 
be separated. Parsons (1951) and Kohlberg (1963) claim that different 
motives govern imitation and identification. They define imitation as 
isolated and dl.stinctive units of matching responses, and identification 
as the internalisation of model's actions or attitudes. Thus, these 
theorists consider imitation as instrumental, as governed by extrinsic 
motives, and identification as influenced by intrinsic motives. 
Affective theories of imitation are difficult to refute. or support 
wholly on empirical grounds because of the many variables that can 
interact with affect and imitation. As Bandura (1969) has argued, there 
are many methodological flaws in many of the identification studies. For 
instance, degrees of parent-child similarity have widely been employed, 
even though such responses are notoriously susceptible to biases and 
therefore may seriously lack validity in descriptions of actual behaviour. 
Bandura further rai'ses the objection that the actual parental child 
rearing behaviour is seldom directly assessed, rather it is often inferred 
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from retrospective reports or questtonnaires. Another serious impli-
cation for affective theory as far as human imitative behaviour is 
concerned is to do with the fact that some investigators have reported 
identification with the aggressor (Bettelheim, 1943; Hetherington, 
1967; Howitt & Cumberbatch,1975). Such mixed findings indicate a need 
for a closer look at the model-observer relationship. 
(d) The AOquisition-Performance Distinotion 
Theories of imitati'on 'vary substantially with regard to their stand on 
the significance of the distinction between acquisition and performance. 
Bandura considers such a distinction as crucial to our understanding of 
"-
imitation. In contrast, other theorists consider this distinction as 
unnecessary· (e.g. Gewirtz & Stingle, 1968; Kuhn, 1973). The importance 
of the distinction for Bandura lies in the fact that according to him 
different sets of variables govern acquisition ar.d performance, "the 
acquisition of imitative responses ••• appears to be accounted for more 
adequately by a contiguity theory of observational learning; the 
perfo~~ce of modelled responses~ on the other hand, is more under the 
influence of reinforcement contingencies" (Bandura, 1971a, p. l14). 
The major objection to cognitive mediational variables as basis for the 
distinction between acquisition and performance comes largely from 
ope rant theorists. For instan~e, Gewirtz & Stingle (1968) claim that 
acquisition, as described by Bandura, is an unobservable phenomenon, and 
that it can be more satisfactorily accounted for by reference to 
reinforcement principles. Another objection, from the Piagetian 
school, is that acquisition· is essentially the interiorisation of 
modelled responses (Kuhn, 1973) thus both acquisition and performance are 
. part and parcel of the accommodation process. 
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Theoretically useful as these criticisms may be, it is important to 
appreciate the distinction suggested by Bandura. The historical 
significance of this goes back to 1948 when Tolman (1948, 1949) proposed 
such a distinction between learning and overt behaviour. His main 
proposi.tion was that organisms (human and otherwise) form 'cognitive 
maps' (or cognitive representation) and that sign learning (or 
perceptual learning) is essentially different from place learning. 
Similarly, the social learning proposition that learning may occur simply 
through close temporal association of events is an echo of Guthrie's 
(1952, 1959) 'contiguity learning theory'. Again, historically~· the 
social learning viewpoint places special emphasis on perceptual contiguity 
(or attention) in imitative learning, and so is not very different from 
the associative classical conditioning theories discussed above. 
Another of Bandura's major contributions towards our understanding of 
imitation is, like Tolman, his demonstration that direct reinforcement 
is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the acquisition of 
modelled responses, as reinforcement theorists would have us believe, 
even though it may be an influential factor in determining whether or 
not the observer will perform the learned act. This observation, 
vicarious learning, helps towards further understanding of how novel 
responses come to be acquired than reinforcement theories do. For 
instance, in the ope rant condi~ioning framework, reinforcement is 
contingent upon the person perf5'rming the response in the first place. 
Thus the person does not get reinforced for a particular response if 
he does not already possess the response in his behaviour repertoire. 
Furthermore, by bringing such factors as attention and motivation into 
the consideration of the mechanisms of imitation, Bandura has portrayed 
the observer as an active and selectively perceptual organism, as 
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opposed to a passive one. A further contribution by Bandura is the 
notion that not only motor responses, but also emotions can be learned 
through the process of imitation - vicariously (Bandura, 1965). 
1. 10 SUMMARY 
A number of theories of imitation and their relative merits have been 
discussed. Despite the dive,rgent views each attempts to present, they 
all share at least two common elements. First of all, they all attempt 
to explain imitatio'n as' a psychological phenomenon. Secondly, and more 
importantly, they all explicitly or implicitly describe imitation as a 
behaviour faci1itator, as mentioned earlier. And with regard to the 
influence of reinforcement, all the theories, perhaps with the exception 
of social learning theory, seem to regard imitation not only as a means 
of obtaining rewards by the observer, ,but also as being reinforcing in 
itself for both the model and the observer irrespective of the behaviour 
concerned. Cognitive involvement, not in one's ability to imitate, but 
rather in imitative behaviour itself, is also not given any prominence 
in these theories (social learning. theory, again, being the only 
exception). And finally, all the theories examined above assume that 
for the effects of imitation to occur, at least t\10 individuals - a model 
and an observer - are required. As Flanders (1968) in his revie~l of 
research on imitative behaviour has noted: " ••• the study of imitative 
behaviour is concerned with causal relationships between M's behaviour 
(or alleged behaviour) and O's behaviour" (p. 316). However, recent 
developments in imitation research guided by social learning theory 
(model1ina) indicate that tilis is not always necessary. 
, . 
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1.11 SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IMITATION 
Imitation studies have largely concentrated on the modelling of certain 
types of behaviour to be copied or learned by the observer: However, 
it is equally. possible to use the imitation of the subject's own 
behaviour by a model to change or modify the subject's behaviour. In 
recent years, some investigators have concerned themselves with this 
aspect of modelling. namely the effects of being imitated on the 
subject's behaviour. 
, . 
(i) ModeUing 
"-
The concept of 'modelling' essentially develops from the tradition of 
imitation. Traditionally in modelling, in order to influence the 
behaviour of a person (an observer) it is necessary to have a second 
person acting as a model for the observer. The application of modelling 
techniques have been fairly wide and apparently successful. Apart from 
the studies mentioned already, Bandura and his associates, and other 
investigators, have employed these techniques in the modification of a 
wide range of behaviours such as dog-phobia, snake-phobia, aggressive 
behaviour, moral behaviour, delinquency, and so forth (e.g. Bandura & 
MoDonald, 1963; Bandura et al, 1967; Davis, 1979; Somervill et al, 
1981; Sarason & Sarason, 1981). 
Clearly modelling shows promise as a practical technique, but equally 
clearly it has the drawback of requiring a second party to act as a 
model. However, a wide range of techniques and their application have 
derived from Bandura and his associates' theory and research. These 
include such techniques (and concepts) as 'being imitated', 'self-
modelling' and 'self-imitation'. 
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(ii) Being Imitated 
'Being imitated' derives from Bandura's concept of modelling, and refers 
to a situation in which a-second person imitates the subject's behaviour, 
and this imitation is in turn observed by the subject. 
AS mentioned earlier, most theories of imitation-tend to assume, for 
instance, that parents themselves take an active role in unfolding the 
imitative potential in their children, and that they find their infants' 
imitation of their own responses gratifying. In other words, imitation 
is a big 'parent-child game'. Piaget (1962), for instance, has reported 
that one of the most effective means of eliciting imitative-behaviour 
from an infant is to imitate what the infant is doing. He has further 
observed that this usually precipitates an interaction in which the 
infant and the adult take turns, with increasing intensity, in imitating 
each other for their mutual gratifying experience. This is notYery 
dissimiliar from lIo1t' s (1931) 'circular' approach to imitation (p./C'J. 
In recent years, enough evidence has been gathered which seemS to 
demonstrate that both adults and children, in fact, derive satisfaction 
from mutual imitation (e.g. Bates, 1975; Fouts, 1972, 1975; The1en 
et a1, 1975, 1976; Roberts, 1978, 1980). Thelen et a1 
(1975), echoing Piaget (1962), reported: "being imitated increased the 
subject's attraction towards the person who imitated him and increased 
the subject's subsequent imitation of the person who imitated him" 
(p. 471). Baron (1970)., The1en et a1 (1976, 1977), Hallahan et a1 (1977) 
and Roberts et a1 (1981) in their studies with children have reported 
similar findings. However, these workers interpret their findings in 
terms of Byrne's (1961, 1971) attraction model, except for Hallahan et a1 
(1977) \'Iho interpret their findings in 1earnj.ng principle terms. 
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On the effects of being imitated on adults, Dates (1975), for instance, 
found that all the adult subjects involved in the study '~ere more 
favourably predisposed towards the children who imitated them than 
non-imitative children. Similarly, for infants, some investigators 
have found pleasurable emotional manifestations in them such as cooing, 
smiling, and so forth, as a consequence of being imitated (Piaget, 1962; 
Huagen & Mclntyre, 1972; 'McCall, 1975). Even though such recent 
studies have reported that infants as well as children increase their 
imitative responses following being imitated, as far back as 1930, 
Valentine observed 'that counter-imitation suppressed his infant's cry: 
" ••• through circular reaction, a whimpering which usually preceded 
tears. I imitated him just at the moment when the whimpering turned 
into crying. He stopped crying, and resumed the earlier sound" (p. 108).' 
Recent studies on the effects of being imit~ted constitute a shift of 
focus from traditional studies which focused solely on the effects of 
imitation on the observer. However, they suffer the same drawback as 
their traditional counterparts in that they tend to examine only the 
positive (or rewarding) aspects of imitation. Hence they tend to couch 
their explanations mainly in terms of reward or reinforcement principles. 
Also, like their predecessors, they tend to see the effects of imitation 
as arisi,ng mainly out of an interaction between a model and an observer. 
This presumed prerequisite (model-observer interaction), as already 
mentioned, is not always necessary for imitation to be effective; 
similarly, being imitated can, in certain circumstances, also have. 
negative (or unrewarding) effects on the imitated, as indicated by 
reports by such workers as Cullinan et al (1975); Kauffman et al (1975, 
1976, 1977); Fouts et al (1976) and Miller & Morris (1974). Such 
, 
unrewarding effects of imitation on the imitated warrant further 
investigations. 
-31-
(iiiJ Negative Effects of 'Being Imitated' 
If 'being imitated' can act as a positive reinforcement for certain 
types of behaviour and increase subsequent imitative behaviaur as we·ll 
as attractian between the imitatar and the imitated, it can equally be 
assumed that it will have the apposite effect in certain situations. 
There is some evidence that this, indeed, is the·case. Accarding to. 
the literature on imitatian, Valentine (1930) was the first writer to. 
report the 'inhibition' effect af being imitated. Regretably, he made 
this observation on one of his children (as an infant) but failed to. 
carry out a systematic study of this seemingly paradaxical effect af 
imitatian. 
systematic studies carried out recently by variaus investigatars have 
pravided evidence which indicates that 'being imitated' can in fact 
suppress or inhibit the behaviaur af the model - the person being 
imitated. Kauffman et al (1977) have reported that contingent imitatian 
of tangue protrusio.n suppressed tangue pratrusian in a mongol child. 
Similarly, Cullinan et al (1975) extendi.ng this field af research to. the 
educatianal field, have reported marked impravements in children's 
sp:elling, and have emphasised its implications far special educatian, 
that is the benefits af counter-imitation in educatian, especially in 
the training af educationally retarded children. The clinical application of 
this technique is exemplified by the case study described in the preface to 
this project. 
In terms of attraction, evidence exists that suggests that contrary to 
previous reports, and popular apinian, counter-imitation in certain 
circumstances can be negatively valenced by the person being imitated. 
Thelen & Kirkland (1976) have reparted that children who. were imitated 
by an older child manifested increased attractian towards the imitator, 
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but did not develop attraction towards younger imitators. Likewise, 
Fein (1973) has suggested that in classroom settings, children regard 
imitation as immoral' (as cheating). 
It appears, therefore, that the effects of imitation, either on the 
imitator or the imitated, depend heavily on the circumstances surrounding 
the act. The factors which determine whether the effects will be 
positive or negative for either of the parties concerned will include 
the valence of the act that is being performed, "imitator-imitated" 
characteristics, and the conditions in which the act takes place,. 
These reported paradoxical effects of imitation, to date, have not been 
, 
satisfactorily explained, at least as far as the present author is 
concerned. Namely, most of the investigators mentioned above have 
tended to interpret their findings in terms of reinforcement principles, 
that is, in terms of reward or punishment principles. They believe, for 
instance, that counter-imitation acts 'as a punishment or an aversive 
stimulus when it leads to extinction or suppression of the imitated 
behaviour (e,.g. Miller & Morris, 1974; Cullinan et al, 1975; Fouts, 
1976; Kauffman et al, 1975, 1976, 1977). In one's opinion, for such 
results to be adequately explained, the subject's cognitive factors 
have to be brought into the picture. For instance, for a subject to 
consider being imitated as aversive, the behaviour in question must 
first of all entail some negative emotional connotations 'for him. 
Nevertheless, following Kauffman et al's (1975) and Cullinan et al's 
(1975) suggestions, 'being imitated' and its derivative (self-modelling) 
have been employed as a therapeutic technique for the modification of 
undesirable behaviours. For 'instance, Davis (1979) has used 
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self-modelling in school settings to alter classroom disruptive 
behaviours. Similarly, Wheman (1976) has employed self-modelling in 
the training of self-help skills in mentally retarded adults. Such 
studies have yielded results which indicate that 'being imitated' or 
'self-modelling' possesses a therapeutic potential. However, these 
studies have largely been directive, that is they have included 
instructions on how the subject's behaviour might be modified or how 
to deal with similar situations in the future. Such experimental 
designs which confound the effects of imitation and instructions make 
the interpretation of these results problematic; namely, it is difficult 
to assess whether the effects were due to counter-imitation (or self-
modelling) or to the instructions given, or indeed a combination of 
, " 
both. If the effects are due to a combination of both, quantifying 
the relative contribution of each becomes even more problematic. 
Apart from these obvious methodological flaws inherent in these studies, 
their findings have not been theoretically adequately explained. As 
already mentioned, these findings have, generally been explained in 
learning theory terms. Of cou:t:se ,it is very difficult to explain the 
inhibition or suppression of behaviour through being imitated unless ,it 
is accepted that there is a certain amount of cognitive involvement in 
the process. That is to say, there has to be some sort of positive 
or negative connotations attached to the behaviour in question in order 
to make it possible to explain either facilitation or inhibition of 
behaviour through being imitated (or modelling). Hence, it is essential 
to incorporate such cognitive factors in any discussion of the effects 
of modelling as well as counter-imitation. 'Self-imitation' or 'self-
modelling' incorporates such cognitive factors. Hence, it is being 
postulated that understanding the cognitive factors which mediate such 
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imitation processes as 'modelling', 'self-modelling', 'self-imitation' 
and'counter-imitation' may lead to a better'understanding of the 
theoretical basis of these processes. 
(iv) SeZ[-ModeZZing 
'Self-modelling' refers to any modelling situation in which the subject 
serves in a dual capacity as a model and an observer; in other words, 
the subject serves both as a model and an observer of his own behaviour. 
In statistical terminology the independent variable is at the same time 
the dependent variable. 'Self-modelling' has been defined by Cre.er & 
Mick1ich (1970, 1977) as a modelling situation in which the subject 
, " 
engages in a behaviour while being video-taped and later on watches 
himself in that situation on video. However, the delay between the 
enactment of the behaviour and its feedback to the subject is not 
always necessary. In other words, the subject can observe his own 
behaviour directly by the use of mirrors, mirror-rooms, or simultaneously 
displayed through a video system. In such a situation, the subject 
observes his own behaviour as it actually happens - there is no time 
lapse between the execution and the observation of the behaviour. 
In this type of self-modelling (where the subject observes his/her own 
behaviour as it actually happens), unlike traditional modelling 
situations, the subject observes his own behaviour not as copied by a 
second party but directly. Clearly this self-modelling technique has 
a number of advantages over second-party self-modelling (being imitated) 
and traditional modelling. These include the fact that the modelled 
behaviour is a perfect representation of the subject's behaviour, the 
economic advantage of not requiring a second-party model, the adverse 
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model-observer characteristics are eliminated from the situation. 
However, the major advantage of this .form of self-modelling over both 
second-party self--modelling (being imitated) and self-modelling as 
defined by Creer and Micklich (1970, 1977) is that the observation (or 
feedback) is immediate, and it is difficult for the subject to deny 
that he had performed the modelled behaviour; Or to rationalise away 
his behaviour, if it happens to be undesirable, because of the immediacy 
of the feedback he receives. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL MODEL OF BEHAVIOUR CHANGE 
SUMMARY 
This chapter is concerned'with the cognitive processes which mediate 
imitation phenomena. Thus a cognitive theoretical model of behaviour, 
change has been proposed as an alternative to learning principle 
interpretations of 'the 'inhibitory as well as facilitatory effects of 
human imitation in general, and self-modelling in particular. The model 
proposes that for self-modelling, or indeed modelling, to have 
inhibitory effects on a person's behaviour, the behaviour in question 
must entail some negative emotional conn'!tations for the individual. . 
Hence, for such effects to be theoretically adequately explained, the 
involvement of cognitive factors has to, be seriously considered. The 
model proposes that some of the cognitive factors involved in the effects 
of modelli,ng (inhibitory or facilitatory) are the person's 'objective' 
awareness (or perception) of the behaviour in question and his/her 
subsequent evaluation of that behaviour. To the extent that the 
behaviour deviates from the person's 'ideal' behaviour or 'self' or 
standard, and to the extent that the person is aware of the mismatch 
between his/her 'ideal' behaviour and his/her actual behaviour, the 
model further proposes that s/he will evaluate the behaviour in a 
negatively affective manner.' The model also assumes that such a 
negative evaluation often gives rise to psychological discomfort with 
the consequence that the person will try to reduce this discomfort, 
in appropriate circumstances, by altering the behaviour concerned. This 
model has implications for other theories and some of these are also 
briefly examined. 
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2.1 nlTRoDucrION 
In an attempt towards a better understanding of the mechanisms which 
mediate the effects of imitation on the model (the person being imitated) 
an exploratory model has been formulated concerned with the individual's 
cognitive processes". -That is, the model relates to the individual's 
awareness of his behaviour and/or its consequences and his cognitions 
(or evaluation) of that behaviour and/or its consequences. The basic 
assumption of the model is that an individual's awareness of his 
behaviour (and/or its consequences) and his subsequent evaluation of the 
behaviour (and/or its consequences), which may be positive or negative, 
will determine the direction of that behaviour in later sltuations. In 
the rest of this chapter an attempt will be made to explain how such 
cognitive processes mediate the effects of modelling in general, and 
self-modelling in particular. 
2.2 THE MODEL 
The model proposes that in order. for self-modelling to be effective in 
mOdifying a person's behaviour the person must be 'objectively' aware of 
the existence of inconsistency between the cognitive elements involved, 
and he must further evaluate either the behaviour or himself. (or indeed 
both) in terms of his 'ideal' self or behaviour. The model bears a close 
resemblance to any other theory of cognitive activity. However, an 
emphasis is placed on the 'objective' awareness of an imbalance between 
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t~e person's cognitions. The significance of this emphasis is that the 
model assumes that such awareness serves as a feedback system which 
motivates the person to evaluate his cognitions and to alter or modify 
one or other of the elements that are in a dissonant relation (to 
use Festinger's, 195~ terminology), for instance, his behaviour or his 
attitude towards that behaviour, to align with his 'internal represen-
tation' of his 'ideal self' or 'ideal behaviour'. Viewed in this light, 
a person's 'objective' awareness of himself or his behaviour and his 
evaluation of one or the other (or both) must take a prominent place 
in an explanation of behaviour change. 
A Schematic Representation of COgnitive-BehaviouraL 
ModeL of Behaviour Change 
THE 
INDIVIDUAL ... BEIlAVIOUR 
i.e. the human + e.g. over-
'0' eating 
.... AWARENESS EVALUATION 
.... (COGNITIONS) .... BEIlAVIOUR 
+' 
+ i.e. 'objec- + i.e. the 
tive' aware- affective 
+ i.e. a change/ 
no change in 
behaviour 
resulting of 
ness or 
perception 
onels own 
behaviour 
(and/or its 
consequences, 
e.g. obesity) 
via e,.g. 
exposure to 
the behaviour/ 
and or its 
consequences. 
consequences 
- positive 
or negative -
of onels 
behaviour 
and/or its 
consequences 
for onself. 
from one's 
evaluation of 
one's behaviour 
or oneself. 
This cognitive model of behaviour change takes the individual and his 
behaviour as the starting point in the analysis of behaviour change. 
This is in contrast to traditional behaviouristic (or behavioural) 
approach which would take the" stimulus rather than the subjects' response 
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as its point of reference (e.g. Skinner, 1953; Ferster & Skinner, 
1957) or the traditional psychoanalytic approach which would take the 
underlying personality defects in the individual as its frame of 
reference (e.g. Freud, 1929; Horney,1945; Stein, 1961). According 
to the present theoretical model, the individual must first act, he 
must engage in a certain behaviour. The individual having acted, the 
next concern is whether the behaviour correspond~ to his 'ideal' 
behaviour; that is if he perceives his behaviour as objectively as 
others perceive it. It is assumed here·that an individual's 'ideal' 
behaviour or 'ideaL self' corresponds to the 'ideal' as defined by 
society or his social milieu which is accepted by him. ' Obj ecti ve ' 
awareness ('objective' perception) of one's own behaviour and/or its 
"-
consequences may be facilitated by exposing one to onself or to one's 
own ongoing behaviour. This may.be achieved, for instance, by placing 
the person in front of a large mirror, by imitating his behaviour 
contingently or by showing him a video recording of himself actually 
engaging in that behaviour, or by verbally pointing out to him that he 
behaves or is behaving in a certain manner. 
The model further assumes that objective awareness of one's behaviour 
(and/or its consequences) often serves as a motivating factor which 
causes the person to evaluate himself as well as his behaviour. HOI.ever, 
this assumption may not apply in the case of a well established skill 
such as typing. Whether the person modifies his behaviour or not will 
be determined by the nature of the evaluation he makes of himself or the 
behaviour concerned. It is assumed that if the person evaluates his 
behaviour in negative terms, he will experience negative affect or 
dissonance as a consequence of the existence of inconsistency between 
the behaviour and his cognition or conception of himself. Thus, just 
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as by -dissonance theory (Festinger,- 1957), this model predicts that if 
the environmental constraints should preclude the person from avoiding 
or escaping from the situation, one would expect him to change or modify 
his behaviour to accord with his self-concept or 'ideal self' in order 
to reduce or minimise the experienced subjective discomfort. In contrast, 
however, if the person should evaluate his behaviour and/or its 
consequences positively, that is, if he should perceive his behaviour 
as being consistent with his 'personal cognition' (i.e. his self-concept) 
then, by the same token, one should expect the behaviour to remain 
unchanged. In certain circumstances, such as the learning of a new 
skill, he may .. in fact increase the incidence of that bphaviour. This is 
particularly true of professional impressionists who spend a large amount 
" 
of time in front of mirrors perfecting their acts. Thus in the case of 
modelling, this model would postulate that whether or not a person 
alters his behaviour as a result of 'being imitated' will be a function 
of his evaluation, positive or negative, of that behaviour and the 
circumstances under which it takes place. 
ImpliCit in this theoretical model is the fact that, if the person 
attempts to modify or change his behaviour as a result of his awareness 
of it and/or its consequences, subsequent exposure to or awareness of 
L~at behaviour (or the change) will further facilitate the modification 
of the behaviour concerned. This is possible because of the feedback 
nature of the awareness or exposure. In this respect, cognitive-
behavioural model of behaviour change may also be vielred not only as a 
feedback system but also as a "cyclic" model of behaviour change. The 
'feedback' or 'cyclic' nature of the model is well illustrated in the 
schematic representation outlined above. For instance, let us take an 
hypothetical individual (femaie) who is a compulsive eater. Let us 
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further assume that for some reason, for instance on viewing herself 
in the nude in front of a full-length mirror, she sees all the girth 
around every part of her body - she has become 'objectively' aware that 
she is 'fat': Now, for confirmation or disconfirmation of her fatness, 
she jumps onto a scale; to her horror, the scale tells her that she is 
not fat, but rather grossly obese (or overweight). She accepts this 
fact and without consulting her family doctor, sl)e attributes her 
obesity to her gluttony. The process does not stop there. Her cognitive 
mechanisms are set in motion. She goes on to weigh the social as well 
as the medical pros .against the cons of obesity. To be brief, our 
hypothetical obese female views obesity not only as a social stigma, 
but also as (medically) dangerous to her health. That is, she has 
" evaluated her behaviour (overeating) and its consequences (obesity). 
negatively. Consequently, she takes a positive decision to reduce het 
weight to an acceptable (social or medical) standard and starts eating 
not only reasonable amounts of food (in. terms of calories) but also 
health foods. Within a few months, this woman has achieved her goal 
(desired body weight) and has already begun to enjoy both the physical 
and social benefits of not being c:ven,eight or obese; for example, she 
has now become more physically and socially active and is also receiving 
more attention from the opposite sex. 
The feedback (or ~cyclic') potential of the model resides in the fact 
that now our hypothetical subject feels proud of herself every time 
she views her body either in the nude or in fashionable clothes. In 
other words, she evaluates the change and consequences of her behaviour 
(not overeating and being fashionable) positively. Hence she should be 
expected to view herself more often the nearer she is to. her goal. 
Another consequence of this pbsitive evaluation of the change in her 
42 
behavieur, as the medel weuld predict, is that .our subject will possess 
a mental picture .of her .obese state and will net want te see herself 
like that (a 'fatty') again. Thus, she will strive te maintain her 
weight less.· She can achieve this net .only by reducing her calerie 
intake, but alse by expending ene.rgy, fer instance by taking up 
physical exercises, er indeed by a cembinatien .of beth. Our subject's 
awareness and herpesitive evaluatien .of the change in her·behavieur 
and its censequences, as we can see, in turn metivate her to·strive 
fer a greater change in the desired directien er at least to maintain 
the change (welght 'less) already achieved, as the case may be. In 
ether werds, .our subject's ublquitieus mental picture .of her .old body 
image (a 'fatty') and her new bedy image (' slim' ), as the medel weuld 
predict, sheuld beth serve as metivating facters influencing her efferts 
at weight reductien er te maintain her weight less. The prefassional 
impressienist uses· the same kind .of mental picture, acquired threugh 
rehearsals in frent .of a mirrer er by means .of a videe system, te 
impersenate his/her medel(s) en stage. 
(iJ 'Objeative Awareness' 
The cencept, '.objective awareness' implies the existence .of at least 
twe ferms .of awareness; these are: 'objective awareness' and 'subject-
ive awareness'. Thus when a persen is net '.objectively aware' .of his 
behavieur and/er its censequences, he is perceiving it and/er its 
censequences in a subjective manner. 
In this framewerk .of ccgnitive-behavieu:r:al change, the distinctien 
between '.objective awareness' and 'subjective awareness' .of .one's .own 
behavieur is net just the mean'1ng imputed te the behavieur, but 'rather 
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the actual perception (visual or auditory) of the behaviour concerned. 
'Objective awareness' of an act is the act as physically perceived (or 
seen or heard) by an observer or a number of observers. In contrast, 
'subjective awareness' (or perception) of an act is the act as perceived 
by the actor. In some instances, both the actor and the observer(s) 
perceive the act in the same light; for example, a handshake, or when 
a person is running to catch a train because he is late. In such 
cases, the perception or a\~areness of one's own act is 'objective' 
because there is an agreement between the parties concerned - the 
actor and the observer(s). Thus objective awareness is both physical 
and consensual (this will be clarified later). 
"-
However in other instances, the actor is unable to perceive his own 
act (e .• g. visually) and the only perception of his action is of a 
proprioceptive nature. For instance, when a person blinks his eyes the 
observer(s) can see the person's eyelids actually shut and open, but 
the person himself obtains this knowledge through the proprioceptive 
feedback he obtains from his eyes and face muscles. Other such 
instances include speech perception, overlearned behaviours (or habits) 
and mannerisms, for example cIgarette smoking, a tic, or tongue 
protrusion. Ta the heavy cigarette smoker, smoking is just an automatic 
response: he does not see his hands oscillating up and down between 
his mouth and the torso, or his lips pursing against the cigarette, 
neither does he see the cigarette smoke being exhaled out of his nostrils 
as the non-smoker observer:.does; the .heavy smoker perceives all these 
actions only proprioceptively. In any of these instances, the actor's 
perception or awareness of his behaviour or act is of a subjective 
nature, it does not correspond to the observer's perception (or. 
awareness) of the same behaviour. 
As mentioned earlier, conditions that generate objective perception of 
a person's own behaviour are nothing more than stimuli that draw tile 
person's attention to himself or his behaviour; that is, situations 
which provide the person with objective evidence of his behaviour.. In 
this respect, objective awareness may be described as a heightened state 
of awareness. The conditions that give rise to this form of awareness 
can be personal or impersonal. Personal conditions are situations in 
which other people serve as a source of objective perception. For 
example, another person can point out the actor's behaviour to him or 
may serve contingently· as a model for the actor's own behaviour ·(as in 
'being imitated' paradigms). Impersonal conditions that lead to 
objective perception of one's own behaviour include looking in a large 
mirror, hearing one's own tape-recorded voice, or watching a video-
recorded film of oneself or one's behaviour. Any setting where a 
manifestation or'· reflection of the person or his behaviour is external 
to himself and can be (objectively) perceived by him is likely to lead 
to Objective awareness. 
(ii) Objective AWareness (Perception) and Behavio~ 
The motivational consequences of objective awareness of one's behaviour, 
like the motivational consequences of cognitive dissonance, depend upon 
the postulate that a person's awareness of inconsistency between his 
actual 'self' or behaviour and his 'ideal' self or behaviour mobilises 
his c.ognitive mechanisms towards the re-establishment of consistency. 
Namely, awareness of the existence of such inconsistency leads the 
person to evaluate himself or his behaviour. Thus the motivational 
consequences of awareness of the existence of inconsistency between a 
person's 'ideal' self or 'ideal' behaviour and his actual self or 
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behaviour, according to cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change, 
will depend largely upon the person's evaluation (or cognitions) of the 
behaviour in question or himself (or in fact both). If the person 
evaluates t.'1e behaviour in negative terms, the model would hypothesise 
that the individual will experience negative affect and will try to 
change or modify that behaviour, thereby avoiding or minimising the 
negative affect, provided that the appropriate conditions are met: 
(1) the person is 'objectively' aware of the inconsistency between his 
'ideal' and actual behaviour; .(2) the mismatch is of an already 
motivated state of affairs. '" 
According to the theoretical propositions advanced here, just as 
". 
, cogni ti ve dissonance' propositions, there are two ~Iays in which a 
person may avoid or reduce the psychological discomfort arising out of a 
negative evaluation of oneself or one's behaviour (or two dissonant 
cognitions). Firstly, when the mismatch is of an already motivated 
state of affairs the person may accomplish this by reducing the mismatch. 
However, since a person's 'ideal' (i.e~ his 'ideal' self or behaviour) 
is a relatively static element, reducing the inconsistency would, of 
necessity, entail the person's modification of his actual behaviour •. 
Hence, cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change would predict 
that an individual who is, or has been made, objectively aware of his 
behaviour which deviates from his 'ideal' behaviour.would be 
motivated or forced to alter the behaviour concerned to accord with 
his 'ideal' behaviour. Secondly, an equally feasible method for 
reducing the discomfort is that not only must there exist inconsistency 
between 'ideal' and 'actual' behaviour, but also, and equally' 
importantly, the l.nconsistency must be negatively (or 'positively) 
evaluated, otherwise no impelling motivational forces will arise out 
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of the inconsistency, despite the fact that inconsistency might exist. 
Consequently, if subjective discomfort ensues as a result of a negative 
evaluation of the inconsistency, and if the former mode of reducing the 
discomfort is not feasible, the person might avoid the stimulus or the 
situation which generates objective awareness of the behaviour concerned. 
and/or its consequences. A positively valued inconsistency, on the 
other hand, is likely to facilitate the behaviour. 
Thus, taking our hypothetical 'fat' woman as an example, inconsistency 
existed between her actual physical state (being obese) and her ·'ideal' 
physical state (a 'shapely figure'). The inconsistency was made salient by 
her objective awareness of her physical state - looking at herself in the nude j 
'. 
a full-length mirror and weighing herself. She was motivated to reduce 
her weight because she negatively evaluated the inconsistency or mismatch 
between the two cognitions - being overweight and having a desire for 
a slim figure. Our hypothetical subject chose to reduce her weight in 
order to avoid the subjective discomfort generated by the mismatch. 
However, according the model, just as dissonance theory would predict, 
she could have achieved the same end ~ reduction of subjective discomfort 
- by avoiding the situations which gave rise to the discomfort. In this 
particular case, she could avoid both mirrors and scales in future, or 
people who are likely to make her objectively aware of her obesity. 
However, if she is placed in a situation where reducing subjective 
discomfort by means of avoidance of the stimuli or escape from the 
situation is impossible, then the only option left is a change in 
behaviour. Having opted 'for a change in behaviour, and having achieved 
her 'ideal' physical state (slim figure) as a consequence, this same 
individual, according to the propositions of the model, is more likely 
to expose herself to these very situaticns for further motivation to· 
strive for, or to maintain, her 'ideal' state. 
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(iii) Evaluation 
Cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change proposes that if, and 
when, an individual perceives his own behaviour objectively, he will 
not merely react to it impartially or in a neutral manner, but rather 
his cognitive mechanisms pertinent to the behaviour will be 'set in 
motion; namely, he will come to evaluate the behaviour and/or its 
consequences, and that the motivational consequences of the evaluation 
will be determined by the affective direction of the evaluation -
positive or negative - which in turn will be a function of the importance 
of the behaviour. The findings of studies to be reported indicate that 
this is often the case. The notion of evaluation, as used in this 
" 
framework, is assumed on the basis of the existence of a psychological 
system or 'internal representation" (an 'ideal') which is purported to 
be possessed by each human being who is in contact >lith reality. 
(iv) The 'Ideal.' 
This concept has so far loomed pretty' large in this discussion, and 
hence warrants some elaboration.' In this cognitive-behavioural change 
framework, the concept 'ideal' is defined as a 'cognitive map (or 
picture)' or 'mental representation' of what constitutes or is believed 
by the person to be correct or acceptable behaviour, attitudes, 
opinions, beliefs, personal characreristics, and so forth. For 
instance, an 'ideal' social behaviour would meet such social requirements 
as appropriate ways of comporting oneself in a mixed company, a palatable 
dinner table conversation with the local priest or vicar, and protocol 
at, for example, a fWleral. In brief, an 'ideal' social behavfour is 
behaviour guided by internalised social norms. In the case of 
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personal characteristics or traits, the average socialised individual 
would possess certain mental representations of ideal personality 
characteristics such as intelligence, sociability, generOSity,· 
thoughtfulness, morality,· and so forth. All such charar.teristics or 
behaviours considered together constitute what an 'ideal' person or 
an 'ideal' behaviour is •. 
Thus, a person uses his 'ideal' as a standard by which he evaluates his 
behaviour and/or its consequences. However, the evaluation may be made 
along a number of possible social or ideological dimensions. For 
instance, a person who regards himself as religious and God-fearing 
will evaluate his behaviour, in the presence of his local priest or 
vicar, according to the disparity between his actual behaviour and the 
behaviour he aspires to as a good Christian (his 'ideal' Christian). 
According to inconsistency theories, for example dissonance theory as 
postulated by Festinger (1957), the greater the disparity between a 
person's 'ideal' and actual behaviour (for instance, if our christian 
friend should use an obscene language in the presence of his priest) the 
more negative his evaluation of his behaviour will be, and hence, the 
greater the dissonance experienced, and consequently the greater the 
efforts to reduce dissonance. However, from cognitive-behavioural change 
viewpoint, there is no reason why a smaller gap between a person's 
'ideal' and his 'actual' should not be the most motivating. Thus, we 
should expect our hypothetical subject (obese woman) to strive harder to 
lose half a stone difference between her actual weight and 'ideal' 
we.ight in order to achieve her goal than, for instance, her initial 
ten stone difference between her actual weight of twenty stone and her-
ideal we.ight of, say, ten stone. This is equivalent to the 'goal 
gradient' phenomenon demonstr~ted by Hull (1934). However, the-precise 
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shape of a graph linking inconsistency and motivation would require 
careful researching. 
(v) Souraes of the 'IdeaL' 
The sources of a person's 'ideal' (i.e. 'ideal' self or behaviour) 
include his own personal judgements about his physical environment 
founded upon his perceptual processes and, more importantly, through 
the process of socialisation. As many theorists of the 'self concept' 
claim, a person acquires his 'ideal' behaviour or 'self' from the .. 
standards of those around him. The standards or 'ideals' of others 
often define, to a large extent, what an 'ideal' person (or behaviour) 
ought to be. 
Mead (1934) holds the view that a person develops the concept of 'self' 
by taking the point of view of another person, thereby leaving himself 
experientially and viewing himself (or his own 'self') as though it were 
an object. Thus the 'self' is seen in terms of cognition or knowledge 
gained through the process of sel~-examination or introspection from the 
point of view of another person(s). This is not very different from the 
evaluation process proposed by cognitive-behavioural change model 
described above. This notion of knowledge gained through the point of 
view of another person(s) as proposed by Mead is also similar to Piaget's 
(1954) concept of 'perspective ability' - that is, the· child's ability 
to step out of his '.egocentric' world and take the point of view of 
another person. The similarity between the above three frameworks,; is 
the fact that they all regard social interaction as the basis upon which 
a person's 'self concept' - 'ideal' or standards - is founded. 
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However, of all the theories of the 'self' as the yardstick with which 
a person judges, and,is judged by, others, Cooley's (1902) concept of 
the 'looking glass self' seems the most pertinent to 'cognitive-
behavioural model of behaviour change'. 'Cooley emphasized the 
importance of subjectively interpreted feedback from others as a major 
bank of data about the self (or one's 'ideal'). This means that one's 
'self concept' (or 'ideal') is significantly influenced by what the 
person believes others think of him. One of the major implications of 
Cooley's concept of 'the looking glass self' is that there is a close 
link between 'self awareness' and the subjective opinions of others 
about one. "As we see ••• our face, figure, . .. in the glass, and are 
••• pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer 
to what we should like them to be; so in imagination, we perceive in 
another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, 
character ••• and so on, and are variously affected by it. A self-idea 
of this ~ort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination 
of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgement 
of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or 
mortification ••• " (in Burns, 1979, p. 14). 
Both Cooley and Mead saw society as the birthplace for 'self' (or the 
'ideal'). Namely the 'ideal' of any individual develops as a result of 
his relations to the processes of social.activity and experience and to 
other individuals within those processes. In short, the source of a 
person's 'ideal' is to be found in his socialisation processes. 
The parallel between Cooley's 'looking glass' concept and cognitive-
behavioural model of behaviour change is quite obvious. A schematic 
representation of Cooley's concept may best illustrate the parallel. 
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A Schematic Representation of Cooley's 'Looking Glass' Concept 
OTHERS .... AWARENESS .... JUDGEMENT .... SELF2 
(Le. seeing (i.e. (i.e. pride 
onels 'self' imagined . or mortifi-
through judgement of cation, which 
others) 'self' by further 
others) influences 
the 'self' ) 
In the above representation of 'the looking glass' concept of the 'self', 
if we substitute SELF l for 'the individual' .and SELF2 for behaviour, the 
similarity between cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change and 
Cooley's theory of the 'self' becomes more striking. It is not far 
fetched to make these substitutions. After all, as many psychologists 
as well as sociologists would agree, it is difficult (if indeed possible) 
to divorce a person's 'self' from his behaviour. The most striking 
similarity between the two formulations lies in the fact that both 
emphasize the important role an individual's cognitive factors -
'awareness' and 'evaluation' (or judgement) - play in determining his 
behaviour or 'self'. Clearly, these two theoretical frameworks mirror 
each other, as it were. 
2.3 RELATED THEORIES 
(£) Introduction 
The 'cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change' is an attempt to 
explain a psychological phenomenon: imitation ('self-modelling'). 
However, since two or more theories may be (more) helpful in accounting 
for the same psychological event, as pointed out by Kaufmann (1973), 
this theoretical model (cognitive-behavioural model) will be related to 
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other theories which may be considered as capable of explaining the 
experimental data that have been gathered under the guidelines of the 
present model. Such theories include: (1) cognitive dissonance theory, 
(2) social comparison theory, (3) attribution theory, the ',interna1-
external' locus of control notion, 
(5) objective self-awareness theory. 
(4) self-perception theory. and 
(ii) Cognitive-BehaviouraL Change and Cognitive Consistency Theories 
The present formulation of cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour 
change may appear to be yet another off-shoot or conglomeration ~~ 
balance theories or a derivation of the propositions put forward by such 
theorists as Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955), Festinger (1954; 1957), and 
Heider (1958). There appears to be a consensus among consistency 
theorists on the nature or definition of cognitive inconsistency. Broadly 
speaking, according to these theories cognitive imbalance is characterised 
by a 'logical' inconsistency, or a contradiction between at least two 
cognitions or elements of cognition. However, there may be' some 
circlUnstances in which inconsistency or 'cognitive disequilibrium' is 
not conspicuously illogical. This apparent paradox arises simply 
because the underlying elements of the inconsistency are latent, that 
is, they have not been properly identified. Thus the present model 
r,egards the 'awareness' rather than the 'logic' of inconsistency as 
the crucial factor in determining a person's efforts at balance 
restoration. 
The cognitive-behavioural model presented here differs somehow from the 
typical cognitive imbalance framework in other ways. The model assumes 
that for cognitive inconsistency to occur, at least two theoretical 
prerequisites need to be fulfilled: firstly the person must perceive 
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his own behaviour as objectively as possible; and, secondly, the 
behaviour must deviate from his 'ideal' behaviour (or a socially 'ideal' 
behaviour accepted by him). It is the assumption of the model that 
awareness of such a deviation will consequently invoke the individual's 
cognitions (or self-evaluation) pertaining to his actual behaviour. 
The ways in which these two requirements may be met have already been 
examined in our discussion of the model. 
However, .one of the majer differences between censistency theeries and 
cognitive behavioural change ls that in neither .of the censistericy , " 
propesitiensis it stated that the individual's '.objective awareness' 
(or .objective perception) of his behaviour plays a causal rele in the 
" 
mabilisation .of his cognitive mechanisms pertinent ta the behaviaur 
(i.e. his evaluatien .of his behaviaur) tewards behavieur change. In 
contrast, cognitive-behaviaural model stipulates that 'cognitive 
equilibrium restoratien' via behaviour 'change becemes pcssible only when 
the motivatianal mechanisms - .objective perceptian of the individual'(3 
own behaviaur and its cencamitant evaluatian - are created. With this 
distinctian, we shauld be able to,cansider mere closely the theoretical 
p:.::apasitiens of behaviour change threugq '.objective awareness' of one's 
behavieur in relation te .one specific consistency theery: "a theery .of 
cognitive dissenance" (Fe stinger , ,1957) • 
CUi) COgriitive-BehaviouraZ Change vs. Dissonanae Theory 
Festinger (1957) has pointed out that: " cognitiens that represent 
knawledge of a persen's own actiens are, in a sense, the easiest kinds 
.of cognitive elements te change since this can be accemplished by 
merely changing the behavieur involved... Consequently, it is clea:.:: 
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that one would expect appropriate modifi.cation of behaviours to be a 
frequent reaction to the existence of· dissonance" (p. 276). Thus, in 
accordance with Festinger's suggestion, cognitive-behavioural model of 
behaviour change would predict a change in behaviour in such circum-
stances provided that the necessary conditions (objective awareness 
and evaluation of the inconsistency) are met. In this respect, the 
present model bears a close relationship with dissonance theory, that 
is as far as Festinger's suggestion and the prediction based on it are 
concerned. 
It would not be unfair to dissonance investigators, and consistency 
theorists in general, to say that they have been unreasonably preoccupied 
" 
with such characteristics of their subjects as their attitudes, opinions, 
and beliefs to the almost complete exclusion of their behaviours. For 
instance, the history of dissonance research indicates that it is always 
a change in attitude, an opinion or balief that has moved towards 
dissonance reduction or consonance restoration. Subjects have been 
induced or asked to lie to others, misrepresenting what they actually 
perceived to be correct (e .• g. Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Carlsmith 
et aI, 1966); they have recorded or written contradictory statements. to 
their own (personal) convictions (e .• g. Cohen, 1959; Helmereich & Collins, 
1968; Sherman, 1970); they have been induced to endure consequences 
that are against their own value systems (e.g. Brehm, 1959; Yaryan & 
.Festinger, 1961); they have been induced to suffer or endure 
physiologically uncomfortable states or tension such as hunger, ·thirst; 
pain, or emotional states such as guilt resulting from the administration 
of electric shocks to others (e .• g. Brehm, 1962; Brock & Buss, 1962; 
Glass, 1964; Green, 1974). 
55 
. .", 
In all such studies, it is attitude that has been reported to move towards 
dissonance reduction or consonance restoration. These examples seem to 
suggest that behaviour does not change in the presence of dissonance or 
inconsistency. However, it is one's belief that behaviour change is 
simply not measured in such studles; and that behaviour, in the 
presence of dissonance or cognltive inconsistency, is just as amendable 
as attitudes, opinions or beliefs. After all,'Pestinger (1957) has 
again pointed out that the cognitive elements that will change when 
dissonance is aroused are those least resistant to change. It follows, 
therefore, that if dissonance is aroused in a situation in which 
behaviour becomes the least resistant to change of the elements involved, 
for instance in a 'self-modelling' situation in which conditions are 
" 
arranged such that not only can the subject not deny or rationalise the 
behaviour, but also cannot escape from the situation (as in the case of 
our hypothetical obese subject described earlier), it is behaviour that 
will obviously change. 'Self-modelling' studies conducted by the present 
author tend to support this view. These studies and their findings are 
detailed below. 
Whether one sees more similarities or dissimilarities than vice-versa 
between consistency theories, especially dissonance theory, and the 
cognitive-behavioural framework presented here will largely be determined 
by one's theoretical frame of reference. Nonetheless, within the 
present framework, there is an .explicit model of human being. Namely" 
for subjective discomfort to be experienced, and hence to be reduced, 
involves cognitive processes and reorganisation on the part of the 
afflicted individual. In this very respect, c,ognitive-behavioural model 
of behaviour change resembles any other theory of cognitive activity, 
including dissonance theory. 
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(iv) Cognitive-BehaviouraZ Change vs. SociaZ Comparison Theory 
'Cognitive-behavioural' change has implications for social comparison 
theory also. Nevertheless, since cognitive dissonance somehow derives 
from social comparison theory, and the former has been examined at some 
great length already, only a brief examination of the latter theory 
will be given here. 
The gist of social comparison theory, as formulated by Festinger (1954) 
is the assumption that humans have a basic drive to evaluate themselves 
- their opinions, abilities as well as their behaviours - against those 
of others. Festinger (1954) has further suggested that a person's 
cognitions - opinions, abilities or behaviour - are consistent with his 
self-evaluation only to the extent that others (or those around him) 
share those cognitions. Thus, social comparison theory concurs with the 
present model that a person's concept of what constitutes, say, a 
'correct' (or 'ideal') behaviour is determined by his social environment. 
This implies that the existence of inconsistency or dissonance between 
a person's cognitive elements is determined by social norms. However, it 
must be emphasized that this is true only insofar as at least one 
necessary condition is fulfilled: the person must accept or internalise 
those norms. This is achieved through a process of evaluation of one's 
abilities, opinions, behaviour, and so forth, with those of others. 
The apparent parallel between social comparison theory,and cognitive-
behavioural change model is the' notion of 'evaluation'.' The basic 
premise of both formulations is the assumption that a person constantly 
engages in a process of evaluation of himself as well as his behaviour; 
and that this evaluation is always against others' concepts or 
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expectations of the individual and his behaviour. These concepts (or 
expectations) are in turn, determined by a set of social rules· or norms 
(or 'ideals'). Thus, regarding behaviour change, both formulations 
would suggest that this is possible to the extent that the individual 
recognises and accepts that his behaviour contravenes the social norms 
governing that behaviour and others' expectations of him. 
The foregoing account of social comparison theory and cognitive-behavioural 
change framework suggests that the experience of dissonance (and its 
reduction) derives from a learning process which is lmiversal, as pointed 
out by Rosenberg (19G8). For instance, inconsistency between a person's 
overt behaviour and his private conviction, competence or interest, will 
often lead to social deprecation. Since social deprecation is a powerful 
negative reinforcer, one of the ultimate effects of frequent repetition 
of such behaviour is that the person alters his behaviour· (or an element 
of· his cognitions); failing this, he will acquire a conditioned avoidance 
orientation towards situations in which such inconsistencies or 
'dissonances' are likely to be encountered. Hence, his efforts to reduce 
such 'dissonances', whether by altering his behaviour or other of his 
cognitive elements, can be viewed as ultimately deriving from his need 
for social, approval. Both social comparison theory and the present 
model agree with self-concept theories (e .• g. Cooley, 1902, Mead, 1934, 
Burns, 1979) that people often acquire their 'ideal' self or behaviour 
from the standards of those aro)lIld them - their significant others. 
(v) COgnitive-Behavioural Change VB. Attribution Theory 
Unlike aforementioned consistency theories, for instance dissonance 
theory,cognitive-behavloural change formulation implies the concept 
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of 'causal attribution'. Thus in this part of the discussion, a 
comparison between causal attribution theory and cognitive-behavioural 
model of behaviour change will be made. 
Kelly (1967, 1973) has described 'attribution' as: .. . . . how people 
make causal explanations. • •• It deals with the information they use 
in making causal inferences, and what they do with this information to 
answer causal questions" (Kelly, 1973, p. 107). Since the theory of 
causal attribution deals also with 'self-perception' (Kelly, 1973) 
and the· present notion 'of behavioural change also deals >lith 'self-
observation' (observation of one's behaviour), it is perfectly legitimate 
to consider both t.ogether (albeit briefly). Both frameworks suggest 
that, for instance, in a case of behaviour change, attribution of 
causality of the change will be largely' determined by the direction or 
the person's perception or his focus of attention. This further·suggests 
that if the person focuses attention to. himself or his behaviour rather 
than the external environment, he is more likely to attribute the cause 
of the change in his behaviour to himself than to the external environ-
ment; on the other hand, if his attention is directed more towards the 
external environment, he will likewise be more likely to attribute this 
change in behaviour to some environmental .agent(s) rather than to 
himself, This suggestion forms one of the fundamental bases upon which 
cognitive-behavioural change is founded. Cognitive-behavioural change 
demands the manipulation of a person's awareness (towards his behaviour) 
in order to modify or alter his behaviour in the desired direction; any 
increase in the person's awareness to>lards his behaviour will tend to 
encourage him to attribute its causality to himself and this will 
contribute towards the achievement of this Objective. If we cast our 
minds back to our hypotheticaiobese subject, the relationship between 
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cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change and attribution theory 
becomes apparent. 
The obvious (salient) similarity between both Kelly's attribution theory 
and cognitive-behavioural change , as far as a change in behaviour is 
concerned, lies in the fact that both postulate that an individual's 
direction of awareness (or perception) or locus of attention is a 
principal determinant of his attribution of causality of a change in his 
behaviour. This leads on to a comparison between cognitive-behavioural 
change and Rotter's (1966) notion of 'locus of control' • 
. '
(vi) Cognitive-Behavioural Change VB. Internal-External ·Locus of Control 
Implied in the foregoing comparison between cognitive-behavioural 
change and causal attribution theory is a relationship between the 
former's formulation and Rotter's (1966) dichotomy between the type ·of 
control an individual possesses over his interaction with his environ-
ment, or more specifically, over his pursuit of rewards. 
To. give only an upshot of Rotter's formulation, Rotter believes that 
people can be dichotomised into two broad categories, ' internal' and 
'external' locus of control categories. An 'internal controller', in 
Rotter's conceptualisation, is a person who when, in the course of his 
interaction with his environment, his behaviour or action results in a 
reward, attributes the cause of the occurrence of the reward solely to 
himself; that is, he attributes rewards contingent upon his actions or 
behaviour to his behaviour or other of his characteristics, such as 
intelligence, sociability, and so forth. Such an individual has no, or 
, 
very little, belief in such concepts as luck, chance, or fate. In 
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contrast, the person who believes in 'external control' is more likely 
to attribute any reward contingent upon his behaviour or action to some 
external agent(s). Such a person is likely to place considerable weight 
in the concept of luck, chance, or fate. Rotter suggests that the type" 
of 'control' a person believes in is learned. 
Although, as can be seen," the 'internal'-'external' locus of control 
notion is couched in learning theory terms, it shares certain common 
properties with the cognitive-behavioural change formulation. If one 
makes the assumption: (a) that the kind of control a person possesses 
is never static, but rather varies with the environmental situation as 
well as the psychological state (or awareness) he is in; and (b) that 
" 
a person's state of awareness or attention likewise varies from one 
situation to another, and from one psychological state to another, the" 
'fit' between the two formulations becomes evident. In other words, 
in terms of attribution theory, whether. an individual attributes the 
results of his behaviour to himself or to some external agent will depend 
upon his focus of attention. Similarly, in terms of cognitive-behavioural 
change, as formulated here, whether or not a person attributes a change 
in his behaviour to himself is determined by the direction of his 
attention - whether his attention is on his behaviour or not, namely, 
whether he perceives his behaviour as objectively as others perceive it 
or not. 
Attribution theory would predict that if a person attributed the cause 
of his (undesirable) behaviour to himself, he would" be more likely to 
alter that behaviour himself than if he attributed its causality to the 
environment. The 'internal'-' external , notion would predict the same. 
From our discussion of cognitive-behavioural change model, it is obvious 
that the same hypothesis would be advanced by the present model. 
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An interesting correspondence between the 'internal'-' external , locus of 
control notion and the present framework lies in the fact that both 
acknowledge, implicitly or explicitly, that the ability to perceive 
oneself as the agent of one's own behaviour is learnable. However, 
while Rotter describes the acquisition of this ability in terms of 
external reinforcement principles, 'cognitive~behavioural change' would 
be inclined to describe it in terms of 'feedback ,. or 'self-reinforcement' 
principles. Whichever of these explanations one may choose, it must be 
recognised that both derive from 'learning theory'. To the extent that 
this ability is learnable, cognitive-behavioural change, apart from 
being similar to any theory of cognitive activity, in a way, is similar 
also to any theory of leanling, behaviourism being perhaps the only 
exception, even though such theorists as Homme (1965) would disagree 
with this exception. And;is far as methodological procedures are 
concerned, it is closely related to soci".l learning (modelling) procedures. 
(vii) A Comparison Between 'Cognitive-Behavioura~Change' and 
Se~f-Peraeption Theory 
The relationship between cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change 
and 'self-perception' theory deals also with attributional processes and 
their effects on subsequent behaviour. In 1965, Bern advanced a 'self 
perception' theory as an alternative interpretation of dissonance 
phenomena. His original formulation of the theory and its subsequent 
reformulations (Bern, 1967, 1978) suggest that the results obtained in 
dissonance studies are due to the judgemental self-observation abilities 
of the subjects rather than motivational components of dissonance theory. 
Bern's suggestion is not significantly different from attributional 
theories such as Kelly's .(1971, 1973). However, Bem has proposed that 
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such attributional processes are often performed by the individual on 
himself. An important theoretical basis of Bern's framework, albeit 
implicit, is the notion of responsibility. In this framework, it appears 
necessary for the creation of dissonance that the individual recognises 
some causal connection between himself and an inconsistent event. The 
source of the causal relationship is not essentially relevant;, the 
relationship may result from intention, personality characteristics or 
other components of the self. 
However, the assumption made by 'self perception' theory that is closely 
related to c~gnitive-behavioural change formulation is the circumstances 
under which behaviour. takes place and their effects on an individual's 
" 
subsequent behaviour., Specifically, self-perception theory, as 
propounded by Bern, assumes two situations in which behaviour is executed: 
(1) situations in which the behaviour is free of tangible external 
reinforcement contingencies, and (2) situations in \'Ihich the behaviour 
is perceived by the person to be under external control (or external 
reinforcement contingencies - rewards .or punishments). Thus for self-
perception theory, the person engaging in a behaviour by virtue of his 
judgemental self-observation abilities, becomes the 'actor' and the 
'observer' at the same time (self-observer). In other words, the person 
identifies the direction or consequences of his behaviour and also the 
circumstances under which the behaviour takes place. He then infers an 
attitude about the behaviour (i.e. he evaluates the behaviour) according 
to the controlling circumstances, that is whether the, behaviour takes 
place under the influence of external forces or not. Thus, self-
perception would postulate that, in the case of the hypothetical example 
given above (our obese subject), our subject would not be so motivated 
to lose we,ight if she attributed her gluttony or obesity to some 
external ,agent (s) rather than to herself. 
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Self-perception theory, ~Iith its notions of responsibility and 'self-
observation', hypothesises, in contrast to dissonance theory, that 
dis'sonant behaviour attributed to the self, that is, dissonant behaviour 
for which the person assumes full responsibility, would be more likely 
to change than a dissonant behaviour influenced by external forces. 
From our account of' cognitive-behavioural change thus far~ it is 
obvious that it would make the Salm prediction. For instance, if' we 
make the fol1mring assunptions: (1) that a person engages in a socially 
" -
undesirable behaviour (assuming that he accepts the social nci-ms governing 
the behaviour); and (2) that he is 'objectively' aware of his behaviour 
and that he cannot deny it (self-observation); both cognitive-behavioural 
" 
change formulation and self-perception theory would predict that the 
person ~Iill be more likely to experience subjective discomfort (or 
dissonance), and consequently attempt to reduce the discomfort by 
changing the behaviour concerned if he cannot attribute the behaviour 
to some external influences than if he perceives the behaviour to be 
under the control of external. forces'-
Although the two theoretical. frameworks - cognitive-behavioural change 
, and self-perception theory - approach the problem of behaviour change 
from slightly different perspectives, there are more obvious similarities 
than dissimilarities between them~ Firstly, both take self-observation' 
as their starting point in their analysis of behaviour change; and 
secondly, both see causal attribution of behaviour to oneself as one of 
the major vehicles of behaviour change. 
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(vii!J COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE VS. OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS THEORY 
Objective Self-aliareneSs theory (Duval & viick1und, 1972; Wicklund, 1975) 
is based on Mead's (1934) concept of 'social self' and has the notion 
self-consciousness. as its core premise. However, the theory distinguishes 
bet',een two forms of awareness (or consciousness): (1) subjective 
self-awareness, and (2) objective self-awareness. Duval and Wick1und 
. use these concepts in a special sense. In subjective self-awareness, 
the person's focus of attention is the external environment - other 
people, objects and events vr1thin his perceptual field. In other words, 
a person in a state of subjective self-awareness is the subject as 
opposed to the object of perception. Objective self-awareness, on the 
other hand, is analogous to what is termed self-consciousness or introspection 
in common parlance. In this state of avTareness, the person's focus of 
attention is directed inward; that is the person perceives himself as an 
object of evaluation. Grammatically,a person in a state of objective 
self-awareness becomes the object of his ovm perception (or eValuation). 
In his later formulation, Wicklund (1975) has substituted the concept 
self-focused attention for the term objective self-awareness. 
The principal assumptions of objective self-awareness theory are similar 
to those of cognitive-behavioural change theory, and may be sUlll!l'.arised as 
fol1mlS: 
(a) objective self-awareness (or self-oonsciousness) results in D.. 
heightened awareness of the self or some aspects of the self that 
are most prominent in D. given situation; 
(b) objective self-awareness leads to automatio self-evaluation, thus, 
a self-aware person will evaluate himself against some personal or , 
ideal standard which he holds; 
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(c) a state of objective self-awareness (and its concomitant self-
eValuation) often gives rise to psychological discomfort resulting 
from a negative discrepancy bet'ieen the person as he is at the 
present and what he would like to be. This discomfort in turn 
motivates the person to reduce the discrepancy; 
(d) the degree of discomfort and the person's efforts to reduce it are 
a joint fUnction of the proportion of attention (in terms of time) 
focused on the discrepancy and the magnitude of the discrepancy 
between the pe~~on's self and the negative aspect of the self that 
is salient to him. 
According to objective self-awareness theory, any feature of the person's 
environment which renrinds him of his position as an object in the ~rorld 
may lead to his attention being focused upon the se~ to the virtual-
exclusion of other aspects of the environment. In other words, a state 
of objective self-awareness _ can be created'simply by pla~in.g the person in 
a situation in which he becomes an object to himself. Morrors, television 
cameras or an audience may facilitate this. 
Mlch evidence has accunmlated to"suggest that the self-focused (or self-
mrare) person engages in self-evaluation. Self-focusing also encourages 
adherence to personal and/or social standards (e.g. Wicklund & Duval, 
1971; Duva1, 1976J Diener & Wal1bom, 1976; '{egner & Schaefer, 1978). 
For instance, studies by Diener & Wallbom (1976) and Beaman et al (1979) 
found that self-focused attention reduced cheating and stealing., 
Objective self-awareness theory has been shown to influence various 
psychological processes - mainly in the area of cognitive social 
psychology. Such phenomena include conformity and attribution (Duval 
& Wicklund, 1972, 1973), seIT-esteem (rckes et al, 1973), the validi,ty 
66 
of self-reports (Pryor et al, 1977), aggression and emotion (Carver, 
1974; Wicklund & Frey, 1980), and perspective taking (Hass, 1979; 
stephenson & Wicklund, 1983). There also exists some evidence that 
self-focused attention can facilitate hQ~ performance (e.g. Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972; Liebling et al, 1974). 
The results of these studies have generally been interpreted as giving support 
to objective self-mlareness theory. That is, the presence of mirrors or 
cameras made the subjects aware of the discrepancies between their actual 
'selves' or performa~~e and their aspired 'selves' or perforD'.ance. Of 
particular interest is a study by Carver (1974) in which the subjects were 
made to beli~ve that electric shocks would facilitate a (bogus) victim's'" 
learning. It was found that self-focused subjects (compared with Sl1bjects 
who were not placed in front of,a mirror) exhibited greater correspondence 
beween their values and behaviour in relation to aggression. According 
to Carver, the subjects showed more aggression (administration of shocks 
to a victim) because the presence of the mirror highlighted the disparity 
between their actual aggression and their desired level of aggression. 
I 
Although objective self-awareness studies, to date, have chiefly been 
in the domain of social psychology, Duval and Wicklund's (1972) original 
formulation of the theory purports to encompass a wide area of psychology, 
including personality, clinical psychology and human performance. Wicklund's 
(1980) review attempts to demonstrate the versatility of U..e theory. 
Nonetheless, the practical application.of the theory, for instance to 
clinical problems (e.g. behaviour discorders), is virtually lacking in 
, the literature. Tuo main features or assunptions of objective se1£-
awareness theory are self-evaluation and the desire to be correct or 
consistent. As Duval has suggested, "All aspects stemming from self-
focused attention, whether efforts to avoid or seek out the state •••••• 
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are presumed to be motivated by the person IS..... degree of completeness, 
goodness or inner consistency" (nuval, 1975, p. 238). Thus in th~ case 
of undesirable behaviours such as addictive behavlours of" psychopathological 
behaviours, for instance, the theory would seem to predict inhibition of 
such behaviours, for example, in the presence of a nO.rror. 
Perhaps the only indirect application of the theory of objective self-
awareness to a maladaptive behaviour - cigarette smoking - comes from a 
study by Leib1ing et al (1974). The study was described to the subjects 
as an investigation into music listening, but it actually investigated 
., -
smoking behaviour. In the experimental condition, the subjects sat in 
front of a mirror, smoking cigarettes, while listening to music. In brief, 
the results of the study contradicted objective self-awareness predictions 
and also the findings of studies conducted for this thesis. The subjects 
smoked more in the mirror condition. However, it might be arguded that 
Leib1ing et alls study HaS a poor test of objective self-awareness theor'J, 
under the circumstances. The measured variables (i.e. the subjectsl 
smoking patterns) may not have been the most salient aspects of the 
situation to the SUbjects. In other words, the subjects might have been, 
more concerned Hith their taste in'music (Hhich was ostensibly under 
investigation) than their smoking. This methodological problem inherent. 
in the study might, however, be due to the theoryls apparent failure to 
specify clearly the conditions under wh:lch certain ,evaluative aspects of 
the person become salient (as Leib1ing et al have suggested). The 
theory's apparent lack of application to behaviour (or clinical) problems 
may partly be attributed to the over-generality of its assunptions about 
these conditions. As demonstrated by the studies to be described, cognitive-
behavioural change theory makes more, explicit these conditions. 
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From the discussion so far, it would seem that objective self-awareness 
theory and cognitive-behavioural' change theory would make similar' 
assunptioris. I1cmever, thero are special instances in ~rhich they differ. 
The follo~g are examples of such instances. 
(a) Objective self-awareness theory postulates that a person in this kind 
of state will almost al.ways find some defect in himself. Cognitive-
behavioural. change,· on the other hand, proJ:'oses that if an individual. 
is placed in a situation in which he can perceive his behaviour 
objectively - as others see it - it is his undesirable behaviour 
which will be' most salient to h:l:m. For instance, if the presence of 
a mirror al.uays generated negative affect, as objective self-awareness 
theory suggests, it would be hard to explain the behaviour of the vain 
teenage girl who spends hours on end in front of a mirror admiring 
her beauty, or of the athletic young man who stares at his well -
developed muscles in admiration in front of a mirror. 
(b) The former theory assumes that the greater tho discrepancy between a 
person's ideal self and his actual. self, the greater the psychological 
discomfort experienced, and hence the greater his efforts to reduce 
the discrepancy will be. Cognitive-behavioural change disagrees with 
this assunption, and suggests that a smaJ.ler gap may indeed give rise 
to the greatest subjective discomfort which '~ill in turn lead to 
greater efforts to bridge the gap. An example is the hypothetical. 
obese uoman described·in the discussion of the theory. 
\ 
(c) Another issue of disagreement between the two theories concerns 
the affective nature (positive or negative) or a discrepancy between 
a person's ideal. self and his actual. self. Objective self-awareness 
theory assumes that such discrepancies are general.ly in the negative 
direction - across virtually all people and all traits - lnth the 
consequence that self-focused attention is presumed to be an avel'siv(. 
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condition. In this respect, as mentioned above, cognitive-
behavioural change makes allowances for individual as well as 
cultural differences. That is, for a person to regard, for 
instance, his behaviour (or some aspect of himself) as desirable 
or undesirable, he must first of all accept the values (social 
and cultural) governing that behaviour; otherwise no discrepancy 
exists and therefore no discomfort arises to motivate behaviour 
change. 
(d) Objective self-awareness assumes that the initial reaction 'to self- '-, 
focused attention is self-evaluation. Cognitive-behavioural change, 
on the other hand, proposes that a person's initial reaction to 
, 
awareness of one's own behaviour is evaluation of that behaviour, 
especially if it happens to be undesirable. Nonetheless, the 
theory acknowledges that the evaluation is always in relation to 
the self both as a unique as well as a social entity. 
Despite the above apparent differences between the two frameworks, like 
cognitive dissonance theory, they may be conceptualised both as theories 
of motivation and cognitive theories. Both postulate that awareness ,of 
oneself or one's own behaviour motivates the person to evaluate (and/or 
alter) some aspect of himself or his behaviour. Nevertheless, whereas 
objective self-awareness deals mainly with the person's inner state or 
'self', cognitive-behavioural change deals chiefly with the person's 
actual behaviour. Thus, they differ in their areas of application. As 
mentioned already, objective self-awareness studies have tended to 
follow cognitive dissonance investigat.i.ons. That is, they have mainly 
involved such social psychological phenomena as opinion change, 
" 
conformity, attribution, and so forth. Cognitive-behavioural change 
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studies (detailed below), on the other hand, fall within the area of 
clinical psychology ~ modification of such undesirable behaviours as 
cigarette smoking, over-eating, and facial mannerisms. 
Cognitive-behavioural change theory proposes that behaviour whose 
evaluative importance has been made prominent to the individual will be 
inhibited when the person perceives that behaviour (and/or its 
consequences) in negative terms. This behavioural aspect of the person 
is not made specific in objective self-awareness theory. Instead, the 
theory stresses the person's·'self'. This preoccupation with the 'self' 
.' 
might be one of the reasons for the theory's lack of application in the 
clinical field. Another difficulty with objective self-awareness theory, 
in terms of its behavioural application, is its assumption that in 
addition to self-evaluation as a reaction to self-focused attention, 
the person will avoid or approach the situation depending upon the 
polar position (negative or positive) of the evaluation. The theory 
makes a further assumption that in the case of a negative discrepancy 
(or evaluation), the person may attempt to reduce the discrepancy by 
avoiding the situation. It is not quite clear how a negative discrepancy 
or inconsistency can be reduced by a mere avoidance response. Mere' 
avoidance of a stimulus situation which highlights a negative cognitive 
discrepancy does not necessarily reduce nor eliminate the discrepancy 
once the person has become aware of its existence. Such a response 
might, however, reduce the psychological discomfort associated with the 
discrepancy. In contrast, cognitive-behavioural change stipulates that 
following a person's objective awareness (or perception) of his 
undesirable behaviour (and his subsequent negative evaluation of that 
behaviour) he will attempt, in appropriate conditions, to alter his 
'. 
behaviour in order to reduce the concomitant subjective discomfort. 
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It might be helpful to emphasise again that objective self-awareness 
theory appears to concern itself primarily with the person's inner 
discrepancies whereas cognitive-behavioural change deals principally 
with behavioural inconsistencies, even though the person's cognitions 
about his behaviour and himself are considered as playing a crucial role 
in determining the desirability or undesirability of the behaviour 
concerned. In essence, objective self-awareness· theory is a theory of 
self-consciousness; cognitive-behavioural change, on the other hand, 
is a behaviour-evaluation theory. Thus, while the former considers 
awareness in terms of 'consciousness' (in a psychoanalytic sens~), in 
the latter theory, awareness refers to actual or physical perception 
(of one's behaviour). So that whereas objective self-awareness theory 
assumes that any inconsistency within the 'self' will motivate a person 
to reduce it, cognitive-behavioural change proposes that a mismatch 
between a person's ideal behaviour and his actual behaviour needs to be, 
first of all, of an already motivated state of affairs for him ·to try 
to reduce it. 
SUMMARY 
Objective self-awareness theory and cognitive-behavioural change theory 
are similar in many respects - in methodology and in many of their 
assumptions. Theoretically, the concept of evaluation, for instance, 
is central to both theories· even though, in the former, the evaluation 
is more about the 'self' whereas in the latter the evaluation is more 
about one's behaviour. Thus, in objective self-awareness theory, a 
discrepancy is defined as the difference between what the person would 
like to be (e.g. intelligent or beautiful) and what he is at the present; 
cognitive-behavioural change defines a wismatch or an inconsistency as 
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the difference between the person's desired behaviour and his actual 
behaviour. In summary, it might be suggested that the main dl.fference 
between the t'IO theories is that objective self-awareness theory has 
the concept 'self-consciousness' as its central premise, i.hereas 
cognitive-behavioural change theory places special emphasis on behaviour. 
Another major difference between these theories lies in their areas of 
application. Objective self-awareness studies generally fall into the 
domain of social psychology; cognitive-behavioural change studies, on 
. 
the other hand, are clinically oriented." 
, -
• The principal purpose of the present theoretical model is to guide 
investigation's to discover the cognitive factors that mediate the' 
i.nhi_bitory effects of ,selt:-model1in~., Thus,for the r,:,st _of the analysis, 
ev.i.dence for the main 'propositions of the theory 'Iill be offered, and 
its theoretical as well as practical'ramificat.i.ons will be further -
examined. 
.-" .. ~ .. -. , 
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SUMMARY. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE EFFECTS OF SELF-MODELLING ON CIGARETTE 
SMOKING BEHAVIOUR 
, -
Two studies of self-modelling are described. The first study was a 
preliminary study which investigated whether self-modelling would 
inhibit cigarette smoking behaviour. Fourteen cigarette smokers 
(4 males and 10 females) served as subjects for a repeated-measures 
design. In the self-modelling condition, the subject watched himself/ 
herself on a television monitor while smoking; in the control 
condition, s/he watched a short cartoon film while also smoking. The 
following variables were measured: (1) the amount of tobacco· 
consumed; (2) the amount of time lit cigarettes stayed in the 
subjects' mouths; and (3) the subjects' physiological responses 
(GSRs). Study One investigated the role of cognitive factors in self-
modelling. It followed the same experimental procedure and involved 
the same variables as the pilot study. However, unlike the pilot 
study, it incorporated cognitive variables-attitudes and communications 
about cigarette smoking. The findings indicated that self-modelling 
inhibited cigarette smbking. The results also suggest that cognitive 
factors mediate the effects of self-modelling. 
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THE EFFECTS OF SELF-MODELLING ON CIGARETTE SMOKING 
BEHAVIOUR: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION 
3.1. Introduction 
The existing literature on the inhibitory effects of being imitated and 
self-modelling suggests tpat being imitated (or self-modelling) inhibits 
undesirable behaviours since it acts as an aversive stimulus for the 
, imita ted' • However, these studies have tended to be 'directive'. In 
other words, they have -either employed a second party to contingently 
imitate the subject, or have 'included instructions on how the subject's 
behaviour might be modified or how to deal with similar situations in 
the future, therefore (perhaps inadverten tly)' highligh ting the negative 
aspects of the behaviour (e.g. Wheman, 1976; Kauffman et aI, 1977; 
Davis, 1979). 
The directive ,nature of such studies renders the theoretical interpreta-
tion of their results problematic. It is unclear whether self-
modelling, the instructions, or a combination of both causes the observed 
behaviour change. To circumvent this methodological problem, and to 
provide a fuller understanding of modelling in general and self-modelling 
in particular, it is important that self-modelling procedures are non-
directive. In 'non-directive' self-modelling, the individual'is at the' same 
time the observer and the model of his own behaviour; he observes his 
own behaviour directly as it happens. A mirror, a mirror-room or a video 
system may provide the means of feedback. The study described below used 
a close-circuit video system. 
3.2. Aim 
This study was an exploratory investigation into the effects of self-
modelling on the behaviour of intelligent adults. It investigated the 
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, ., 
effects of self-modelling on cigarette smoking behaviour. 
3.3. Hypothesis 
It was assumed that owing to the widespread dissemination of health 
education in Western nations today, cigarette smoking is generally (i.e. 
medically and socially) deprecated by most people, including· many 
cigarette smokers themselves. These beliefs stem from a negative 
cognitive evaluation of smoking. Thus, it was hypothesised that in a 
self-modelling situation, a cigarette smoker would consume less 
tobacco than in a control condition. 
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3.4 METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
(i) Design. The study employed a repeated-measures design, and 
consisted of two experimental conditions: (1) 'self-modelling' condition 
and (2) 'control' (film) condition" In the former condition, through 
a video system, the subjects viewed themselves on a televisicn monitor 
for about 10 minutes· while smoking; and .in the latter the subjects 
watched a 10-minute long cartoon film (which was relatively void of 
emotions for adults, at least) on the same television monitor ~Ihile also 
smoking. The study was carried out in the Psychology Laboratory of the 
Department of Social Sciences at Loughborough University. The Laboratory 
comprised an experimental room and an observation room. The t,~o rooms 
',,:. 
were adjacent to each other with a one-way screen between them, but the 
subjects could not be observed through the one-way screen because of the 
experimental arrangement - the subjects were enclosed in a screen cubicle 
situated inside the experimental room •. However, they could unobtrusively 
be observed on television monitors attached toa video con~~le inside the 
observation room [see Appendix 6: Diagrams l(c) and led)]. 
Three variables were under observation in each experimental condition. 
These ''le re : (1) the amount of c.igarettes consumed by the subjects 
(measured in grams); (2) the amount of time lit cigarettes were in 
contact with the subjects' lips (measured in seconds); and (3) the 
subjects' emotional responses (~SRs). 
(ii) Subjeots. Fourteen cigarette smokers (4 males and 10 females) 
participated in the study. They were all university students (at 
Loughborough University) who were pursuing various degree courses. 
Eleven of the subjects completed 6 sessions each (3 sessions under each 
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experimental condition) while the remaining 3 completed only 4 sessions 
each (2 sessions under each experimental condition). Six of the subjects 
expressed positive attitudes to cigarette smoking, while the remaining 
8 expressed negative attitudes to the habit. 
(iii) Apparatus and Nateriats. The apparatus and materials which were 
situated in the experimental room included the following: 
(1) 2 video cameras (Sony, Model AVe 32S0E) 
, -
(2) television monitor with a .S8m screen (pye, Model LDOO1) 
(3) E1ectret condenser microphone (R.S. Components Ltd.) 
(4) cigarettes (Benson & Hedges Special Filter King Size) 
(5) an ashtray 
(6) a cigarette lighter 
(7) glass sample tubes with tops 
(8) a screen· cubicle •... 
The main apparatus and materials which were situated in the observation 
room included the following: 
·(1) video-tape recorder (National, Model NV:3030E) 
./ . 
(2) video-cassettee recorder (U-matic No. VO-18l0UK) 
(3) video mixture console with Hitachi monitor and speaker 
(4) galvanometer (Biofeedback Systems Ltd., Modei SCL.100) 
(5) timer-counter (Campden Instruments Ltd., Model ·565) 
'(6). an ·e1ectronic balance (Sartorius, Model 2432) 
(7) cartoon films ('Tarzan and the l\pes', Tarz an and the 
Earthquakes', and ~ Honkong Phooey.') 
(8) a clock. 
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See Appendix 6: diagramn lea) to led) for experimental room, 
observation room and apparatus. 
(iv) Proaedure. The subjects were recruited. on the pretext that the 
study was an investigation into the effectn of cigarette smoke (or tar) 
on domestic television screens, and whether or not such effects 
interfered with the visual perception of images portrayed on television 
screens so affected. The subjects were run individually, and each 
attended 2 sessions a week, with about 3 days between sessions. This 
was possible because the subjects were given a timetable from which 
they chose their individual convenient times. 
'-. 
When a subject reported for a session, s/he was ushered into the 
experimental room. S/he was thtm asked to runon the spot for about one 
minute. " After that s/he was. asked to sit in an armchair situated outside 
the cubicle. The experimenter then placed the electrodes of the 
galvanometer on two fingers of the subjects' non-dominant hand, leaving 
the dominant hand free for smoking. The index and ring fingers were 
used. The elctrodes were connected to the galvanometer situated in the 
observation room by a wire passed through the wall bet\~een the two rooms. 
With the electrodes in place, the subject was then asked to relalc as 
much as possible. The experimenter then left the room, ostensibly to 
enable the subject to relax, but in fact left for the observation room 
and recorded the subjects' GSR in order to establish his/her GSR baseline." 
Mode 2 and 100% sensitivity level of the galvanometer were selected for 
this purpose and maintained throughout the session (and the experiment) 
for all the subjects. In mode 2, the galvanometer provided both audItory 
and visual feedback of transient increase of skin conductivity. After 
'. 
the subject's GSR baseline had been established, the experimenter 
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ret:urned to the subject and ushered him/her into the ccreen cUbicle. 
The cubicle was constructed in such a way that it limited external 
stimulation to the subject. It also obstructed the one-way screen 
thereby reassuring the subject that s/he was not being observed. 
When the subject and the experimenter entered the cubicle, the subject 
was asked to sit in an a~chair facing the television monitor (the 
chair was placed about 2m al1ay from the television monitor). The 
experimenter then ensured that the electrodes were still'firmly (but 
not too tightly) placed on the subjects' fingers. The subject was 
then given a cup of coffee and his/her attention dra~n to a table placed 
next to the chair. On the table were the following items: (1) a 
~ 
packet of cigarettes (Benson & Hedges Special Filter King Size);, 
(2) a cigarette lighter; (3) an ashtray; (4) a'glass sample tube;'and 
(5) a microphone [see Appendix 6: Diagrams 3(a) and 3(b)]. The subject 
was further requested to relax and try to make himself/herself 'as 
comfortable as possible throughout the session. After that the experi-
menter gave him/her the following instructions as distinctly as 
possible: 
"I'm going next door to play a film on this television monitor for you 
to watch. r~ile you are watching the film, I'll be monitoring your 
bodily responses, especially the movements of your eyes ,and face muscles, 
to determine if you are relaxed and attending to the film, so try to 
keep this hand and especially the fingers (the fingers with the elec-
trodes) as still as possible. Rest this hand on the arm of the chair 
to avoid any unnecessary movements. You can start drinking your coffee 
whenever you are ready; but, please, do not start smoking till I ask 
you to a~ so. When I tell you to smoke, help yourself to these 
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cigal'ettes on the table, and tl'Y to l'elax and enjoy your smoke and "the" 
film just all you would nOl'maUy do if you wel'e lJatching TV and having a 
smoke by youl'self at home 01' in yOUI' flat. Feel fl'ee to put the 
cigal'ette away when you feel you /ve had enough of it. You may smoke as 
many cigal'ettes as you Like inside this cubicle, but you al'e not to take 
any of them outside this l'oom. When you/ve had enough ofa aigal'ette, 
please, do not stub it out in the ashtl'ay, instead drop it (still bUl'ning) 
in this glass tube and pl'ess the aover (top) tightly on it; when the 
oxygen in it is exhausted, the aigal'ette end wiLL die a natul'aL death. 
" " 
This makes "the ashtray easiel' to dean fOI' the next subjeat. But 
remember to use the ashtl'ay onLy when you want to flick out the ash from 
the aigal'ette. [See Appendix 6: Diagram 3(c).] 
"' 
"Please, don /t be afraid to tel'l7linate the session at any point if you 
don't want to aontinue. I/m going next dool' to put on a film on this 
TV monitor for you now, so when you've finished smoking or want to 
tel'l7linate the session, use this miarophone to give "me a sr~ut and I'LL 
heal' you on the speaker next dool'. As you aan see, I aan' t see you 
·beaause you are enaLosed, so you need to caZZ me when you've finished." 
These instructions were repeated for each subject throughout the study. 
After giving these instructions, the experimenter went into the 
observation room and adjusted all the video equipment, and monitored the 
subject's GSR again. When the subject's GSR reached the baseline level 
established earlier on, the experimenter started the video cassette 
recorder to record the subject and then instructed him/her to smoke, 
and at the same time started the videotape recorder to play a film for 
the subject to view on the TV monitor in front of him/her; or plugged 
a coaxial cable into the monitor attached to the console for the subject 
ii,:' 
: .. J. '" .. '. 
flJ. 
to vie\~ himself/herself on the same monitor (in the experimental room) 
depending on the experimental condition [see Appendix 6, Diagrams 
l(a), l(b) and l(d)]. The subject's GSR was then recorded at 
one-minute intervals during the first 7 minutes of the session. This 
started from the very moment the subject started smoking, that is, as 
soon as s/he put light to the cigarette [see Appendix 6, Diagram 3(a)]. 
Although the subject could not be observed through the one-way screen, 
the experimenter could still observe him/her on the monitors attached 
to the video console. 
The experimental conditions (i.e. 'self-modelling' and film) were varied 
by either playing a cartoon film on the video tape recorder for the 
, 
subject to watch on the TV monitor in front of him/her, or by plugging a 
coaxial cable into the monitor·.attached to the console thereby projecting 
the subjects' image onto the monitor in front of him/her to view 
hi~self/herself actually smoking. The experimental conditions were 
randomised in such a manner that each subject saw films half of the 
total number of sessions and himself/herself the other half. This 
randomisation made .it relatively difficult for the subject to predict. 
what he/she was going to see (i.e. himself/herself or film) when he/she 
reported for a session: The films were also varied so that no subject 
saw the same film twice. 
• 
e7. 
FIGURE 1 
Randomisation of Experimenta~ Conditions [01' IndividuoZ Subjeats 
(a) (b) 
SESSION SELF FILM SESSION SELF FILH 
1 1 1 1 
2 { 2 1 
3 1 3 I 
4 1 4 I 
5 1 5 I 
6 -I .. 6 { 
Notes: The above figures [Figure 1: (a) and (b)] represent the 
". 
experimental conditions for 2 subjects. In (a) the subject viewed 
himself in sessions 1, 4 and 6, and films in sessions 2, 3 and 5; and 
in (b) the subject viewed himself in sessions 2, 3 and 5, and films in 
sessions 1, 4 and 6. 
When the subject finished smoking, s/he called the experimenter on the 
microphone, and the experimenter went and removed the electrodes from 
his/her fingers, thanked him/her for his/her co-operation and reminded 
him/her of his/her next session. After the subject had left, the 
experimenter collected the glass tube containing 'the subjectis 
cigarette butt. He then went into the observation room and stopped 
the video equipment, and labelled the sample'tube (with the butt in it) 
appropriately (see Figure 2). After that he returned to the experimental 
room, cleaned the ashtray and re-arranged the cubicle for the next 
subject. 
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FIGURE 2 
A GLass SampLe Tube Containing A Cigarette Butt and Beal'ing the 
Subjeat's Nwnber, Name and Experimental. Condition 
I '" '{ 1 ~!~ S ~" • 
.;;;1<", 
Name: A. Smi.th ~H 
i.~. , 
Condi tion: EUm "'"""7'\ I" \~-.1.--..;, ______ ..&.-.-~@;;;;;...,.~~:LJJ "~ili 
- < ' 
cigarette butt·, 
After the last experimental session of the day, the experimenter played 
back the recorded experimental sessions onto the monitor attached to the 
video console and recorded the total length of time a lit cigarette was 
in contact with each subject's lips. Time count started from the very 
-
moment the subject put light to the cigarette. The timer-counter which 
gave up to .01 second accuracy was used for this purpose. The 
cigarette butt of each subject was then weighed without the filter (the 
filter was cut off in order to eliminate saturation effects). The 
weight of the butt (without the filter) was then recorded. The full 
,weight of an unsmoked Benson & Hedges Special Filter King Size without 
the filter had already been established (0.8598 grams). The"balance 
(Sartorius 2432) which gave up to 0.1 gram accuracy was used for this 
purpose. To cut the filter off a cigarette butt, the butt was placed 
on a piece of aluminium foil and the filter was neatly cut off with a 
sharp surgical scalpel. The purpose of the aluminium foil was to collect 
any loose tobacco that fell out of the butt. Having recorded the 
weights of the cigarette butts, the experimenter then recorded the mean 
of each subj'C'ct,' S minute-by-minute GSR1'! observed during the experimental 
session. 
A (complete) session lasted on average 10-15 minutes. After completing 
the last session each subject was invited to comment, in writing, on 
how s/he felt in both experimental conditions [see Appendix 1 [iii)). 
The subjects were also requested to give their opinions about cigarette 
smoking. They were then classified as "positive" or "negative". in 
acc9rdance with their expressed opinions (i.e. positive or negative about 
cigarette smoking). Eight subjects expressed negative attitudes towards 
cigarette smoking - they:-expressed the wish to be able to, give it up some 
time; while the remaining 6 subjects expressed positive attitudes towards 
the habit. The positive subjects regarded cigarette smoking as not any 
more dangerous to their health than, for instance, crossing a busy road. 
The· experimenter finally thanked the subject'for his/her co-operation 
throughout the study, and debriefed him/her. 
3.5. Results and Discussion 
Data was obtained on the following variables: (1) the amount of 
tobacco consumed by the sUbjects. This was defined as the difference 
between the weight (gm) of an unsmoked cigarette (without the filter) 
and the weight of the butt (also without the filter) after the smoking 
episode; (2) the amount of time lit cigarettes were in contact with 
the subjects' lips; and (3) the subjects' emotional arousal (GSRs). 
The experimental mean was 1.642; 27.15; and 18.96 for variables 1, 2 
and. 3 respectively; and the control mean was 2.134; 29.27; and 7.36 
for variables 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Related t-tests were performed on the data and the results indicated 
that: (a) the subjects consumed less tobacco in the self-modelling 
condition than .. in the control, condition (t = 3.14, d.f. = 13, 
P = .001); (b) the amount of time lit cigarettes were in contact with 
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the subj ects' lips was significantly lOHer in the former than in the 
latter condition (t =_ 2.39, d.f. = 13, P = ('00l); and (c) the 
subjects were more emotionally aroused in the self-modelling condition 
than in the control condition (t = -6.99, d.f. = 13, P = .007). 
Pearson's correlation coefficients Here calculated betHeen the following 
variables: (1) the amount of tobacco consumed and the amount of time 
lit cigarettes were in contact with the subjects' lips (r = .10); and 
(2) the amount of tocacco consumed and the subjects' emotional arousal 
. ~. -
(r=.18). Neither of these correlations was statistically significant. 
In order to determine whether the subjects' expressed attitudes 
influenced their behaviour in the experimental conditions, difference 
scores were calculated between the subjects' scores in the film 
condition and in the self-modelling condition on all the three measures. 
The differences between subjects with positive and those with negative 
attitudes towards smoking were compared using unrelated t-tests. It 
was predicted that those with-negative attitudes towards the habit 
would be most affected by the self-modelling condition. Although the 
results were in the expected direction for smoking (for amount consumed, 
t = 1.449, p = < .05; and t = .772, p = < .05 for time lit cigarettes 
were in contact with the lips), there was a very insignificant 
difference in the wrong direction for GSR (t = .135, P = > .05). In 
general, however, the data gave some grounds for considering further the 
role of cognitive factors in self-modelling. 
3.6. Discussion 
The resul ts of the present study were in the predicted direction; that 
is self-modelling reduced cigarette smoking compared with the control 
condition. 
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The apparent redundancy of instructions or a second party in se1f-
modelling, as indicated by the present findings, raises some important 
theoretical issues. These issues specifically concern the theoretical 
interpl"etations of the effects of self -modelling (and being imi ta ted) • 
Most investigators who have reported inhibitory effects of se1f-
modelling (and being imitated) have tended, to explain their results in 
terms of simple learning principles (e.g. Kauffman et a1, 1975, 1976, 
1977; Cullinan et a1, 1975).' For instance, Kauffman et a1 (1977) 
attributed suppression of tongue protrusion in a retarded mongo1,chi1d 
by'contingent imitation,to punishment. That is the child regarded 
being imitate'Ci as an aversive stimulus. However, it might be argued 
that the behaviour in question must first oL,a11 be negatively valued 
by the subject in order for him to regard the imitation of that behaviour 
as aversive. Hence a satisfactory explanation of the effects of 
modelling in general and self-modelling in particular should take into 
consideration cognitive factors. 
Further tentative support for this assumption comes from the subjects' 
invited comments on the study [see Appendix 1(a)].. Below is a random 
selection of the comments: 
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b . t 3 ( t) Su Jeo ma e .. ... I unconsciously tried not to look at the 'I'V 
so much as I kept seeing an image I wasn't used 
to. 11 
SubjeotS (mate) ...... seeing myself the third time, I felt 
extremely self-critical and dissatisfied somehow 
with myself." 
Subjeot7 (femate) .. smoking seems a useless pastime and to l'atch 
'. -
myself smoking made me wonder why I continued the 
.' habit ••• n 
Subjeot9 (mate) .. ~ •• I did not realise that I looked like I did on 
'TV, i.e. my face was 'longer 'than I imagined it was 
and sometimes it felt like looking into the brain 
of a very weary person." 
Subjeot10 (femate) . . . I avoided watching the television screen .. 
after I had sussed out what I looked like. I felt 
at a loss what to do." 
Subjeot11 (femate) "It, gave me a chance to watch ho,~ I appear as I 
smoke or drink and a chance to view myself'as 
others would see me." . 
In summary, the results of this study indicate clearly that self-
modelling can have inhibitory effects on the behaviour of ' 
intelligent human adults. The findings, (e.g. the subjects' GSR) and the 
subjects' comments on the experimental condition also seem to indicate 
88 
that cognitive involvement on the part of the subject mediate the 
effects of self-modelling. Hence it is suggested that the behaviour 
concerned and the subjects' cognitive evaluation of that behaviour are 
among the various factors·that play a paramount role in determining the 
effects of self-modelling. It would further be hypothesised that if the 
behaviour entails negative emotions for the subject, then self-modelling 
will have inhibitory effects on that behaviour •. This may explain the 
findings of the present study. 
> 
On the basis of the findings of the present study and the theoretical 
. -~ 
arguments detailed above, it is necessary to carry out further studies 
in order to elucidate the role cognitive factors play in self-modelling 
phenomena (or modelling in general). 
, 
\ 
STUDY ONE: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
COGNITIVE FACTORS AND SELF-MODELLING 
3.1. Introduction 
In the pilot study, it was found that self-modelling reduced cigarette. 
smoking. The results and findings further suggested that cognitive 
factors (i.e. cognitive involvement on the part of the subjects) might. 
account, at least i,n Rapt, for the effects of self-modelling. This 
suggestion is based upon the assumption that in [non-directive) self-
modelling (as used in the pilot study), there is no inbuilt direction 
for behaviour change, so that only the subject's cognitions about the 
behaviour concerned can account for the observed behaviour change. 
However, it was difficult to determine the degree of the relationship 
between cognitive involvement (on the part of the subjects) and the 
effects of self-modelling since the study did not investigate directly 
the role cognitive factors play in self-modelling. 
It seems likely that for self-modelling to inhibit or facilitate a 
person's behaviour, the behaviour concerned must possess negative or 
positive connotations, as the case may be, for the individual. Thus 
in order to examine directly the relationship between cognitive factors 
and self-modelling, the study described below manipulated a cognitive 
variable - attitudes about cigarette smoking. 
Dissonance 'theory (Festinger, 1951) proposes that inducement of 
dissonance or consonance in a person, via exposure to dissonant or 
consonant information aboub a ,behaviour ot' an attitude which he already 
possesses, will influence his behaviour or attitude accordingly. On 
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the basis of this proposition, Brehm and Coheh (1962) have classified the 
major phenomena of dissonance theory into three main categories: (1) 
forced-compliance studies;· (2) free-choice studies; and (3) exposure to 
information studies. The exposure to information category of dissonance 
studies involve.two amin paradigms: (a) studies in which the individual 
is involuntarily exposed to information that is inconsistent with informa-
tion or an attitude which he already possesses; ·and (b) stUdies that 
examine the individual's willingness to expose himself voluntarily to 
dissonan t information. 
The present study employed the former paradigm (Le. involuntary 
exposure to dissonant information) to invest~gate such cognitive factors 
as may mediate the effects of self-modelling. The subjects were first 
of all involuntarily exposed to information that was either consonant or 
dissonant with their attitudes towards cigarette smoking, and then later 
viewed themselves engaging in that behaViour. Thus the present paradigm 
may be referred to as "double forced-exposure to information paradigm". 
In such a situation, dissonance theory would make:.·.the following predictions: 
(1) if the information is inconsistent with the person's attitudes 
towards the behaviour, he will either distort the information or change 
his att~tudes about the behaviour (or the behaviour itself) in order to 
reduce the ensuing dissonance; (2) if the information is consistent with 
:the person's attitudes towards the behaviour then consonance is achieved, 
and there will be no change in any of the elements of cognition involved. 
On the other hand, cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change (as 
described earlier), like objective self-awareness theory (Duval & 
Wick1und, 1972; Wicklund, 1975) would hypothesize that, in such a 
situation, whether or not the person changes his behaviour or attitude 
towards the behaviour t~ill depend upon :;he nature of his evaluation 
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(positive or negative) of not only the behaviour, but also of himself 
in relation to the behaviour or attitude concerned. 
3.8. Aim' 
The aim of this study was twofold: 
(1) to investigate whether or not cognitive factors mediate the effects 
of self-modelling; 
(2) to advance a cognitive (theoretical) interpretation of the effects 
of self-modelling. 
3.9. Hypotheses,,' 
Partly on the basis of the findings of the pilot study, it was hypothesised 
" 
that: 
(1) The subjects' initial attitudes to cigarette smoking prior to self-
modelling and prior to receiving information would have no effect 
on the following dependent variables: 
(a) amount of tobacco consumed; 
(b) amount of time that lit cigarettes stayed in the subjects' 
mouths; . and 
(c) the subjects' emotional arousal. 
(2) The subjects who received information favourable to cigarette 
smoking as compared to those who received unfavourable, information 
about the habit, regardless of their initial attitudes to smoking, 
would produce: 
(a) higher levels of tobacco consumption; 
(b) higher levels of time that lit cigarettes remained in the mouth; 
and 
(c) lower levels of emotional arousal. 
, " 
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This is because the favourable information is reassuring, and thus 
creates no cognitive discomfort. The unfavourable information, 
on the other hand, would tend to create discomfort in the subjects. 
(3) The subjects' initial attitudes would interact·with information 
such that: 
(i) subjects with positive attitudes towards smoking who 
received favourable information about smoking would show: 
(a) higher levels of tobacco consumption; 
(b) greater amount of time that lit cigarettes stayed in their 
. mouths; and 
(c) lower. levels of emotional arousal; 
"-
(ii).subjects with negative attitudes to smoking who received 
unfavourable information about the habit would show: 
(a) lower levels of tobacco consumption; 
(b) lower amount of time that lit cigarettes remained 
in the mouth; and 
(c) higher levels of emotional arousal. 
3.10 Method. 
(i) Subjects 
Subjects consisted of 37 regular cigarette smokers (16 males and 21 
females). Their mean self-reported cigarette consumption was 15 
cigarettes per day. The subjects were all pursuing.various degree 
courses at Loughborough University. Each subject served under two 
experimental conditions: self-modelling condition and control condition. 
An experimental mistake involving one of the subjects (a female) necessitated 
her exclusion from the statistical analyses. None of these subjects 
participated in the previous study. 
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(ii) Experimental Design 
This study employed a pre-test-post-test design. The post-test condit'ion 
involved involuntary exposure to information. The variables that were 
measured in the present study were the same as those in the previous experiment; 
and both pre-test and post-test data were recorded. In the pre-test condition, 
the subject viewed a ID-minute long cartoon film on a television monitor while 
, smoking. After all the subjects had,served under the pre-test condition, 
as in the previous experiment, they were asked about their opinions regarding 
cigarette smoking. For the purposes of the post-test condition, they were 
then assigned into two groups: (1) positive (or consonant) smokers, and 
(2) negative (or dissonant) smokers, in accordance'with their expressed 
opinions about cigarette smoking. Members of each group were further 
randomly categorised into two sub-groups. 
, 
Each sub-group was then exposed 
to either consonant or dissonant information about cigarette smoking, that. 
is, information which was either favourable or unfavourable to cigarette 
smoking (Appendix 2(a) (i) and (ii». This categorisation (and sub-
categorisation) resulted in the following four groups. 
(1) positive ,smokers exposed to ,favourable information; 
(2) positive smo~ers exposed to unfavourable information; 
(3) negative smokers exposed to favourable information; 
(4) negative smokers exposed to unfavourable information. 
(iii) Apparatus 
The apparatus employed in this study was identical to that used in the 
previous experiment; the only addition being:' 
(1) literature emphasizing the health hazards of cigarette smoking; 
(Hammond, E.C., 'The Effects of Smoking', Scientific American, 
1962, 2D7, 39-51 (Appendix 2(a) (i»; 
(2) fictitious literature (written by the experimenter) de singed to 
play, down the health hazards associated with cigarette smoking 
(Appendix 2(a) (ii». 
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(i v) Procedure 
The present experiment was conducted in the same Psychology Laboratory 
as the previous study; it also followed the same experimental procedure 
as the one described in the previous study. 
However, some minor modifications were made in this study'. For instance 
the subjects were made to believe that the study was an investigation 
into the relationship between cigarette smoking and long term memory. 
The purpose ,of the deception was to distract the subjects from the true 
purpose of the study; and also to €nsure that they read the appropriate 
literature which they were given. Another difference was that this' study 
employed a pre-test-post-test design; and the subjects were categorised 
into consonant (or positive) and dissonant (or negative) smokers after 
" 
the pre-test sessions. 
In the'pre-test condition, the subjects viewed a ID-minute long cartoon 
film on a television monitor while smoking. Three days before each group 
(as described above) reported for the post-test session, all its members 
were given literature (i.e. favourable or unfavourable information) about 
cigarette smoking (Appendix 2(a) (i) and (ii». Each was then requested 
to read and digest it for the second and final stage of the experiment at 
the end of which s/he would be given a short memory test based on the 
11 tera ture. 
In the post-test condition, the subject viewed himself/herself on a 
, 
television monitor while smoking. At the erid of the post-test session, 
the experimenter asked the subject one or two questions about the literature 
s/he had read. This ostensibly constituted the memory test, but it was 
actually to determine whether or not s/he had read it, and also to reaSsure 
him/her that s/he had not wasted his/her time reading it. All the subjects 
seemed to have read their appropriate literature fairly well. Although almost 
all the subjects who received the unfavourable literature remarked that parts 
of it (mainly the medical jargons) were too technical for them to understand, 
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their discussion of it indicated that, on the whole they had got the gist 
of it. Precautions were ,taken to ensure that no subject was exposed to 
both types of literature while the experiment was in progress. One 
subject (female) who was accidentally exposed to both was excluded from 
the statistical analyses. 
At the end of the post test session, each subject was debriefed and those 
who received the favourable literature were told to disregard the contents. 
3.11 Results 
Basically, the design cons1sted of two independent variables - positive versus 
negative initial ~ttitude and favourable (consonant) versus unfavourable 
(dissonant) information about cigarette smoking. The dependent variables 
consisted of the following: 
(a) amount of tobacco consumed; 
(b) amount of time that lit cigarettes remained in the mouth; and 
(c) the subjects' emotional arousal (GSR). 
For the purposes of statistical analyses, the differences between the pre-
test and the post-test data were computed for each sUbject. (See Appendix 
2(b): (i) - (iii».' 
The following hypotheses were tested,in this study: 
Hypothesis 1: This concerned the effect of the subjects' initial attitudes 
on the dependent variables. Unrelated t-tests were performed 
on the pre-test data to determine whether or not there was 
such an effect. 
'Analysis of the results indicated that prior to treatment (i.e. prior to 
self-modelling and information) the 'positive' and 'negative' subjects 
were similar as far as the above dependent variables were concerned (p=>.10; 
for each variable). 'Positive' mean was.6217; 32.17; and 4.20 for amount 
of tobacco, amount of time and emotional arvusal l'espectively; and 'negative' 
mean was .5984; 32.53; and 3.86 for amount of tobacco, time and emotional 
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arousal respectively (see'Appendi~ 2(d): (i) - (iii». Hypothesis 1 was 
,J 
therefore supported, in so far as a null hypotehsis could be accepted. 
Hypothesis 2: ThiB concerned the effect of information on the measured 
variables regardless of'attitude. Thus, in order to 
examine the effect of information, comparisons were made 
between the following sub-groups, using unrelated t-tests: 
(1) positive smokers exposed to favourable information; 
(2) positive smokers exposed to unfavourable information; 
(3) negative smokers exposed to favourable information; and 
(4) negative smokers exposed to unfavourable information., 
These intergroup comparisons resulted in six separate comparisons (see 
Appendix 2: (e)-(l). The data indicated that irrespective of the subjects' 
" initial attitudes to smoking, the subjects who received favourable information 
about the habit smoked more and showed"lower levels of emotional arousal 
compared'to those who received unfavourable information. Hypothesis 2 was 
therefore SUbstantiated. (See Table 2 below). 
Table 2: MEAN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRE-TEST AND POST-TEST CONDITIONS 
BY ATTITUDE AND INFOR~~TION 
r .. AMOUNT Of I TIME (SECONDS) GSR I TOBACCO CIGARETTES 
CONSUt1ED WERE IN MOUTH 
(GRAMS) 
" I 
I Consonant Subjects Exposed to 
-.0435 -6.10 2.29 I Consonant Infor'rJation 
", 
Consonant Subjects Exposed to , .0541 3.47 -1.74 
Dissonant I n!'cf'!lla tion 
Dissonant Subjects Exposed to 
-.0260 -3.84 2.55 
Consonant Information 
Dissonant Subjects Exposed to 
.0739 .91 -2.33 ' 
Dissonant Information 
,-
The above Table indicates that irrespective of initial attitudes, subjects 
exposed to unfavourable information about smoking smoked less than those 
exposed to favourable information about the habit. 
Specifically, when groups exposed to different types of information 
about cigarette smoking were compared (i.e. favourable versus unfavourable 
information) significant differences were observed in the amount of 
tobacco consumed, amount of time that lit cigarettes were in contact with 
the subjects' lips, and the subjects' emotional arousal (p=<;05). 
However, no significant differences were obtained in any of the above 
variables when groups exposed to the same type of information (.i.e. 
favourable or unfavourable information) were cempared (p=>.05). This 
was the case irrespective of initial attitude, thus confirming the 
prediction that the subjects' initial attitudes per,~e would have no 
i 
effect on the depEmdent variables. 
Hypothesis 3: This concerned the combined effect of attitude and 
information on the measured variables. To determine 
the interaction effect of the above independent variables, 
a 2-way ANOVA was performed· on the data on each dependent 
variable (see Tabl~ 3 below) . 
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"" 
, .. 
SC8~G3 O~ VARI\TION 
A (Category of S) 
B (Irri'or:;:at,icn) . 
AB (Interaction) 
VTithi.."l Cell 
Total 
" 
SO'u:tCE OF VA.lTIATION 
A (Cat'1i;ory of S) 
B (I:1f'o::":l:at1on) 
AB (Interaction) 
~·lithi.."l Cell 
Total 
S01?CE GF ~~IATION 
A' (CateGory of S) 
B (Infor~tion) 
A3 (Interaction) 
Hithi..." Cell 
Total 
TABLE 3: SU11W,RY OF 2-HAY l,JIOVA ON DATA: BY VARTABIE 
(i) Amount of tobaooo consumed 
SU"M OF SQUARES DEGREES OF FREED OH MEAN SQW.RE F-RATIO 
.0024 1 .0024 .3934 
40876 1 .0876 14.3607 
.0007 1 .0007 .1148 
.1957 32 .0061 
.2865 . 35 .0082 
(11) Amount of time cigarette staged in mouth 
SD:-r Op.: SQUAP.ES 
.. 
-. 
483.4135 
59.7538 
805.8213 
1348.9886 
sm-r OF SQUAP.ES 
.4512 
173.4371 
3.2868 
95.2125 ' 
472.3876 
DEGP.EESOF F'REEDOH NEA}! SQUA.11E 
l' 
1 483.4135 
, 59.7538 
-32 25.1819 /. 
35 38.542431 
(i11) 'G&1 
DEGREES OF rnEEDOH KEAN sqUAP.E 
1 .4512 
1 173.4371 
·1 3.2868 
32 2.975h 
35 7.7825 
F-RATIO 
19.1969 
2.37289 
F-RATIO 
.1516 
58.2903 
1.1046 
. ••• _6 ____ 0 __ _ • : .... _ •.• 
EX?ECTED P BOB. 
> .05 
~ 4.15 .c:. 0.01 
> .05 
1<;XPRCTED .. PROE 
;.-
.05 
~ 4.15 ~ 0.01 
> .05 
. 
EXPiCTED F paOE 
> .05 
2: 4.15 < 0.01 
> .05 
The results, as indicated in Table 3, revealed that there was no main 
effect for attitude; neither was there any interaction effect between 
the subjects' initial attitudes to smoking and the type of information 
they received (favourable or unfavourable) •. Thus hypothcsis 3 was not 
supported. However, a highly significant main effect was found for 
information (p=<.Ol). This effect applied equally to all the three 
variables. This suggests that the type of .information the subjects 
were exposed to rather than their initial attitudes influenced their 
smoking behaviour in the self-modelling condition. 
Pearson's correlation coeff~cients were computed on the data to determine 
if there was any correspondence between any of the variables under investigation. 
Contrary to the findings of the previous study, analyses of the results 
revealed a positive correlation between the amount of tobacco consumed and 
time spent smoking (r = .3525); a negative correlation between time spent. 
smoking and physiological arousal (r = ~.3752); and a ~egative correlation 
between amount of ·tobacco consumed and physiological arousal (r = -'.5223); 
(See Appendix 2 (m». The negative correspondence obtained between the 
amount of time the subjects spent smoking and their physiological arousal 
(GSR) indicates tha~ the more emotionally aroused the subjects were the less 
they tended to smoke and vice-versa. 
direction. 
This in fact was in the hypothesised 
3.12 Discussion 
The following hypothses were tested in this study: 
(1) The subjects' initial attitudes to smoking per se would have no 
effect on the dependent variables (i.e. without self-modelling 
or information). 
(2) In a self-modelling situation, irrespective of the subjects' 
initial attitudes to smoking, favourable information about 
cigarette smoking would produce higher levels of tobacco 
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consumption and the time that lit cigarettes rcmained in the 
mouth, and "l·ower emotional arousal compared to information 
unfavourable to the habit. 
(3) There would be an. interaction effect between the subjects' 
initial attitudes and information on the measured variables, 
although this effect would depend upon the type of information 
(favourable or unfavourable) the subjects received. " 
The above hypotheses in addition clearly relate to the major objective 
of trying to establish the role of cognitive factors in self-modelling. 
The results and findings supported the above predictions with the 
exception of an interaction between the subjects' initial attitudes and 
, 
the type of information they received. That is irrespective of initial 
attitudes smoking waS least in the subjects who received unfavourable 
information about the habit and greatest in those who were given information 
which was favourable to smoking. 
In this study, unlike the pilot study, the subjects' cognitions about 
smoking were manipulated directly through exposure to information that 
was either favourable or unfavourable ;0 cigarette smoking. The 
results seem to indicate that this manipulation (i.e. the information) 
varied the effects of self-modelling. 
The present results and findings support the assumption that cognitive 
processes are involved in self-modelling. However, as indicated by 
the pre-test data and the" findings of Study Four (Ch. 6) these same 
cognitive factors (i.e. attitude and information) without self-
modelling seem to have no effect. Thus the lack of interaction 
between attitude and information is not surprising given the lack of 
101 
( 
effect of attitude acting independently. This lack of interaction 
may be due to the fact that attitude and smoking had clearly co-
existed in the subjects. 
The assumption that an individual who possesses negative cognitions 
about a behaviour should experience psychological discomfort when seeing 
himself indulging in that behaviour seems support~d by the data. 
Similarly they appear to support the suggestion that one of the ways in 
which an individual in such a situation may reduce the discomfort is by 
terminating or modifying the behaviour concerned. 
Through health education, most cigarette smokers are aware of the health 
risks associated with smoking; thus many cigarette smokers may be said 
to harbour, albeit to varying degrees, a discrepancy between their 
knowledge of the ill-effects of smoking and their actual behaviour 
(1. e. smoking). It would appear that" in' the pilot study, for' 
instance, this discrepancy was made more prominent to the subjects by the 
self-modelling condition - when they viewed themselves actually smoking -
relative to the control condition. The heightened awareness of this 
discrepancy in the self-modelling situation led the subjects to 
evaluate their smoking negatively. It may be that one of the conse-
quences of this negative evaluation was the higher emotional arousal 
observed in that situation compared with the control condition. The 
subject's con~ents on the study seem to support this suggestion (p;88). 
Although the results and findings of the above two studies seem to 
contradict the findings of a similar study based on Duval and 
Wicklund's (1972) objective self-awareness theory (Liebling, et al, 
1974), they appear to indicate that: (1) self-modelling can inhibit 
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cigarette smoking behaviour; and (2) that cognitive factors mediate 
the effects of self-modelling. Thus these findings give some grounds 
for discussing the present results in cognitive terms. 
3.1=1. General Discussion 
One of the aims of Study One was to investigate whether or not cognitive 
factors mediate the effects of self-modelling; that is, to examIne the 
theoretical implications of the results and findings of the previous 
study (pilot study). Cognitive behavioural model of behaviour change 
. . ... -
(described in Chapter 2) seems appropriate in this endeavour. Like 
cognitive consistency theories, one of the basic assumptions of this 
model is that every human organism, like all. biological organisms, is 
an equilibrium-seeking organism; thus, most, if not all, of his behaviour 
is directed towards the maintenance or establishment of internal or 
cognitive equilibrium. According to 'cognitive-behavioural model of 
behaviour change', the existence of inconsistency (or mismatch) between 
a person's 'ideal' behaviour and his actual behaviour should motivate him 
to re-establish consistency. This of course depends on the further 
assumption that the person is aware (or is made aware) of the existence 
of such inconsistency, and also that he evaluates negatively one or both 
of the cognitions involved; (i.e. himself and the behaviour) •. 
The model proposes that negative evaluation of one or more of the 
cognitive elements involved (e.g. the behaviour·or self) entails 
negative emotions. Thus if the inconsistency is evaluated in negative 
terms, the person will be more likely to change the behaviour (or 
cognitions about himself) in order to eliminate or reduce the negati.ve 
emotions arising out of the inconsistency- that is, to establish 
. . 
consistency. This will be particularly likely if other modes of 
reducing the discomfort such as avoiding the situation or other people 
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who are likely to make the inconsistency salient to the person are, not 
feasible. 
This cognitive'framework would thus seem a satisfactory explanation for 
the results and findings of the present studies. As mentioned' 
previously, in Britain today as in most Western nations, health, education 
is widespread. Through the mass media and other sources of information, 
most cigarette smokers have become aware that cigarette smoking is 
incompatible with a healthy life. 
- . ~. -
They recognise that ideally, they 
should not smoke at all, or at least they should smoke less than they 
actually do. Consequently, many smokers may be said to harbour (albeit 
to varying degrees) dissonance or cognitive,inconsistencybetween their 
knowledge of the ill-effects of smoking and their actual behaviour (i.e. 
smoking). It would appear, therefore, that in the pilot study, for 
instance, the existence of such inconsistency was made salient to the 
subjects in the self-modelling condition - when they viewed themselves 
actually smoking. The heightened awareness of this inconsistency, as 
proposed by cognitive behavioural model of behaviour change, led the 
subjects to evaluate their behaviour (smoking) negatively. One of the 
consequences of this negative evaluation of smoking might be the greater 
emotional arousal observed in the self-modelling condition relative to 
,the film condition (as measured by GSR). That the subjects attempted 
to reduce .tois negative affect by altering their behaviour is supported 
by their reduction of tobacco consumption both in terms of quantity and 
amount of time they left lit cigarettes in their mouths in the self-
modelling condition. The subjects' comments on the study (pilot, study) 
as a whole makes this suggestion all the more plausible (p. 88 ). 
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The role of cognitive factors in self-modelling becomes more evident 
through examination ,of the results of Study One. For instance a 
comparison between consonant subjects exposed to favourable information 
and dissonant subjects exposed to unfavourable, information reveals 
highly significant differences between the two groups in the amoun~ of 
tobacco consumed, the amount of time lit cigarettes were in contact with 
their lips, and their emotional response (P = < '.01 for each variable). 
On the other hand, when consonant subjects and dissonant subjects were 
exposed to the same type of information (favourable or unfavourable) 
about cigarette smoking, no significant differences were observed 
between them as far as the above variables were concerned (P = > .10). 
Neither was any significant difference found between the subjects with 
negative attitudes and those with positive attitudes to smoking in their 
smoking behaviour in the pre-test condition (p = ,>.10). 
The overall implication of the present results is that the subjects' 
smoking behaviour patterns in the self-modelling situation varied in 
accordance with the type of information they were exposed to, as 
opposed to their initial attitudes. In other words, the manip~lation 
of the subjects' cognitions about smoking via exposure to information 
had a significant influence on their smoking behaviour in the experi-
mental situation. Thus, according to cognitive-behavioural model of, 
behaviour change, subjects,who were exposed to favourable information 
about cigarette smoking evaluated their behaviour (assuming that they 
accepted the information) positively in the self-modelling situation, 
and hence smoked accordingly; while those who were exposed to 
unfavourable information evaluated smoking negativ~ly and consequently 
smoked less relative to the former group of subjects. This is not 
surprising because the former, type of wformation was designed to 
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foster consonance or positive affect in the subjects while the latter 
information was designed to induce dissonance or negative affect in the 
subj ects. Thus, as indicated by the results, the more negative the 
concomitant affect the greater the emotional arousal experienced and the 
less the subjects smoked, and vice-versa. The suggestion that the 
subjects made cognitive evaluation of themselves ahd their smoking 
behaviour in the self-modelling condition is further attested by the 
comments of the subjects involved in the pilot study. 
Although these experiments involved relatively young and healthy . '"' 
subjects (university student,s), it is doubtful if the results would have 
contradicted the'present findings had the subjects been older 
smokers with a longer history of cigarette smoking or more concerned 
with their health. In fact, it might be assumed that had the subjects 
been older or more concerned with their health, the results would have 
moved even closer in the hypothesized direction because it is generally 
accepted that older people are more susceptible to the diseases 
associated with,cigarette smoking, such as heart disease and lung cancer, 
than young people,. 
Both studies demonstrate that self-modelling can inhibit a person's 
undesirable behaviour. The results also raise a number of theoretical 
as well as practical implications. As already suggested"the findings 
of the present studies support the theoretical viewpoint advanced in 
Chapter Two. This proposes that if an individual evaluates his 
behaviour and/or its consequences negatively, he will experience 
subjective discomfort when placed in a situation where he can observe 
himself engaging in that behaviour. 
" 
In order to eliminate or reduce 
the subjective discomfort resulting from such evaluation, the person 
will either change the behaviour or reorganise his cognition (i.e. 
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opinion or belief) about the behaviour. Thus one of the major 
theoretical issues raised' by the results and findings of these studies 
is that cognitive factors mediate self-modelling phenomena. In other 
words, the effects of self-modelling on a person's behaviour 
., 
(facilitatory or inhibitory) depends largely on his cognitions 
(positive or negative) about the behaviour concerned. In Study One, 
inducement of consonance in the subjects, via exposure to favourable 
information about cigarette smoking, seemed to have facilitated their 
smoking behaviour. Conversely, inducement of dissonance via exposure 
to unfavourable information about the habit seemed to have inhibited the 
subjects' smoking behaviour. 
This cognitive interpretation of the effects of self-modelling (or 
modelling in general), differs from learning theory interpretations of 
self-modelling or being imitated discussed in chapter one (e.g. Byrne, 
1971; Cullinan et aI, 1975; Kauffman' et aI, 1976,1977; Thelen et aI, 
1976, 1977, 1981). For ins tance, Kauffman et aI, (1977) in their 
report of suppression of tongue protrusion in a mentally retarded mongol 
child by contingent imitation concluded that the subject regarded being 
imitated as an aversive stimulus. In other words, the subject inter-
preted being imitated as an aversive (or punishing) stimulus from which 
he tried to escape by keeping his tongue in his mouth. A cogni ti ve , 
interpretation of Kauffman,and his colleagues' findings would be that 
their subj ect' s suppression of his tongue protrusion was a result of 
cognitive reorganisation of his behaviour which he was made more aware 
of following being imitated. However, if one regards negative, ,2ffect 
(as proposed by cognitive-behavioural model) as an aversive drive or 
stimulus, then the above two interpretations are not essentially dis-
" 
similar. HO\~ever, the interpret(3,tion of such intangible stimulus as 
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being imitated as aversive (or rewarding) involves cognitive processes 
on the part of the individual.. Thus, cognitive-behavioural model of 
behaviour change would appear to be a more appropriate framework in 
which self-modelling phenomena may be interpreted. 
The findings of the present studies have implications for therapy as 
well. For instance, with regard to smoking, the literature on the 
modification of cigarette smoking behaviour indicates several. subject 
factors that· might b~~mployed in the design of treatment programmes. 
Two of the cognitive factors which have been employed in the treatment 
of cigarette smoking are: (1) Rotter's (1966) locus of control, and 
(2) Effective Cognitive Dissonance (Keutzer,. 1968). For instance, 
Best and Steffy (1971) using a procedure designed to induce dissonance 
in the subjects reported that inducement of dissonance in the 
subjects produced greater reductions in cigarette smoking than the use 
... 
of locus of control procedures. Kuetzer (1968) also found that the 
level of the subject's cognitive dissonance at the beginning of smoking 
treatment was a .significant predictor of treatment outcome. These 
findings give further support to 'the cognitive interpretation of the 
findings of the present study. With respect to treatment it would 'seem 
that inducement of cognitive dissonance combined with self-modelling 
may be a more effective technique for the treatment of cigarette 
smoking behaviour. The results and findings of the present studies 
support this suggestion. In both studies, volunteer subjects who did 
not actively seek help to break the habit reduced their tobacco consuWP-
tion remarkably in the self-modelling situation relative to the control 
condition. The impact of self-modelling on cigarette smoking was 
even more remarkable when it was combined, in Study One, with dissonance 
" 
arousal procedure, 
• 
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The results and findings of the above two studies, have implications 
for cigarette smokers themselves. For instance, asked why they smoke, 
cigarette smokers often give such reasons (or excuses) as: "To calm the 
nerves", "To break the monotony and the boredom",' and so forth. ,These 
are two of the most. frequently cited reasons by cigarette smokers for 
, continuing the habit. If smoking actually had such effects, we would 
expect the subjects to increase their smoking, in the self-modelling' 
condition in which one would expect them to be more bored than in the, 
film condition rather than vice-versa, as indicated by the. results of, 
, . . ~ -
the above two studies. Likewise, to calm their nerves, they should 
have consumed more tobacco 'in the self-modelling condition in which they 
wer~more emotionally aroused (as measured by GSR) than in the film 
condition. Instead, the opposite was observed. I t would seem, 
therefore, that 'boredom' and 'bad nerves' are mere feeble excuses often 
given by smokers for continuing the habit. At best, any calming 
effect that a cigarette smoker may derive from smoking may be described 
as placebo effect. After all, nicotine is a stimulant rather than a 
tranquillizer. 
In conclusion, the results and findings of the present studies seem ,to 
indicate that cognitive factors mediate self-modelling phenomena. They 
demons trate that the type Of effect (facilitatory or inhibitory) self-
modelling has on a person's behaviour is dependent, to a large extent, 
upon the person's cognitions (or evaluation) about the behaviour in 
question. If the person evaluates the behaviour in positive terms, 
then that behaviour will be facilitated in a self-modelling (or' 
imitation) situation. Conversely, if the behaviour is negatively 
evaluated by the individual", then that behaviour will be, inhibited or 
suppressed in a self-modelling situation. Thus it appears that 
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ClIAPTI~R FOUR 
STUDY TWO: SELF-l-1CJDELLING AS A HODE or' SELF-CONTROL 
IN AN EYEBLINK CLASSICAL EXTINCTION EXPERTI1ENT 
SUHK<\.RY 
The use of self-modelling as a technique for self-control was 
investigated. ~,o groups of 64 subjects received 40 eye blink 
conditioning trials each, follovl9d by extenction trials with a 
30-second rest period between the acquisition phase and the 
extinction phase. The experimental group viewed themselves in 
a mirror during the extinction phase, whereas the control group 
received no visual feedback. The conditioned stimulus consisted 
of an auditory tone, while the unconditioned stimulus consisted 
of light from an electronic flashgun directed into the subject IS 
eyes. Analysis of the extinction data shrnred that self-niodelling 
inhibited the conditioned response. This is consistent ,lith the 
findings of similar studies which employed facilitative and inhibitory 
linstruction techniques l • This study provides further evidence that 
cognitive processes are involved in the effects of self-modelling. 
It also suggests that these operate in (olassical conditioning) 
situations where the role of cognitive factors has not been fully 
recognised. 
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4:. 1 INTRODUCTION 
The traditional h~~othesis for classical conditioning is·that repeated 
pairing of a conditioned stimulus (CS) with cm unconditioned stimlllus 
(UCS) will cause the CS to elicit a conditioned ~esponse (CR) in a 
subject in an uncollscious automatic fashion.. Thus the hypothesis ' 
assumen that in humans, the higher mental or cognitive processes are a 
myth, or at best, a mino~ factor that need not be considered in 
standard conditioning experiments. This assumption ob':iously ignores·' 
the important roie the subject's awareness of the CS-UCS relationship; 
.. .. ~ . 
as well as his a\~areness of his own behaviour, plays in t.he kind of 
events observed by the experimenter ih conditioning experiments. 
.. ' 
In autonomic conditioning, there seems to be little need for the subject 
to be aware of his response'- In most cases, for instcmce, GSR, the 
subject may not even be aV/are that he is capable of producing the 
r'~sponse. However, in most standard motor classical condit1:oning 
exper:'.ments such as flnger ~ithdrawal conditioning, it might be assu!ned 
that the nubject I s awa-Cel~etlS of the situation plays an important role. 
In such a situation, the subject makes a conscious decision about ~Ihat 
response to make, so that he Illust, at least, initially be aware of the 
response. It is possible, nonetheless, to conceive of a ·situation where 
the subje,ct is not kinesthetically aware o,f his mo·tor ·respcnse, e.g. a 
slight blink of the eyelid ~lhen· he expects the eHaiting UCS to occur~ 
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Such' a motor tack \'11th un unconscious response 1s anilloguoun to. 
autonomic conditioning. 
Recent investigators of 'conditioning phenomena in hUmans have beccme 
aware that when oxposed to a conditioning experiment, the human subject 
does not often remain a passive pliable vessel responding to the 
dictates of the stimuli and their contingencies. As Lockhart (1973) 
and Orne (1962), for instance, have suggested, more often than not the 
human subject comes to the experiment with thoughts, feelings, emotions,' 
attitudes, beliefs and expectations which play a major and critical role 
in the behaviour which ,,'e .observe in the experimental situation. In 
short,. attempts to understand human conditioning in terms of simple 
stimulus and response characteristics have not done justice to the' 
complexity of behavioural variation <lhicl1 the subject exhibits even in 
the simplest or most disguised conditioning situations. For instance, 
. 
it 'may be suggested that the subject's kno<lledge and interpretation of 
the stimulus arrangements is at.least as potent a variable as are the 
stimulus characteristics themselves. Accordingly, it may be postulated 
. " 
that manipulation of the knowledge or al1areness dimension alone is 
sufficient to facilitate or inhibit responding despite the physical 
characteristics of the experimental paradigm. It is. not surprising, 
therefore, that there is a developing trend to study this cognitive 
(knol{ledgejawareneos) dimension of human interaction with conditioning 
procedures. 
One of the early investigators who sho~led interest in practical questions 
of extinguishing undesirable conditioned autonomic responses where 
co"vent~onal extinction procedurea were c6mpared to what: might be termed 
"extl.nction plus knowledge" was Haggard (1943). Haggard investigated a 
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va-.:iety of cogni.tive variables affcctill(J nkinl·e5i"\:ilnce (GSR) phcnomcnn 
by associatlng shod: with a verbal stimulus. Onc of the conclusions 
drawn from this Gtudy '1n:; thilt cognitive factors have an important 
effect on general reactivity (emotional arousal) variables and th;lt the 
influence of cognition on extinction, while present, dep"nds upon other 
variables, such as task requirements. 
Warren.(1934) has defined cognition as "a generic term used to designate 
all processes involved in kno~ing (it begins with i~mediate awareness of 
objects and perception and extends to all forms of reasoning)." (in 
Grant; p. 75). If ~Ie accept this definition, then it becomes obvious' 
that the human subject in a classical conditioning (or extinction) 
'<. 
experiment is not only physically but also cognitively involved in the 
experiment. Thus cognitions are certainly involved in eyelid conditi.-6ning, 
but the question of how these may affect behaviour is not very well 
understood. It will be hypothesised in the present study that the effects 
of these cognitions on a person's behaviour primarily depend upon the 
human subject's evaluation of the behaviour involved. 
The study of cognitive activity or awareness in conditicning has mainly 
involved "instruction ·techniques". For instance, Gormezano and Moore 
(1962), Hilgard and llurtphreys (1938), and Prokasy and Allen '(1969) used 
the "Instructed Conditioning Technique" ,dth the eyeblink response. All 
these investigators reported conditioning. On t11,1 other hand; F'ishbein 
and Gormezano (1966), llUgard and Humphreys (1938), 11.iller (1939), 
HiJ.l (1967) and Prokasy and Allen (1969) using the "Instructed Non-
Conditioning Technnique" reported a drastic reduction in 'conditioning; 
All these findings highlight the importance of cognitive variables in 
conditioning experiments. Cognitive activity in Cl;lssical. as well as 
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o.['erClnt conditioning has been il cl.1bjcct of a, numhcl: of J:cvic\oJn .,(c.g. 
Cree1mun, 19GG; Ho::;::;,1971; and Brelier, 1975). The cxi::;tence of this 
revic\< literature pennits the present aut:hor to focu::; attention chief.1y 
on one of tho ways in which the subject's cognitions may influence his 
behaviour in a conditioning expedJo(mt. 
It is perhapn not a coincidence that 'involuntary' responses are the 
ones that we ordinarily do not see or feel, whereas the 'voluntary' 
responses of large skeletal ~uscles are out in the open for our 
inspection. It seem::;, therefore, that it is the absence of continuous 
information about our, internal responses that cause them to be beyond 
our volitional control. After all, we ordinarily learn responses and 
.'. 
learn to guide our behaviour by observing what "e do, seeing its conse-
quences and making appropriate adjustments. l~owiedge of·the response 
and its consequences is embodied in what is termed "feedbaCk stimuli". 
These feedback stimuli are exceptionally import. ant not only in 
learning, for instance, new Skilled motor move~ents, but also in our 
control of undesirable behaviour and maintenance of adaptive behaviour •. 
4.2 AIM 
This experiment explored learning theory interpretation of self-modelling 
phenomena relative to cognitive-behavioural model of behavi·our change. 
Thus it investigated the use of self-modelling (or self-feedback) as a . 
mcde of self-control in an eycblink classical extinction experiment. 
, . 
, 
, 
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4.3 HYPOTHESIS 
An abnormally high rate ofeycblink is decmed socially undesirable 
in humans (and perhaps a threat to survival). Hence it was 
hypothesised that a human subject in an eyeblink classical 
conditioning experiment Ifho was provided with a visual feedback 
of his responses would be less resistant to extinction than his 
counterpart who was not provided with such feedback • 
. ~ " 
4.4 HETHOD AND PROCEDURE 
(i) Subjects 
Sixty-four volunteer subjects (31 males and 33 females) participated 
in the experiment. The subjects consisted o.r postgraduates and 
undergraduates of various academic disciplines at Loughborough 
University. They Ifere recruited on the pretext of a study of how 
human adults process tlfO different kinds of sensory stimuli 
presented simultaneously. Four subjects were excluded from the 
I statistical analyses ouing to equipment difficulties during the 
experiment. All the subjects liere screened for contact lenses. 
(ll) Apparatus 
This comprised the following: 
(1) Birbeok Laboratory Timer and Signal Source 
(2) Oscillograph (George Washington Ltd., 400 ND/2) 
(3) Electronic Flash Unit with Gold Xenon Tube (Sunpak Auto 24) 
(4) Headphones (ITT, SKH 400) 
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(5) A large mirror (61 cm x 45 cm) 
(6) 3 screens 
(7) 3 electrodes 
(8) Electro-jelly 
(9) Surgical spirit 
(10) Surgical adhesive tape 
(11) Cotton Wool 
(See Appendix 6: Diagrams 2(a) and 2(b).) 
(Ui) . Design 
The experiment involved the extinction o£ eyeblink clasical conditioning. 
The stimuli were a tone (CS) and a £lash o£ light (UCS) which were 
presented to the subject sinrultaneously (interstimulus interval = .0). 
The stimuli were controlled by a Birbeck Laboratory Timer and Signal 
Source. The metronome mode of this equipment was selected. In this 
mode, auditory pulses of 100 msec duration occurred at 4.5 second . 
intervals. The audio level was set to maximum and the stimulus 11as red 
to the subject via headphones of 400 ohm impedance. The Birbeck had an 
internal relay providing two se~s of ourput contacts. Throughout the 
experiment, a connection was made to the normally open contacts of both 
sets. At the commencement of the suditory tone, these contacts closed. 
.. . 
One set.-o£ contacts was used to provide a reference signal for the 
oscillograph (George Washington 400 MD/2). 
, 
, 
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'l'he oscillograph ~Ias an ink-pen r.ecorder of Hhich tlW tractn were u:'l£d, 
cach having its input from a 100 uv cal. A.C. input coupler module, 
No. F'C124. These modules plugged into the \'7ashington (oscillograph), and 
could be substituted for -others - the galvanom.l.G module 'vas used in this 
experiment. 'l'he closure of the other set of the B!rbkec' S outpnt contacts 
provided a sufficient 'disturbance' at the input of one A.C. input 
coupler of the oscillograph to enable a suitable defle<.:tion·of the pen 
to be made. These pulses Here recorded as events. The second.A.C. 
input coupler of. the oscillcg.raph was . .c0nnected to three electrodes 
which were placed in appropriate areas of the SUbject to enable eyeblink 
responses to be significantly recorded on the other track of the 
oscillograph. In addition to the pen recording the event marking, a 
'-. 
timer pen was also triggered from appropriate leads from the Dirbeck 
'. 
Timer and Signal Source. The chart speed of the oscillograph ~/aS set 
at .625 cm/sec. The gain control on the oscillograph Has adjusted for 
each subject such that UR (unconditioned response) produced a. pen 
deflection of not less than 4 nun. The Birbeck and the ~!ashington were 
screened from the subjects throughout the experiment. 
The visual stimulus (UeS) Ims provided by an electronic flash unit 
(Sunpak Auto 24). The flash unit was supplied f.rom 240 volt A.C. mains 
via a Sunpak A.C. adapter,. and was operated on manual setting. The UCS 
too was controlled by the Birbeck Timer and Signal Source. The Dirbeck 
maintained constant intertrial: intervals of 4.5 seconds through the 
experiment. The flash unit waS mounted on a tripod placed behind (and 
above) the mirror in front 'Of the subject at eye level, and 188 cm away 
from the subject. The mirror was mounted on a table (74 cm high) placed 
in front 'Of, and 160 cm mvay . irom, the subject. 1\ white 1 Gm circular. 
spot ~las placed in the middle of the front and back (opaque side) of 
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the mirror for the subjccts of fixate on (Sce Appendix 6: Diagrams, 
2: (a) and (b». 
The subjects were assigned alternately to the experimental and 
control groups. All the subjects f'aced the back of the nd.rror 
during the acquisition phase. !lm,ever, the experimental subjects 
vie~red themselves in the mirror during the extinction phase, ,rhereas 
the control subjects continued to face the back (i.e. the opaque 
side) of it. This enabled the experimental subjects to obtain 
visual f'eedback of their conditioned responses, whereas the control 
subject were denied this visual f'eedback. The subjects were run 
individually. 
During the acquisition phase, 40 simultaneous presentations ,(i.e. 
inter-stimulus intel~al = .0 sec.) of the conditioned and unconditioned 
stimuli m~re given to the subject. In a pilot study using 12 
subjects, the mean number of trials required to condition and ' 
extinquish were f'ound to be 10 and 4 ~spectively. ' The acquisition 
phase of the experiment ,ias followed by a 30-second rest period 
~fter which the conditioned stimulus (tone) alone ~ras presented to 
the subject. The mirror was turned around during the rest period 
f'or the experimental subjects to view themselves throughout the' 
extinction phase. Only the subject.'s responses (Le. eyeblinks) 
during the latter phase were recorded for statistical' analyses. 
The main variable of interest was the number of' trials the subject 
required to reach a criterion of 4 successivenon-rcsponses to the 
conditioned stimulus presentations. 
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All the subject's eyeblin.Tc re sponGes uere continuously recorded 
during fue extinction phase. For data analysis, the subject's 
responses l,ere scored for all pen deflections of more than 2rnrn. 
All other responses of 2m:n or less were considered as 'non-responses'. 
A response vlas scored as conditioned response if it occurred 
simultaneously ldth the onset of the conditioned stimulus or if it 
occurred 154 mseo before the onset or after the offset of the 
conditioned stimulus. All other responses (i.e. eyeblinks) vlhioh 
fell outside these criteria were regarded as non-responses. 
Extinction (or response inhibition) was defined as 4 suooessive 
non-response trials; Md the nwnber required to reach this criterion 
included these 4 successive non-response trials. 
(iv) Procedure 
The present study was carried out in the Social Psychology Laboratory 
at Loughborough University. 
When the subject arrived for the experimental session, s/he was seated 
in a comfortable arw~hair inside the screen-cubicle situated in a 
dimly illuminated room (even though illumination HaS dim, the Experimental 
Subjects could see their reflections clearly in the mirror - Appendix 6: 
Diagram 2(a». The purpose of the experiment (as described earlier) 
was then explained to hirn/her,. and was asked to try to relax as much 
as s/he could. 
The experimenter then cleaned the appropriate areas of the subject1s 
face for the electrodes with surgical spirit. Electro-jelly l-TaS then 
applied on the electrodes which were then placed on the appropriate 
areas of the subjeot's face: one electrode was attached to 'the subject's 
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forehead (between the eyebr01fS); another vTaS placed just abwe the 
subject's left eyebrm-r, and the third electrode Has placed just 
belot. the left eye. Surgical adhesive tape vTaS used to keep the 
electrodes in place (App~ndix 6: Diagra.'1l 2 (b». After this the 
experimenter instructed the subject to try as much as possible to 
fixate 011 the vThite circular spot in the middle of the front or back 
or the mirror, depending on the phase (i.e •. acquisition or extenction) 
of the experiment and whether the subject was in the Experimental 
or Control Group. 'The subject was further instructed to fixate on 
the white circular spot throughout the experiment, but not to stare 
or look so hard as to strain his/her eyes. The purpose of fixating 
on the white spot .Tas to encourage the Experimental Subjects to 
vie~T themselves in the mirror during the extinction phase; and also 
to discourage both groups of subjects from looking around the room, 
as this would have made it difficult to control (or monitor) the 
eyeblinks. It was also to make conditions as uniform as possible 
for both groups. 
After placing. the electrodes on the subject and having adjusted the 
equipment (the Birbeck and the Washington) behind the screen (i.e. 
out of the subjects' sight), the experimenter helped the subject to 
put the headphones on. Having done this, the experimenter went behind 
the screen and adjusted the gain control on the Washington for the 
subject such that his/her UR (uhich was verbally elicited by the 
experimenter) produced a pen deflection of not less than 4 mm. After 
that the subject was given 40 acquisition trials (i.e. CS-UCS 
presentations). These presentations were controlled by' the Birbeck 
at constant intervals of 4.5 sec. The duration of each presentation 
" 
was 100 msec. The CS was presented to the subject via the headphones, 
while UCS to the subject's eyes was produced by the flash unit. The 
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acquisition phase tTas i!l1Jllediately follOl'led by a 30-secend rest 
period durin(> llhich the experimenter truned the mirror around for 
the Experimental Subjects. to vielf themselves. The extenction 
trials involved the presentation of CS alone to the subject at 
the same interval and duration as during the acquisition period. 
Extenction trials were run to a criterion of tl successive non-response 
trials ·(as described above) •. The subject!s responses (i.e. eyeblinks) 
were recorded by the oscillograph throughout the experiment for 
data analysis. 
Upon tEirminatfon of the extinction phase, the experimenter stopped 
the equiprrent, removed the headphones and fue electrodes from the 
subject and lliped the electro-jelly from the subject!s face with 
cotton wool and surgical spirit. The experimenter then verbally 
(i,e. informally) intero(>ated the suject about his/her suspicions 
and beliefs about the nature of the experiment. This ,Ias done, as an 
attempt to assess the subject!s awareness of his/her conditioned 
responses. The subject was subsequently debriefed, and asked not, 
to discuss the experiment with any of his/her friends .. mo were likely 
to take part in it. The experimenter then shovlOd the subject his/her 
printed-out responses and thanked him/her for taking part in the 
study. 
4.5 RESULTS 
" 
For the purpose of data analysis, a conditioned response llas defined 
as an eyeblink of more than 211ll1l amplitude occurring simultaneously' 
with the conditioned stimulus onset or 154 msec before the onset or 
after the offset of the conditioned stimulus. Any other response 
122 
(i.e. eyeblink which did not; meet this criterion) Ha:J regarded as 
non-response. Analyses of the results lTere cen.fined to extfnct,ion, 
which waS in turn defined as 4 successive non-response trials. The 
results .fere analysed in terms of number of trials the subjects 
required to reach extinction criterion. This included the 4 
successive non-response trials. The data from 4 subjects were 
randomly deleted by a third party to allow the use of equal lIs for 
the analysis of variance. The mean number of trials required to 
reach extinction criterion 107as 21.214 and 28.312 for the experimental 
group and the control group respectively (See Appendix 3(b): (1) and 
(11» • 
,> 
To test the experimental hypothesis, a 2-• .,ay ANOVA was performed on 
the data. The results are summarised in the Table below. 
TABLE 4 
Sll1!1ARY OF 2-'tTAY AlIOVA ON OBSERVED DATA 
SOURCE OF SUM OF DEGREE OF MEAN 
VARIATION SQUARES FREEDOH SQUARE F-RATIO 
A(Categoljf of S) 707 1 707 4.80 
B (Sex) 154 1 154 1.05 
- . 
AB (Interaction) 463 1. 463 3.15 
Within cell 7621 .. 52 147 
Total 8946 55 
The above Table indicates that there was a significant main effect for 
the experimental condition; that is the experimental subjects 
extinguished quicker than the '. control subjects (p".( .01). However, 
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mOB. 
" .01 
> .05 
-< .05 
the results also revealed an interaction effect betHcen sex and the 
experimental condition (p = ~ .05). 
Because of the obsel~ed interaction effect, further comparisons (on 
thc basis of sex) were made, using t-tests, betHeen the following 
groups: 
(1) experimental male subjects vs. control male subjects; 
(2) experimental female subjects vs. control female subjects; 
(3) experimental male subjects vs. experimental female subjects; . 't, 
(4) control male subjects vs. control female subjects. 
The means for these groups were: experiment~l male subjects, 22.429; 
experimental female subjects, 20.0; control male subjects, 23.786; 
and control female subjects, 32.857 (See Appendix 3(b): (i) to (iv». 
Examination of the results revealed a significant difference between 
the experimental female subjects and their control counterparts, 
(t =_2.704; d.f. = 26; p = <.05). HOHever, no significant difference 
was obtained betl;een the experim:mta1 and control male subjects 
(t =-0.309; d.f. = 26; p = > .05). Similarly, there was no significant 
difference between the sexes of the same experimental condition 
(p = > .05); although the difference betHeen the control male subjec·ts 
and their female counterparts approached the conventional .05 level 
of Significance. Clearly the interaction is producing the apparent 
main effect Hhich should be treated cautiously. The analysis of 
variance will give precedence to main effects when in fact they are 
the product of interaction. 
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4.6 SUl1HAll.Y Al'ID AtrAI,YSES OF RESULTS 
The only variable that was under investigation in the present experiment 
was the number of trials the subjects required to reach the extinction 
criterion described earlier. It }/as hypothesined that extinction of 
conditioned eyeblink response would be quicker in the exper~£ntal 
condition compared }I"ith the control condition. "A 2-way .AllOVA 
per£ormed on the data revealed a signi£icant main e££ect for the 
experimental condition; that is self-mo:l.elling reduced the conditioned 
response relative to the control rondition (F = 4.80; d.£." 1; 
P = < .01; I-tail). The hypothesis was thus supported. 
" HOl-rever, the results also revealed a significanc interaction ef£eot 
bet~Teen sex and the experirnental oondition (F = 3.15; d.£." 1; 
P = < .05). Thus, further oomparisons using unrelated t-tests were 
made to exrunine inter-sex as l1e11 as intra-sex di£ferenees. The 
£ollouing results emerged: 
(1) there was no signi£ioant difference between the male subjects 
of the two experimental oonditions (p = > .05); 
(2) a signifioant difference was obtined between the experimental 
£emale subjects "and their oontrol oounterparts (p = < .05); 
(3) "no signifioant differenoe was obtained between the two sexes 
o£ the same experi~enta1"oondition (p = > .05); however, the 
dif£erence between the control male subjects and their £emale 
counterparts "was close to .05 level of signifioance. 
In general, the results seemed to indioate that the experimental 
condition alone did not have an e£fect on the subjeots' responses; "but 
the experimental female subjeots were more responsive to self-modelling 
than the experimental male subjects. The control £emale subjec"cs 
appeared to have been the most resistant to extinction. It would 
therefore seem that the interaction has produced a spurious main effect. 
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4.7 DISCUSSION 
The results of the present experiment uere in the predicted direction; 
that is self-modelling reduced conditioned eyeblink response relative 
to the control condition. H01fever, the results also seemed to 
indicate that the experimental female subjects were the most affected 
by self-modelling. They also indicated that the control female 
subjects were the most resistant to extinction compared lath their 
female counterparts and the males of both experimental conditions. 
The present findings are contradictory to learning (Stimulus-Response) 
theory predictions. In other uords, classical learning theory ~lould 
predict no difference between the two experimental conditions of 
the present study. Thus, the superior extinction performance of the 
experimental subjects rclative to the control subjects can hardly 
be explained in' terms of simple stimulus-Response principles. 
In cognitive-behavioural terms, h01,ever, the explanation for the 
present results and finding is obvlous. According to this model, the 
rapid rate of extinction observed in the Experimental Subjects was due 
to the psychological discomfort they experienced follOwing their 
negative evaluation of their CRs. In other words, the subjects in 
the experimental condition.experienced discomfort because they obtained 
instant visual feed-back of their mm responses (CRs) which were 
inconsistent ~th their self-images. Cognitive-behavioural model of 
behaviour change ~lould propose that because the subjects dl.d not like 
seeing themselves blink at; a subjectively undesirable rate, they used 
this feedback to control their eyeblink responses. The Control Subjects, 
on the other hand, could no~ avail themselves of this knowledge of 
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response (Le. visual feedback), and therefore were not visually 
aware of their excessive blinks.· Thus, the control subjects did 
not experience the kind of subjective discomfort that was experienced by 
their experimental counterparts, or at least not to such an extent as to 
motivate them to suppress or inhibit their conditioned responses. 
That· the Experimental Subjects experienced psychological discomfort 
is borne out by the Subject'~ post-experimental verbal descriptions of the 
study. For instance, while 78% of the Experimental Subjects reported 
that they realised in tne extinction phase, that they were blinking their 
eyes at a greater rate than they normally did, only 30% of the Control 
Subjects reported awareness of this fact. Also, while the former group 
of subjects seemed to have used this knm<ledge to control their 
conditioned responses, the few control subjects "ho reported awareness 
·of their responses failed to use this awareness (or feedback) to control 
their eyeblinks. As one Experimental .female subject reported: "I did 
not like seeing myself blinking so much so I tried to stop myself from 
blinking". 
As indicated by the results, there was no significant difference between 
the male subjects of the two experimental conditions. But a significant 
difference was found between the females of both conditions. These findings 
might be due to sex differences in conditionability (or dissipation). ·If 
this were the case, then the rapid rate of extinction in the experimental 
female subjects relative to the control female subjects might be 
interpreted as giving further support to the cognitive interpretation 
of the results obtained in this study. In Western societies, as in· 
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most human societies, there are social pressures on females to be 
more particular, and hence more self-conscious, about their physical 
appearance or 'self-presentation' than males (Orbach, 1978). It 
is not surprising, therefore, that the experimental females in this 
study were found to be more responsive to the experimental condition. 
They appeared to be more. perceptive of their responses (i.e. paid 
more attention in front of the mirror). Since their responses (i.e.· 
feedback of their CRs) were negatively inconsist~t with their so1£-
image, according -to cognitive-behavioural change theory, they 
experienced greater subjective discomfort. One of the modes of 
reducing this discomfert, as the above theory liould predict, was a 
change in behaviour; and this is I-That these subjects appeared to 
have done. That is, they tried to control their conditioned responses 
to coincide with their self-image. The control females, in contrast, 
could not avail themselves of such visual feedback. The significant 
difference found between the. female subjects of the two experimental 
situations makes this suggestion even more plausible. 
The most plausible interpretation of the results and general findings 
. of the present study is that the response decrement observed in the 
experimental group vTas produced to a large extent by their negative 
evaluation of their responses and its concomitant subjective discomfor-h. 
This suggests that cognitive factors are involved in classical 
conditioning phenomena, at least, as far as human subjects are concerned. 
The results also suggest that the human subject can employ his/her self-
observed behaviour ·or responses to control or modifty his/her mm 
behaviour. 
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Som~ of the theoretical implications of the results and findines of this 
study for learnine theory have already been montioned. Briefly, theso 
finding imply that in eye~id conditioning experiments, as in any other 
learning situation, many cognitive variables are of theoretical 
importance. The variables ifhich have been identified stress the 
import'ance of awareness and verbally induced sets upon performance. 
Whether any learning occurs in classical conditionine situations in the 
absence of m,areness is an open question. Of major importance is the 
question of just hOll cognitive factors operate in determining 
conditioned behaviour. 
Traditionally, one of the most frequent interpretations of cognitive 
influences in condHioning has been in terms of facHitatory or 
inhibitory effects upon performance through the subject·s set towards, 
his/her task or the experimental conditions. For eyeblink conditioning 
situations, these efi'ects are of historical significance and have been 
extensively discussed (e.g. Hilgard and Hunphreys, 1938; Norris and 
grant, 1948). The general results have been clear evidence of 
inhibition and facilitation by instructional variables. Some more 
recent reports on electrodermal response illustrate this type of effect. 
For instance, Hill (1967) first discussed conditioning with her subjects. 
She .then told half of them that the "intelligent thing is to be 
conditioned", while telling the other half that "the intelligent thing 
is not to be conditioned". The results indicated differential responding 
in aocordance with instruction - the favourable group responded at a 
consistently higher level than the anti-instruction group. The findings 
of the present experink'lnt are consistent lfith this report and stress 
the important role of oognit~ve variables in determining the acquisition 
or performance of any human behaviour. 
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The decision as to Hhethcr to be conditioned or not is often influenced 
by the experimenter in most instructi.on procedures, _such as Hill's 
(1967). However, in the present experiment, the decision was made 
(perhaps subconsciously) en~irely by the subject; this decision Has 
manipulated iIi.directly only by the experimental setting. In other 
vlOrds, the subject was exposed to his/her OHn response, and it li"as 
left entirely to him,lher to decide whether to continue to m,ske the 
response or to inhibit it. l-lhichever the subject decided to do was, 
according to cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change, chiefly 
determined by his/her cognitions about the response. The point may 
become more -clear if we liken the two conditions of the present 
experiment to the "instructed conditioning" and "instructed non-
condi tioning" technique such as Hill's (1967). Both the "instructed" 
non-conditioning" paradigm of Hill's and the experimental condition of 
the present study l~ere designed to arouse psychological discomfort in 
the subjects regarding their responses. Hill's "instructed conditioning" 
paradigm, hOHever, was to foster consonance in her subjects vrhereas 
the control condition of the present stuqy might be described as 
emotionally "neutral". The results of both studies indicate to us how 
cognitive factors operate in determining conditioned behaviour. They 
indicate that, at least in human subjects, whether a behaviour becomes 
conditioned or not depends to a large extent upon lThether or not that 
behaviour is consistent with the subject's cognitions about the 
behaviour. This interpretation is in keeping with Rescola' s (1973, 1974) 
suggestion that conditioning involves not only the formation of 
associations betl,een events, but also the development of internal 
representations of these events. 1I00fever, in the case of eyelid 
blinks, like any other response that the subject canno~ see himself/ 
herself making, a/he cannot form-an accurate internal representation-
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of his/her response unless s/he is provided with a visual feedback 
or his/her response to enable him/her to regulate it. In the present 
study, this feedback uaB provided in the experimental condition. 
These results are of special relevance to social learning or modelling 
theory. Several theories assume· that some type of mediational process 
is involved in obervational learning (e.g. Aronfrced, 1968; Bandura, 
1969, 1977; Rosenbaum and Arenson, 1968). All these theories suggest 
that rr.ediation occurs, at least in part, during the period 1rhen the 
obscrver is exposed to the model's performance. Although the' covert . 
performance of a previously learned imitative response may be regulated 
by reinforcing contingencies (Bandura, 1969) the acquisition of the 
response may be influenced by a variety of mediating factors, such as 
task characteristics and model characteristics. Because it is difficult 
to measure covert mediation, theories of observational learning have 
had to assume the presence of media:~ing processes. The findings of this 
experiment may be regarded as contributing t01fards the assessment of 
one form of mediational factors involved in observational learning, 
namely (cognitive) evaluation or affect regarding the behaviour. They 
demonstrate the effects of exposure to one's a.m response and the 
cognitive factors associated mth it on the learning or conditioning 
of automatic responses such as eyelid blinks. 
The results and findings of the present experiment have implications 
not only for theory but also for therapies using models. Exposure to a 
model's performance tends to elicit similar observer responses, but as 
the present results indicate, this appears to be the case only if the 
observer has a favourable attitude or cognitions about the model or the 
behaviour being performed. The implications of these findings for 
131 
\ . 
~ 
therapies using biofeedback techniques are also apparent. It would 
appear that many internal (as well as external) behaviours could be 
made more discriminable, and hence learnable or controllable, if their 
activity ~;ere to be fed directly to the conscious person through' 
amplifiers or other appropriate means. This suggests that the success 
or failure of biofeedback techniques to influence the activities of the 
internal (involuntary) organs of a person is principally dependent upon 
the person's ability or inability to recognise the changes that take 
place in the organs concerned; that is, the person's awareness of the 
internal activities, as originally suggested by the work of Kamiya 
(1962, 1969). This implies that awareness of an individual's own 
behaviour or internal activity appears 'to be a necessary prerequisite 
''-." 
for effecting changes in behaviour. The importance of one's awareness 
of one's ovm behaviour in effecting behaviour change also explains 
positively why"for instance, two visceral responses, micturition and 
defecation are successfully controlled by almost everyone through 
cultural training. Such successes make plausible the hypothesis that 
• 
other internal responses can be similarly controlled given sufficiently 
pervasive and persistent training conditions. 
Because eyeblink is in the autonomic nervous system this study brings 
cognitions into an area which is slightly unusual in the literature. 
Thus the conclusion (and suggestion) that may be dravm from the results 
B,nd findings of the present experiment is that a person' can control or 
regUlate his own behaviour (volitional'or autonomic) effectively if he 
can observe or discriminate that behaviour. In other Hords, if an 
individual cannot observe or discriminate Hhen he is oris not doing 
some 'act' then he cannot mobilise his cognitions pertinent to the act. 
to enable him to control or regualte that act. This implies the 
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potential effectiveness of I self-modelling I as a method of self-
control, and thus as a potential therapetic technique for the control 
and management of behaviour disorders ~There traditional.procedures 
have either failed or achieved only limited success. Further 
investigations are needed to determine its potential in the clinical 
and educational fields as Hell as other fields of psychology. 
, . 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
STUDY THREE: . SELF-MODELLIN.G AND WEIGHT CONTROL 
SUMMARY 
This study involved the use of self-modelling in an applied area. It 
investigated the use of self-modelling in the treatment of obesity or 
overweight. Thirty-two females enrolled in a private slimming club 
volunteered to participate in this study which was conducted over a 
period of 10 weeks. The Experimental and Control Groups were similar 
as far as their pre-treatment mean weights and desired mean weights 
were concerned. Analyses of the data indicated that towards the end of 
the study, the Experimental Group lost significantly more weight than 
the Control Groups. At the end of the study, the average weight loss 
for the Experimental Group was 4.27 pounds, and the average weight loss 
for Control Group I was 2.4S·pounds, while the average weight loss for 
Control Group II was 3.66 pounds. Analyses of follow-up data collected 
6 >leeks after the end of the study confirmed this finding. At follow-up 
the mean weight loss ,ras 8.27 pounds, 2.78 pounds and 2.00 pounds for 
Experimental Group, Control Group I and Control Group II respectively. 
The data suggest that self-modelling can be used in the control of 
addictive behaviours such as overeating, cigarette smoking 
they also suggest that cognitive factors are involved both in the 
acquisition and control of such behaviours •. The data are explained in 
cognitive terms, and their implications are discussed. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The problem of overweight is widely recognised not only as a physical 
or medical problem, but also as a social and psychological problem. It 
is common knowledge in the medical field that the obese person cannot 
achieve optimal health. S/he is more likely than the non-obese person 
to experience diabetes and is more likely to suffer from vaso-muscular" 
diseases such as hypertension and heart diseases. Socio-psychologically 
such a person, in Western cultures especially, is also more likely to 
experience low self-esteem, poor body image, "and a feeling of self-
consciousness than his/her non-obese counterpart (this is particularly so 
of women because of the social pressures on them to be attractive to 
men [Orbach, 1978]); these in turn have adverse effects on the person's 
physical health. The economic burden that the medical trea"tment of 
obesity places on the NHS in Britain, for instance, not to mention the 
amount of money individuals spend annually on drugs and aids to dieting, 
is like'lise enormous (Howitt, 1982). 
The literature on the origins and problems of obesity adopts several 
approaches. For instance, the behaviourist approach views overeating 
as a maladaptive learned response to environmental cues, that is, for 
instance, an obese person eats as a means of obtaining social rewards 
such as attention from others (e.g. Ferster et al, 1962). Traditional 
cognitive approach, on the other hand, views the obese person as 
stimulus-bound (Schacter, 1967; Schacter and Gloss, 1968). This means 
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that the obese individual has not learned to distinguish the psysiological 
cues to hunger from other physiological states. Thus, for the obese 
person, according to traditional cognitive approach, eating is partly a 
learned avoidance and a means of coping with, for instance, anger, 
reaching for food whenever he is irritated. 
Losing weight has shown to be a formidable task for both therapist and 
client, as aptly sununarised by Stunkard (1958), "Most obese persons 
will not remain in treatment, most will not lose weight, and of those 
who do lose weight, most will regain it" (p. 79). This pessimistic view 
is supported not only by case histories (e.g. Ferster et al, 1962; 
Goldiamond, 1965; Cautela, 1966b), but also by survey studies of 
" 
clients in medical settings (e.g. Barmon et al, 1958; Franklin and 
Rynearson, 1960; Silverstone and Solomon, 1965), most of which have 
reported a general lack of success in effecting any long-term weight 
reduction. Various reports on diet restriction have likewise been 
disappointing (e.g. Stollak, 1967; Bray, 1970). Generally, behavioural 
approaches to the treatment of obesity along the lines of Ferster's et 
al (1962) and Stuart's (1967) procedures have also been relatively 
ineffective as far as long-term weight reduction is concerned. 
Generally, the behavioural approaches to the treatment of obe'sity tend 
to be confined to a list of stimulus and environmental control procedures, 
such as "chew food 20 times"; "knives and forks down after each bite", 
and so forth. Such a behavioural approach gives little attention to 
the affective and cognitive processes involved in overeating. As an 
extension of general experimental psychology, behaviour modification is 
essentially environmentalistic, looking to external variables for the 
alteration of undesirable behaviour; it does not tell us how, for 
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instance, the obese individual so manipulated perceives the reasons for 
his changing. 
An examination of the contingencies governing addictive behaviours in 
general, and overeating in particular, shows several reasons why this 
type of behaviour should be resistant to change. Addictive behaviours 
such as overeating provides immediate positive reinforcement for the 
individual, while the reward for not eating is usually' extremely 
delayed. Furthermore, the aversive consequences of overeating are 
typically delayed for weeks or even years. As Eysenck (1961) has 
pointed out, therapies based on pairing aversive reinforcement with the' 
performance of the undesirable behaviour are likely to be ineffective 
in the long run, because the fear of the negative consequences will 
tend to be extinguished when the behaviour is performed without the 
negative reinforcement following. Hence, in the case of obesity, it 
seems reasonable to postulate that the type of treatment programme that 
is likely to effect weight reduction and its long-term maintenance would 
be one that would not necessarily prolong the (immediate) positive 
reinforcement a person derives from overeati~g, but would rather bring 
forward the negative consequences of doing so, that is, a programme 
that would take into account the person's cognitions not only about 
obesity per se, but also about his/her body image. 
5.2 AIM 
This study was a field investigation into the use of self-modelling in 
the treatment of overweight. 
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3.3 HYPOTHESES 
Orbach (1978) has suggested that most obese persons are very aware of 
how their faces look but not in relation to the rest of their bodies, 
and that such individuals tend to avoid subjectively unacceptable views 
of themselves by, for example, keeping their heads down as they walk 
past shop windows lest they cast a glance of themselves unaware and 
trigger negative feelings or cognitions. In other words, most obese 
persons seek to avoid reflection of their body images. It would, 
therefore, follow from cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change 
that if an obese person were made (objectively) aware of his or her 
entire body: 
(1) s/he would experience negative feelings or cognitions about over-
eating and would thus exercise self-control over his/her eating 
habits, and/or engage in more physical activities; 
(2) s/he would be more motivated to lose weight than his/her 
counterpart; 
(3)· s/he would stay in treatment for a longer period of time than 
his/her counterparts; 
(4) such an· individual would be more likely to maintain his/her weight 
loss than his/her counterparts. 
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5.4 METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
(i) Subjects 
The subjects were 32 females who had voluntarily enrolled in a private 
slimming club which met we:ekly'for one hour. The mean age of subjects 
was 31 years, and ranged from 16 years to 58 years. Subjects' mean 
baseline weight in poundage was 147 and ranged from 114 to 195, and 
their mean desired weight (goal) was 129.53 [Appendix 4(e): (i)-
(iii)]. Each subject paid a membership fee and a weekly session' charge 
to the club. ,Twenty-four subjects had been with the club for an average 
period of 4 months when this experiment began, while 8 of them enrolled 
'" 
at about the same time as the study began. Subjects were in various 
occupations at the time of the study, including teachers, a nurse, 
typists, school canteen ladies, housewives and 2 school girls. The mean 
age of onset of overweight amongst all the subjects was 22 years, although 
49% of them described themselves as overweight during adolescence. 
Sixty per cent of all the subjects in this study stated that they had 
made at least two unsuccessful attempts at weight reduction previously. 
A pre-experimental questionnaire revealed that almost all the subjects 
wanted to lose weight for cosmetic, reasons. With regard to the subjects' 
levels of motivation to lose weight, the questionnaire further revealed 
that most of them (75%) envisaged a 'lot' of satisfaction from weight 
loss. This was confirmed by the subjects' reported self-perception 
prior to joining the slimming club. Seventy eight per cent of them 
described their body images prior to joining the club in a negative 
fashion [see Appendices 4(a) and,4(b)]. 
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(U) Apparatus 
The apparatus used in the present experiment consisted of a mirror-room 
together with a Slater 209 measuring scale to record the subjects' 
weights. The mirror-room, which was portable, was specially constructed 
for the purposes of this study, and consisted of a square 'room' with 
8 feet sides and height of 5~ feet. The inside was covered in non-
breakable acrylic mirrors. This enabled' the subjects to, see their 
bodies from all angles [see Appendix 6: Diagram 3(d)]. 
(Ui) Proaedure 
"" 
One week prior to the study, each subject answered a questionnaire 
designed to investigate such factors as her level of motivation to lose 
weight, her body image, eating habits and physical activity, whether 
she looked at her body either in the nude or half-clothed in a full-
length mirror and her feelings about her reflection in the mirror 
[see Appendix 4(a)]. Subjects were also requested to complete another 
questionnaire six weeks after the termination of the experiment (follow-
up contacts)Isee Appendices 4(c) and 4(d)]. After the completion of the 
pre-experimental questionnaire, subjects were given forms and 
instructions to self-monitor their daily eating habits, body weight and 
physical, activities for one week. This constituted the baseline week. 
After the baseline period, the subjects were allocated into three 
separate groups on the basis of their willingness to participate in the 
experiment. Twenty-one subjects volunteered to participate and were 
randomly assigned to conditions. Of these 12 were in the Experimental 
Group and 9 in Control Group i. These subjects continued to monitor 
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daily their eating habits, body weights, and physical activities. The 
Experimental Group also viewed themselves in the mirror-room weekly, 
initially for one minute, and from the third week onwards, the time was 
increased to 2-3 minutes. Of course, Control Group I was subjected to 
the same treatment but did not enter the mirror-room. 
Subjects who refused to participate in the study comprised Control 
Group 11. They neither monitored their daily eating habits, physical 
activities nor their daily body weights; and like Control Group I, 
they,never entered the mirror-room. All the subjects, however, 
weighed-in on a Slater 209 scale provided by the club leader before each 
weekly one-hour group session began, and the leader recorded clients' 
weekly body weights on their individual cards. These recorded individual 
weekly weights were used, at the end of the study, for intergroup 
comparisons. The data on daily body weight, food intake and physical 
activity were also collected for comparisons between the Experimental 
Group and Control Group I. 
When subjects met for a weekly session, they changed into their 
appropriate costumes (leotards) and then lined up for their weekly 
weigh-ins. The Experimental Subjects weighed-in first in order for 
them to visit the mirror-room before the session began. After the 
weigh-ins, the group (club) leader announced their individual weights. 
The client who lost the most in poundage in that week was proclaimed 
the 'Slimmer of the Week'. The slimmer of the week received a certifi-
cate from the leader and applause from the whole group (other clients). 
After that the experimenter collected the completed forms for self-
monitoring for the previous week from the Experimental Subjects and 
Control Group I Subjects, and supplied them with fresh forms for the 
following week. 
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After weighing-in, the Experimental Subjects, in their leotards, follo>led 
the experimenter to a separate room where the mirror-room was situated. 
The subjects then entered the mirror-room, one at a.time, and viewed 
themselves from all angles. The subjects waited outside the room where 
the mirror-room was situated and took turns to enter. The experimenter 
remained unobstrusively outside the mirror-room. During the first two 
sessions, each subject was allowed to view herself closely from all 
angles for a period of one minute. From the third week onwards subjects 
viewed themselves on average for 2-3 minutes weekly. After a subject 
had viewed herself, she joined the other groups for their weekly 
session. During a session, the group leader advised the whole group on 
dietd.ng and grooming for about 4-6 minutes. After that i:,he whole group 
., 
carried out various light bodily exercises to pop music played on a . 
standard cassette recorder for about 20 minutes. 
The experiment was conducted over a period of 10 weeks. Six weeks after 
the end of the study, subjects in all the 3 groups were contacted. Those 
who were still attending sessions were contacted by the experimenter 
while those who had left the club were contacted by post, and were 
requested to complete a post-experimental questionnaire. The post-
experimental questionnaire was similar to the pre-experimental questionnaire 
[Appendices 4(a) and 4(c)]. Data on the subjects' weights at follow-up 
were also collected for analyses [Appendix 4(g)]. 
Like most obesity studies, attrition amongst all the 3 groups involved 
was found. On the last day of the study (the tenth week), only 41% 
(5 out of 12),33% (3 out of 9), and 18.2% (2 out of 11) of the 
Experimental Group, and Control Groups I and II respectively, attended 
session [Appendix 4(e): (i)-(iii)]. 
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5.5 RESULTS 
Because of lack of co-operation on the part of the subjects in monitoring 
their daily eating habits and physical activities, coupled with serious 
inaccuracies in their self-reports, these variables - eating habits and 
physical activity - were not used for statistical analyses. Thus only 
data on the subjects' body weights were analysed. 
Data on subjects' body weights were analysed in terms of (1) pre-treat-
ment weight, (2) desired weight (goal), (3) weekly absolute weight loss, 
and (4) cumulative (net) weight loss (i.e. pre-treatment weight minus 
weight at the end of the study or at the time the subject left the 
programme). Following Stunkard and McLaren-Hurnes' (1959) and Harris 
and Bruner's (1971) suggestion, individual results are presented [see 
Appendix 4 (e) : (i) - (i11)] 1. 
The mean pre-treatment weight· in poundage was: Experimental Group, 
146.08; Control Group I, 149.66; and Control Group II, 146.72. The 
mean desired weight in poundage was: Experimental Group, 131; Control 
Group I, 130; and Control Group lI, 127. A oneway ANOVA performed on 
the pre-treatment data revealed that there were no significant differences 
between the means of the 3 groups as far as their pre-t>:eatment weights 
and desired weights were concerned (F = .065; d/f = 2; p = .9370; and 
F = .0031; d/f = 2; p = .9969 for pre-treatment weight and desired 
weight respectively). 
1 Appendix 4(e): (i)-(111) represents individual changes in weight 
during the treatment period. . The data also reflect the drop-out 
, 
rate of the subjects and also ·specify treatment time for each subject. 
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Because of the lack of significant differences amongst the groups in 
their pre-treatment weights and desired weights, the analysis suggested 
by Wilson's (1978) weight index: (kg lost/initial overweight) x (initial 
kg/ideal kg) .:x 100: was not employed in subsequent analyses. 
A oneway ANOVA was performed ·on all the other data. According to the 
analyses, no significant differences emerged between the groups until 
the seventh week of treatment. In the seventh week, a highly signifi-
cant difference was observed between the group means in terms of weekly 
absolute weight loss (F = 7.6408; d/f = 2; P = .0043). Further 
t-tests (Student's t-test) indicated that the differences were between 
the E:xperimental Group and Control Group I (p = <.05) and also between 
the two Control Groups (p = <.05). No significant difference between 
the E:xperimental Group and Control Group II was observed at this stage. 
No significant differences were observed in week 8, however. Analysis 
of weekly absolute changes in week 8 only approached the conventional 
.05 level of significance (F = 2.2801; d/f = 2; P = .1366). However, 
in the tenth week, the last week of the study, a highly significant 
difference was obtained between the means (weekly absolute weight loss) 
of the groups (F = 10.9744; d/f = 2; P = .0099) [Appendi:x 4(f): 
(i)-(iv)]. Subsequent t-tests indicated that the obtained difference 
was only between the E:xperimental Group and Control Group II "(p = .01). 
A follow-up study was carried out 6 weeks after the end of the e:xperiment. 
All the subjects were contacted either personally or by post. During 
this period, 4 E:xperimental Subjects, 2 Control Group I Subjects and 3 
Control Group II Subjects had stopped attending club sessions. One of 
the Experimental Subjects left 4 weeks before the end of "the study 
because she had almost achieved her goal (140 lb) and during contact she 
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was still losing weight; and another (Experimental Subject) had left 
because of pregnancy. All the drop-outs were contacted by post and all 
of them responded. 
Subjects' individual weights were observed at follow-up, and analysed 
according to groups. However, the Experimental Subject who was pregnant 
during this period was excluded from the analyses. The data were 
analysed in terms of (1) follow-up weight (i.e. pre-treatment weight 
minus weight at follow-up) and (2) percentage follow-up weight (i.e. 
percentage difference between pre-treatment weight and follow-up weight). 
The mean follow-up weight in poundage was: Experimental Group, 141.8; 
control Group I, 146; and Control Group II, 144.27 [Appendix 4(g): 
'. 
(i)-(iii)]. A oneway ANOVA performed on the follow-up weight yielded a 
marginally significant difference between the means of the 3 groups 
(F = 2.5601; d/f = 2; p = .0953) [see Appendix 4(g): (iv)-(v)]. 
Subsequent student's t-tests performed on the same data indicated 
significant differences between the Experimental Group and Control 
Group I (t = 2.32; d/f = 18; P = .025 [one-tailed]), and between the 
Experimental Group and Control Group II (t = 2; d/f = 20; p = .05 
[one-tailed]). There was no significant difference between the Control 
Groups. These results indicate that the effects of the experimental 
condition were more evident during the follow-up period. 
The 3 groups were also compared on percentage follow-up weight (as 
defined above) and a one way ANOVA performed on the percentage data 
revealed an overall significant difference between the means of the 3 
groups (F = 3.3608; d/f = 2; P = .0492). Further t-tests (one-tailed) 
indicated significant differences between the Experimental Group and 
Control Group I (t = 1.9841; d/f = 18; P = .05) and between the 
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Experimental Group and Control Group II (t = 2.3579; d/f = 20; 
P = >.025). However, there was no significant difference between the 
2 Control Groups (t = 0.3967/ d/f = 18; p.= >.05), as one would 
expect •. 
5.6 SUMMARY AND ANALYSES OF RESULTS 
Four main hypotheses were advanced in the present experiment: if an 
obese person with negative attitudes towards o!::>esity "ere made 
(objectively) aware of his/her entire body:. (1) s/he would experience 
negative feelings about his/her body image and would thus exercise 
self-control over his/her eating habits; (2) s/he would be more 
motivated to lose weight than his/her counterparts; (3) s/he would 
stay in treatment for a longer period of time than his/her counterparts; 
(4) s/he would be more likely to maintain his/her weight loss than 
his/her counterparts. 
As mentioned earlier, the first hypothesis could not be tested owing to 
the difficulties involved in self-monitoring and serious inaccuracies 
in self-reports. Although the results of the data collected during the 
treatment period generally failed to support the second hypothesis, the 
follow-up results support this hypothesis. The general lack of support 
for the second hypothesis by the treatment data may be due to the fact 
that the experiment was not carried. out over a long enough period of 
time for its effects to be fully realised. This suggestion becomes 
more plausible when one examines the data on absolute weekly weight loss. 
The main significant differences, as far as the absolute weekly weight 
loss was concerned, were observed during" the later stage of the 
experiment, that is, between the seventh and tenth week: significant 
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differences between the Experimental Group and Control Group I (at the 
5% level) and between the 2 Control Groups in the seventh week; and 
.01 significant difference between the Experimental Group and control 
Group 11 in the tenth week. Inspection of the results indicates that in 
the period between week 7 and week 10 of treatment, the Experimental 
Group appeared to differ from the Control Groups. However, while the 
Experimental Group showed some stability, the Control ~roups fluctuated 
during this period which was to be expected since the Control Groups were 
not receiving any treatment. The results also suggest that the (requested) 
daily self-monitoring of eating habits, body weight and physical 
activity had no influence on the results. Nevertheless, because of the 
fluctuating nature of body weight, like body temperature or heart rate, 
it appears that a week by week analysis of the results of the present. 
study was not a particularly meaningful method of evaluating the efficacy 
of the experiment. 
, -
Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 were all supported.by both treatment and follow-up 
data. In the ninth week of the experiment attendance rate was: Experi-
mental Group, 50%; Control Group,I, 33%; and Control Group 11, 36%, 
and in the tenth week (the last week of the study) attendance rate was: 
Experimental Group, 41.66%; Control Group I, 33.3%, and Control Group 
Il, 18.2%. Also during follow-up, the Experimental Subjects as a group 
had lost more poundage than either of the Control Groups. In terms 
of attrition, 4 Experimental Subjects (including the pregnant subject), 
2 Control Group I Subjects, and 4 Control Group 11 Subjects had left 
the club during the follow-up period. However, of the 4 Experimental 
Subjects who had left the club, one did so because of pregnancy, and 
another because she had almost reached her goal. Besides, the Experi~ 
mental dropouts, except for the pregnant one, continued to lose weight 
during this period. On the other hand, all the dropouts of the 
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Control Groups, except for one Control Group II Subject, had gained 
weight, as indicated by Individual Results. In brief, analyses of the 
follow-up data indicated 'that the Experimental Group, as a whole, 
was significantly associated with weight change in the predicted 
direction, namely, this group lost the, greatest amount of weight; whereas 
the Control Groups did not differ significantly in the amounts of weight 
lost over the same period. 
5.7 DISCUSSION 
Obesity, whatever its root causes, is seen as the result of a positive 
energy balance. When the energy balance c~, be reversed, obesity can 
be overcome. It is this model of obesity which serves as the ingredient 
for most traditional and behavioural intervention procedures. The 
results of the present study, however, introduce another dimension into 
the concept of obesity and its intervention procedures. This study, 
unlike for instance behavioural procedures, takes into account the obese 
person's views and cognitions about obesity itself, herself, as well as 
her consumatory behaviour.' The present results suggest that a treatment 
procedure for obesity must start with the individual's perception and 
cognitions about his physical state or looks., If the individual's 
awareness of her body arouses negative cognitions or affect in her, she 
will be more likely to change her behaviour either by eating less or by 
engaging in more physical activities, or indeed, i:>y combining both, to 
accord with her cognitions. This suggestion permits a cognitive-
behavioural interpretation of the results of the present study. 
Goldrnan et al (1968), reported that anxiety and nervousness about shock 
decreased more for non-obese subjects than for obese subjects following 
eating, therefore leading to a refutation of the commonplace fallacy 
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that obese persons are more likely to eat in response to negative arousal 
than non-obese persons and that eating is more l:ikely to reduce the 
subjective discomfort of obese persons than non-obese persons. This 
report in fact ties in with the findings of the present study and also 
suggests that subjective discomfort was experienced by the Experimental 
Subjects involved in this study as a result of being exposed to their 
bodies. 
The traditional concept of the aetiology of obesity and its dynamics is 
that personality disturbance precipitates overeating and that obesity 
is a symptom of this underlying disturbance. Since personality factors 
trigger off inappropriate eating in this conceptualiSationi intervention 
is aimed at changing personality. A behavioural analysis of obesity, on 
the other hand, as delineated by Stuart and his associates (Stuart, 1971/ 
Stuart and Davis, 1972) for instance, views inappropriate behaviour as 
the first st.ep in the chain. According to Stuart (1971), it is the 
obese state itself which preCipitates the thoughts and feelings associated 
with personality problems. Hence, the behavioural approach intervenes 
by attempting to alter the individual's eating habits directly so that 
he or she can have different experiences in his or her environment, 
these experiences leading, in turn, to changes in the thoughts and 
feelings which comprise the message which the individual gives himself 
or herself. This approach is correct insofar as it goes. As Stuart 
himself has pointed out, t.he consequences, that is, the weight loss, 
social acceptance and changes in thoughts and feelings, are often 
delayed because people need to'lose large amounts of weight, which takes 
time. Therefore, intervention at only the behavioural level is not 
enough. For instance, massive weight loss achieved through hospitalised 
fasting has proved to be insufficient motivation to control weight 
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(Swanson and Dinello, 1970). Neither is intervention at the 'thoughts 
and feelings' level, e.g. in Stuart's model, is enough by itself, as 
demonstrated by the lack of positive results achieved by traditional 
psychotherapy. It appears obvious, therefore, that attacking the problem 
at both behavioural and cognitive levels is a necessary intervention 
strategy. In the absence of therapist contact or social pressure or 
support, it is unlikely that the use of any programme along Ferster's 
(Ferster et al, 1962) such as Stuart's model will result in a signifi-
cant weight loss which will be maintained over time, as Jeffery (1976) 
has pointed out. 
The present study attempted to approach the problem of obesity simul-
taneously at 3 levels: (1) self-perception or objective body awareness 
(i.e. exposure to the subject's own body in its entirety), (2) subject's 
cognitions or feelings of her own body image, and (3) subj ect 's 
behaviour. According to this strategy, the obese person must first of 
all see his or her body as objectively as possible - as others see him 
or her; the person must accept his or her body as it is, in its 
la.rgeness. The second step in the chain is the individual's cognitions 
or evaluation, positive or negative, of his or her body. Lastly, having 
made cognitive evaluation of his or her body, the person will then 
decide to behave or act in accordance with his or her cognitions of 
himself or herself. 
The basic premise of the present study was that if an obese person's 
awareness of his or her undistorted body image aroused negative 
cognitions or feelings in.him or her, s/he would strive to eliminate or 
reduce such negative affects (or dissonance) by modifying his/her 
behaviouq that is either by reducing his/her caloric intake, or by 
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increasing his/her energy expenditure, or indeed by combining both. 
This in fact is what seemed to have happened in this experiment. It 
has already been suggested that negative affect was aroused in the 
subjects who viewed themselves weekly in the mirror-room. This group 
of subjects lost the greatest amount of weight compared to their control 
counterparts. However, cognitive-behavioural model of behaviour change 
acknowledges the fact that an obese person who holds positive cognitions 
about obesity or roundness of the body, would behave accordingly. That 
is the negative affect is aroused in a culture which values slimness; 
the cognitions may be different in cultures with opposite values. For 
instance, Worsley (1981) has reported that Australian adolescents of 
South Eastern European perentage have more positive attitudes towards 
overweight individuals (adolescents) than their counterparts of Western 
European parentage. 
That the experimental condition aroused negative affect in the subjects 
is attested by their reactions to their body images on their first two 
visits to the mirror-room. Most of them expressed surprise at their 
own objective views of themselves .. in the experimental situation, as 
indicated by their responses to the post-experimental questionnaire 
[see Appendices 4(c) and 4(d): question 26]. Almost all of them 
perceived their mirror reflections as being fatter than they·thought 
they actually were. On their first visits almost everyone of them could 
be heard by the experimenter, from behind the mirror-room, weighing 
·various parts of her body, for instance, patting her buttocks, feeling 
her waist and thighs, and holding her stomach in and so forth; and at 
the same time muttering to herself, such as: "Oh, I'm fat!"; "Christ, 
I didn't realise that I was so fat ••• Perhaps the mirrors are 
distorted."; "I must lose a hell of a lot of weight on my bum."; "Oh, 
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this is depressing! My legs don't feel as fat as they look."; and so 
forth. In fact, one subject (21 year old), on her first visit, emerged 
from the mirror-room in tears. However, she continued to participate in 
the experiment, since, according to her, the mirrors enabled her to 
see which parts of her body needed "shaping uP.". 
While behavioural treatment programmes of obesity typically seek to 
manipulate only environmental variables, the present study recognises 
that important as they are, these variables are not necessarily the 
only set of factors behind this problem. The important role the obese 
person's cognitions of his or her physical state or looks plays in his 
or her motivation, or lack of it, towards weight reduction needs to be 
acknowledged. It must be appreciated that cognitive factors are as 
manipulable as environmental factors, as emphasized by Homme (1965): 
"Coverants - the covert operants of the mind." The present study 
followed Homme's suggestion. 
In efforts to facilitate the maintenance of weight loss, some investigators 
have studied the application of self-reinforcement. The basic assumption 
of self-reinforcement is that the subject will eventually have to manage 
his or her own weight in the absence of the therapist's support. This 
involves the training of the subject in self-management (e.g" Jeffery & 
Christensen, 1972). In ~he treatment of overweight, self-modelling, as 
used in the present study, would appear to be more parsimonous, and 
more effective than application of self-reinforcement as suggested by 
Jeffery & Christensen,(1972). In the first place, it does not require 
any training on the part of the subject. Secondly, self-modelling is 
capable of applying both positive and negative reinforcements 
, 
simultaneously. For instance, in the case of overweight, the individual 
is instantly reinfcrced either positively or negatively following 
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overeating, depending upon his or her cognitions or level of mottvation 
toward weight reduction, by virtue of the fact that as a result of 
his/her exposure to his/her body, s/he will carry a mental representation 
of his/her body in its largeness. This ubiquitous mental picture should 
remind the obese individual of his/her body image and his/her efforts 
to reduce weight or control it; it should remind him/her of his/her 
weight problem in the face of temptation to overeat. If the person 
succumbs to temptation to overeat s/he is instantly negatively reinforced 
by this mental picture; on the other hand, if s/he is able to resist 
the temptation, s/he is positively reinforced by the knowledge that 
s/he has taken a step in the desired direction. However, the major 
potential self-modelling possesses for the treatment of overweight 
appears to lie in the fact that, unlike most behavioural procedures, . 
the negative reinforcement associated with overeating is not delayed·for 
years, months or even hours, instead the behaviour (i.e. overeating) 
and the negative reinforcement (e .• g. feelings of guilt) bear a very 
close temporal relationship. 
Self-modelling, according to the findings of the present study, may 
also prove to be an important contribution towards the solution of the 
formidable problem of attrition which besets most traditional as well 
as behavioural procedures. 
It is generally agreed that the purpose of an effective and permanent 
weight reduction and welght control programme is the development of 
self-control of eating and related daily activities. Bandura (1969) 
has stres~ed the importance of mediating variables in the process of 
self-control. This implies the importance of thoughts in dealing 
" 
with impulsive action and for introducing competing cognitive 
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alternatives into self-regulatory sequences. The 'cognitive-behavioural' 
model adopted in the present study fully embodies the suggestion offered 
above by Bandura. Both dissonance research and the data Bem (1967) has 
gathered supporting the interpretation of that research/and studies of 
'locus of control' (e.g. Rotter, 1966) lead to the conclusion that 
behaviour change is very much influenced by an individual's explanation 
for his/her behaviour. If an individual believes that s/he is 
responsible for engaging in a behaviour which is inconsistent with 
his/her own attitude, his/her attitude or behaviour will more readily 
change to become consistent with one or the other than if s/he believes 
that external forces are responsible for his/her behaviour. If we make 
the assumption that the behaviour modification or therapy client 
construes agents of change to be outside himself, then we have 'a change 
brought about via external influences. It would thus appear that 
operant approaches would pose problems for the maintenance of weight 
loss once the artificially imposed contingencies are withdrawn. Hence, 
the paucity of reports of behaviour change through traditional 
behavioural techniques such as operant procedures in the treatment of 
obesity, as of clgarette smoking .and other addictive behaviours, may be 
accounted for, in part, by notions of attribution. It would appear, 
therefore, that behaviour change believed to be brought .about by oneself 
will be maintained to a. greater degree than behaviour change· . which is 
believed to be due to external forces or agents. It is therefore not 
surprising that the Experimental Subjects involved in the present study 
were, as a group, associated with a greater welght loss than the Control 
Subjects during the follow-up period. The decision and the motivation 
to lose weight was taken and fostered by the subjects themselves as a 
result of the cognitive processes engendered by the experimental 
, 
condition, as a result of becoming objectively aware of their body 
. 154' 
images; and because they attributed the changes in their body" weights 
to themselves, they became more encouraged and motivated to persevere in 
their efforts to control their weights. As one Experimental Subject 
sunnnarised it at follow-up: "When I lost 14 lb, I thought I could do 
it by myself, so I left the club, and I did it. Now I feel confident 
and proud of myself, because I"have lost more than I originally aimed 
for." [see Appendix 4(d): question 26]. 
The present experiment was a field study which investigated the appli-
cation of self-modelling to social behaviour, in the long or medium 
, ". 
term, outside of the strictly controlled laboratory situation. It 
investigated the use of self-modelling in the treatment of overweight. 
The results and findings support those of previous studies, which have 
been described above. They further demonstrate that self-modelling as 
a therapeutic technique has potential not only in laboratory situations, 
but also outside of the laboratory. Nevertheless, further studies are 
needed to guage its efficacy relative to other forms of behaviour 
change procedures. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
STUDY !:'OUR: THE RELATIVE EFFICACY OF SELF-MODELLING 
COMPARED WITH OTHER BEHAVIOUR CHANGE TECHNIQUES 
SUMMARY 
This study compared the relative efficacy of self-modelling with two 
forms of behaviour change techniques: (1) negative modelling in which 
the subject is vicariously punished for the modelled behaviour,and 
(2) a form of biofeedback in which the subject observes visually and 
auditorily his/her own physiological response to the behaviour s/he 
is performing. The study was of cigarette smoking behaviour; and it 
employed a pre-test-post-test experimental design. In the self-
modelling condition the subject smoked in a mirror-room. In order to 
manipulate cognitive aspects of the situation so that all the subjects 
had negative cognitions about· smoking, anti-smoking literature was 
given to the subjects three days before the second part of the 
experiment. The results showed that the amount of tobacco consumed was 
lowest in the self-modelling group. 
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6. 1 INTRODUCTION 
Much effort has been made in the conceptualisation and development of 
procedures in the area of behaviour change. Because of the large 
number of procedures which have been developed for modification of 
behaviour, comparisons of different procedures are needed in order to 
guage what theoretical conceptualisations contribute most to our 
understanding of behaviour change, and also what procedures are most 
" 
effective in bringing about such changes. Most behaviour modification 
programmes, today, follow the works of such historical 'as well as 
contemporary learning theorists and investigators as Pavlov (1927), 
Watson (1924), Skinner (1953, 1957), Wolpe (1958), Lazarus (1958), 
,~, 
,", .. - .... 
Wolpe & Lazarus (1966), and Bandura (1969). 
In the clinical field, 'modelling', (in its various forms) and'bio-
feedback' are two of the major procedures used in bringing about 
behaviour change. Both procedures derive from learning principles. 
The theoretical underlying assumptions of biofeedback techniques are 
based on operant conditioning principles; whereas modelling techniques 
have social learning as their basic principle. 
Biofeedback has been reported to be particularly 'successful in the 
treatment of physical or physiological disorders such as neuromuscular 
disorders (e.g. Shapiro'& Surwitz, 1976; Basmajian, 
(1977), tel,sion headache and migraine (e,.g. Sturgis et al,1978), muscle 
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tension (e.g. lIaynes et al, 1975; Bild and Adams, 1980), and cardio-
vascular disorders (e.g. Engel, 1977; Blanchard & Epstein, 1978). 
Essentially, biofeedback involves training the client to recognise 
his/her own physiological (or internal) responses and to use this 
knowledge (or feedback) to control such responses. As regards the 
future of biofeedback in clinical practice, Ferguson (1981) has emphasised 
the important role this technique will play, in the 1980s, in the treat-
ment of a variety of medical and psychological problems. He has also 
predicted that biofeedback is going to form an important part of the 
growing trend towards health care as opposed to disease care • 
• Modelling, on the other hand, has mainly been used in the treatment or 
'. 
modification of (overt) behaviour disorders. For instance, Bandura et al 
(1967) and Somervil et al (1981) have used modelling to treat snake 
phobia; and Davis (1979) has used it to modify classroom disruptive 
behaviour. Modelling has·also been used in the training of desirable 
behaviours such as moral behaviour (Bandura & McDonald, 1963) as well 
as self-help skills (Wheman, 1976). Sarason and Sarason (1981) have 
also demonstrated that modelling can be used to teach cognitive as well 
as social skills in adolescent delinquents. Common to biofeedback and 
modelling techniques is the fact that they both rely on knowledge of 
response (or feedback) for effecting the appropriate behaviour change. 
One of the various forms of modelling procedures is 'negative modelling'. 
According to Bandura (1969, 1971), negative modelling refers to a 
situation in which the observer is vicariously punished for the modelled 
behaviour. Thus, this modelling effect is contingent upon vicarious 
reinforcement which is defined as the operation of exposing the observer 
to the procedure of presenting a reinforcing stimulus to the model 
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after,· and contingent upon, a certain response made by the model. 
Vicarious reinforcement is not contingent upon a response made by the 
observer. 
Vicarious reinforcement can either increase or decrease the imitation of 
the model by the observer depending upon the nature of the reinforcement 
being applied. That is, positive reinforcement is likely to increase 
the imitation of the model, whereas negative reinforcement is likely to 
decrease the imitation of the model. It has been reported that training· 
under vicarious punishment conditions gives rise to decrements in 
imitation (e .• g.Bandura . & Walters, 1963; Bandura & Kupers, 1964). 
For instance, Bandura (197lb; 1977) has reported that subjects often 
" 
decreased their imitation of the model if the model was punished. He 
suggests that seeing the model rewarded or punished provides the 
observer with information regarding the types of responses most likely 
to lead to reward or punishment. Bandura (1977) has further suggested 
that seeing the consequences to the model may lead to the arousal of 
the observer's emotions (especially in the case of punishment). 
A feature of vicarious reinforcement is that it does not have to be 
experienced by the observer directly. As noted by Bandura & Barat·'<,-
(1971), human imitative behaviour is often controlled by anticipated 
consequences of prospective actions. These anticipated consequences 
are often established through differential reinforcement that is either 
directly experienced, inferred from observed response consequences of 
others, or conveyed through verbal explanations. The occurrence of 
inhibitory effects of vicarious experiences is indicated when, as a 
function of observing n.egative response consequences to the model, the 
observer shows either decrements in the same class of behaviour or a 
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general reduction of responsiveness. The inhibitory effects of 'negative 
modelling' can therefore best be evaluated either by measuring response 
decrements from baseline levels or by. comparison with the performances 
of subjects who have not experienced the same negative response 
consequences. 
Negative modelling, as described above, requires at least two individuals: 
a model and an observer. In contrast, in a self-modelling situation, as 
used in previous studies (detailed above) , the observer is his own model. 
The results of previous studies indicated that self-modelling can. be 
used as a sucgessful procedure for the extinction of undesirable 
behaviours. Nonetheless, the practical usefulness of self-modelling, 
like any other treatment or training procedure, can only be guaged by 
investigations comparing it with other forms of modelling (or feedback) 
procedures. The present investigation compares the relative efficacy 
of self-modelling and other forms of feedback systems in the intervention 
of cigarette smoking behaviour. 
6.2 AIM 
This study investigated the relative practical usefulness of self-
modelling compared with n.egative modelling and a form of bioi;eedback in 
. .'. 
the treatment of cigarette smoking behaviour. 
6. 3 HYPOTHESIS 
On the basis of previous seli;-modelling studies and evidence from 
existing negative modelling and biofeedback studies, it was hypothesised 
that cigarette smokers would 'smoke less in terms of the amount of 
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tobacco consumed and the amount of time lit cigarettes stayed in their 
mouths in the following treatment conditions: (1) self-modelling, 
(2) negative modelling; ·and (3) biofeedback, than in a control (or 
no-treatment) condition. 
6.4 METHOD AND PROCEDURE 
(i) Subjects 
Forty university students at Loughborough University volunteered to 
participate in this experiment. Four 'of them dropped out of the experi-
ment after the pre-test session, thus leaving 36 subjects (19 males and 
17 females). At the time of the study all the subjects were active 
cigarette smokers with an average consumption of 15 cigarettes per day 
(as reported by the subjects themselves). 
(ii) Apparatus 
The apparatus used in the present experiment was the same as that 
employed in previous smoking experiments [see Appendix 6: Diagrams 
1 and 2]. However, the following apparatus was also used in this 
experiment: 
(1) a mirror-room [see Appendix 6: Diagram 3(d)] 
(2) fictitious anti-smoking literature written by the 
experimenter [see Appendix 5(a)] 
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(3) a pre-taped BBC television (Blue Peter) programme 
('What Ice Did To The Land'), 
(4) a television film of two models of both sexes (two 
cigarette smokers~ 
(iiiJ ExperimentaZ Design and Procedure 
This study was conducted in the Social Psychology Laboratory at 
Loughborough University. It followed the same experimental design as a 
previous smoking experiment (see Study Two), thus a pre-test-post-test 
design was employed. However, unlike the previous one, only the 
following variables were measured: 
(1) the amount of tobacco (measured in grams) consumed 
by the subjects; and 
(2) the amount of time (in seconds) lit cigarettes were 
in contact with the sUbjects' lips. 
In the pre-test condition, all the subjects smoked cigarettes, 
individually, in the same experimental condition. .That is each subject 
smoked while watching a pre-taped television programme (BBC's Blue 
Peter) on rock formation ('What Ice Did To The Land'). After all the 
subjects had served under the pre-test condition, each was then 
randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: (1) self-
modelling, (2) negative modelling, -(3) biofeedback, and (4) control. 
Having been assigned into groups, the sUbjects were then run, again 
'. 
individually, on a group basis. Three days before a group reported for 
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the second part of the experiment, each member received fictitious anti-
smoking literature designed to manipulate cognitive aspects of the 
situation so that all the subjects had negative cognitions about 
smoking [see Appendix 5(a}]. The subject was requested to read and try 
to understand it, and also to familiarise himself/herself with it before 
reporting for session. Each subject was told that, at the end of the 
session, s/he would be asked a few questions relating to the literature. 
This was to ensure that the subjects read and understood the literature. 
The subjects believed both the literature and the request to be genuine. 
In the post-test condition, the self-modelling subject sat in a mirror-
room in which s/he could see, from all angles. his/her full-size image 
" 
(or reflection) and every movement s/he made, including his/her smoking 
-pattern (e.g. his/her puffs at a cigarette, and exhalation of cigarette 
smoke). The mirror-room was constructed such that the subject could not 
avoid viewing himself/herself and his/her ac~ions [see Appendix 6: 
Diagram 3(d}]. In the negative modelling condition, the subject watched 
a film of pre-taped bronchial patients of both sexes (modelled by two 
drama students) on a television monitor while smoking. The models 
coughed very badly when they inhaled cigarette smoke. The film served 
as negative vicarious reinforcement to the subjects. In the biofeedback 
condition, GSR electrodes were attached to two fingers of the' subject's 
non-dominant hand. The. galvanometer which provided both visual and 
auditory feedback was placed next to the subject so that s/he could see 
and hear his/her own response [see Appendix 6: Diagrams 3(a}-3(c}]. 
The subject was made to believe that the magnitude of the feedback 
(auditory as well as visual) was closely associated with the amount of 
cigarette smoke inhaled, that is, the amount of nicotine and other 
noxious chemicals and gases absorbed into his/her lungs and bloodstream 
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(in previous studies, it was observed that the subjects' GSR tended to 
be higher during puffs and inhalation). The post-test condition for 
the control group was the same as the pre-test condition. 
This investigation followed the same procedure as the one used in Study 
Two: that is, the subject sat and watched himself/herself in the 
mirror-room or a film on a TV monitor while smoking, and was filmed. 
The negative modelling subjects and control subjects received the same 
instructions as did their counterparts involved in study Two. However, 
the instructions were appropriately modified for the other two groups • 
. For instance,. the self-modelling subjects were instructed to view them"" 
selves in the mirrors as much as possible; while the biofeedback 
subjects were instructed to attend, as much as possible, to both the 
visual and auditory feedback provided by the galvanometer. 
At the end of the post-test session, each subject was interviewed 
(unstructured interview) by the experimenter about the anti-smoking 
literature and the experimental condition under which s/he served, with 
regard to whether the literature o.r the experimental condition (or in 
fact both) had any effects on his/her attitude to smoking; and whether 
or not s/he was likely to cease smoking as a result. This interview, 
. "'"~:-~ 
like the rest of the session, was video taped and later analysed. At 
the end of the interview, the experimenter debriefed the subject, 
thanked him/her for his/her participation in the experiment, and asked 
him/her not to discuss it with anyone who was taking .part in it. 
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6.5 RESULTS 
The variables that were measured in this investigation were: 
(1) the amount of tobacco (measured in grams) consumed by 
the subjects; and 
(2) the total amount of time (in seconds) lit cigarettes 
were in contact with the subjects' lips. 
The former variable was calculated in terms of the difference between 
the we.ight of an unsmoked c.igarette (with the filter) ·and the weight of 
' .. 
the butt (with the filter) after the smoking episode (the weight of an 
unsmoked Benson and Hedges Special Filter King Size - with the filter· 
- being 1.0024 grruns). The latter variable was calculated in terms of 
the total amount of time (seconds) a lit c.igarette was in contact with 
the subject's lips, and this included the very moment slhe set light 
to the cigarette [see Appendix 6: Diagram 3 (a) ] • 
The data were analysed in terms of: 
(1) the difference between the amount of tobacco consumed 
(as defined above) in the pre-test and the post-test 
conditions; . 
(2) the difference between the total length of time (seconds) 
lit cigarettes were in contact with the subjects' lips 
in the pre-test and post-test conditions [see Appendix 
SIb): (i)-(iv)].' 
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TABLE 5 
Group Means: Amount of Tobaaao Conswned and Amount of Time Lit Cigarettes Stayed in Subjects' Mouths 
-
I MEAN AMOUNT OF TOBACCO MEAN AMOUNT OF TIME (SECONDS) CONSUMED (GRAMS) CIGARETTES WERE IN SUBJECTS' !l'lOUTHS 
i 
Pre-Test Post-Test Difference Pre-Test Post-Test Difference 
SELF MODELLING 
.6478 .4855 .1629 39.53 32.51 7.0178 SUBJECTS (N = 9) 
NEGATIVE MODELLING 
.6671 .661-5 .0056 25.79 28.90 -3.111 SUBJECTS (N = 9) 
BIOFEEDBACK ! 
SUBJECTS (N = 9) .6079 .5767 .0311 31.51 31.9822 -.4756 
CONTROL 
.6394 _ .6423 -.0027 34.55 28.3133 -3.7633 SUBJECTS (N = 9) 
- " 
Table 2 shows ~he group means of the amount of tobacco consumed by the subjects (as measured in grams) 
and the amount of time (in seconds) lit cigarettes were in _contact with the subject's lips. 
A oneway ANOVA was perfonned on the pre-test data and the results 
indicated that there were no significant differences between the means 
of the groups as far as the variables under investigation were concerned. 
This suggests that the four groups were similar in their smoking 
behaviour prior to treatment (F = .3091; d.f. = 3;' p = .81861 and 
F = 1.5382; d.f. = 3; p = .2236; for amount of tobacco consumed and 
amount of time respectively); [see Appendix 5(c): (i) and (iii)]. A 
Pearson's correlatio~coefficient was also performed on the pre-test data. 
Analyses of the r~sults revealed a statistically significant correspon-
dence between the two variables: amount consumed and amount of time 
[r = .71; p = .001 - see Appendix 5(d)]. 
In view of the above results, the use of the differences between pre-test 
and post-test data for statistical analyses was justified. A oneway 
ANOVA performed on the data (i.e. "the differences) indicated that there 
were significant differences between the group means with regard to 
amount of tobacco consumed (F"= 3.0791; d.f. = 3; p = .0413); but 
not in amount of time cigarettes were in contact with the subjects' lips 
(F = 1.6039; d.f. = 3; p = .2078); [see Appendix 5(c): (iv) and (v)]. 
Subsequent student:' s t-tests were calculated on the data. Analyses of 
the results showed that the observed difference was only between the 
self-modelling subjects and the other groups. This means that smoking 
was least in the self-modelling subjects. The self-modelling subjects 
differed, in amount of tobacco consumed, not only from the control 
subjects but also from 'negative modelling' and 'biofeedback' subjects." 
This difference was significant at the .05 level of significance. The 
other experimental groups (i.e. negative modelling subjects and biofeed-
back SUbjects) did not differ significantly from each other, nor from 
, 
the control group (p = >.05). As far as the second variable (i.e. amount 
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of time) was concerned, none of the experimental groups differed 
,o·! 
significantly from the control group. However, a Pearson's correlate<1 
coefficient revealed a high correspondence between the two variables 
(r = 721 P = .001)1 [see Appendix Sed)]. 
6.6 DISCUSSION 
It is generally recognised that negative modelling in which the subject 
(or observer) is vicariously punished for the modelled behaviour has an 
inhibitory effect on the performance of the behaviour (e.g. Bandura, 
1971b, 1977).. It is also generally accepted in the clinical field that: 
appropriate training in biofeedback can produce changes in behaviour (at 
least physiologically). Self-modelling, as used in this study and in 
previous studies, has hardly been employed as.a behaviour change 
technique. However, the results and findings of the present study and 
previous ones demonstrate the potential of self-modelling as a behaviour 
intervention technique. The results indicate that self-modelling 
compares (more) favourably with other well established behaviour change 
procedures (negative modelling and biofeedback). Of the three procedures 
used in the present study, only self-modelling was effective in reducing 
smoking as compared to the control condition. Thus the hypothesis put 
forward in this study was only partially supported. 
The results and findings of this study have implications for health 
education via the mass media. For instance, post-experimental interview 
(unstructured) revealed that even though the subjects involved in this 
study fully comprehended the anti-smoking literature and regarded its 
contents (especially the data) as disconcerting, it failed to make any 
lasting impression on their pre-existing attitudes· towards cigarette 
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smoking. All the subjects' comments on the literature regarding its 
impact on their attitudes and smoking habits may be summarised thus: 
"We've heard it all before. These days it. is difficult to avoid such 
messages unless you don't watch TV or you never visit a doctor's surgery." 
Specifically, one biofeedback female subject admitted that even though 
her father was a medical doctor (GP) whose surgery was full of anti-
smoking posters and leaflets, every member of her family (including her 
father) was a heavy cigarette smoker. 
with regard to the experimental conditions, the negative modelling 
subjects appeared the least affected compared with the control subjects. 
In fact they tended to imitate the models' smoking behaviour; that is, 
they tended to use the model's smoking or cough as cue for them to smoke. 
However, on interviewing, almost everyone of them reported that if s/he 
coughed·as badly as the models (especially the female model) did, s/he 
would seriously think twice about smoking. It appears therefore that in 
this instance negative modelling aroused (vicariously) the subjects' 
emotions, but failed to reduce their smoking significantly. These 
findings contradict, for instance, Bandura's (197lb; 1977) report 
that vicarious negative reinforcement inhibited the subjects' imitation 
of the modelled act. Therefore it appears that the effp.ctcf negative 
modelling depends not only upon the valence of the modelled situation and 
the valance of the consequences to the model, as suggested by Wi!!land 
(1981), but also upon the likelihood OM latency of the consequences to 
the observer. 
The biofeedback condition, on the other hand, appeared to have had a 
greater impression at least on the subjects' cognitions about smoking. 
Even though they did not smoke slgnificantly less than the control 
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subjects, about 70% of them reported that it made them aware of the 
damage they were doing to their physical health, and thus tried to inhale 
less smoke than they normally would have done. A further 65% of them 
believed that if they had such a gadget (the galvanometer) in a portable 
form (e.g. in the form of a wrist watch) to give them such feedback it 
would reduce their smoking rate (or smoking topology) considerably for 
at least a few days or weeks (perhaps, until they habituated to it). 
Nonetheless, three of the subjects reported that they found the 
galvanometer and how it reflected their physiological response so 
intriguing that they intentionally smoked more - took longer puffs and 
inhaled deeper - than they would otherwise have done. They did this to 
test the machine (the galvanometer), as they called it. In other words, 
" 
they tried to trigger off the galvanometer to satisfy their curiosity. 
This may explain partly why the biofeedback subjects as a group did not 
differ significantly from the control group both in their tobacco 
consumption and amount of time lit cigarettes were in contact \'1ith their 
lips. 
As indicated by the results, smoking was least in the self-modelling 
condition relative to the other experimental conditions and the control 
condition. Furthermore, post-experimental interview revealed that the 
self-modelling condition aroused negative emotions in the subjects. Of 
these, only two subjects (males) reported absence of any subjective 
discomfort in the experimental condition. The rest (about 88%) reported 
that the presence of mirrors surrounding them made them feel very 
uncomfortably self-conscious. They also pointed out that besides making 
them self-conscious, the mirrors hidghtened their awareness of the fact 
that they were smoking, which in turn heightened their feelings (or 
knowledge) that they were doing something (smoking) that they should not 
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be doing. For instance, one male subject stated: "Seeing your entire 
self from every corner you look is off-putting enough, seeing smoke 
coming out of your mouth and nostrils makes it even worse." Another 
subject (female) stated that the mirrors made her feel so uncomfortable 
and guilty about smoking that she was going to make a real effort to 
give it up. Yet another female subject was even more emphatic about her 
feelings towards the mirrors: .. ... if I could only smoke in such a 
situation, surrounded by mirrors, I would rather not smoke at all." 
The above results and findings clearly demonstrate that self-modelling, 
at least as used in this study, is a viable and potentially useful 
technique for altering behaviour in the desired direction. In this 
study, its potential for bringing about behaviour change relative to two 
forms of feedback systems - negative modelling and biofeedback - is made 
obvious. However, promising as these results are, more extensive and 
comparative studies are needed in order to guage the full potential and 
efficacy of self-modelling as·a therapeutic (i.e. treatment or training) 
technique. The necessity for such studies becomes more compelling when 
one considers the various advantages this type of self-modelling 
possesses over other forms of behaviour intervention procedures such as 
drugs and other behaviour therapy procedures. Some of these advantages 
are: 
(1) economically, the apparatus involved is fairly cheap to purchase, 
and does not require an expert personnel to operate or maintain it; 
(2) the procedure does not require any training on the part of the 
client in order for him/her to benefit from it; 
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(3) it is relatively'free from the ethical problems which beset a 
number of behaviour modification procedures; and 
(4) compared with drugs, the advantages and benefits of self-modelling 
must be calculated not only in monetary terms, but also in terms 
of physiological ill-effects. 
These advantages plus the apparent effectiveness of the procedure make 
self-modelling a potentially valuable tool for the investigation and 
treatment (or modification) of a wide range of behaviour problems, for 
instance, overeating, alcoholism, cigarette smoking, and such behavioural 
mannerisms as tics or excessive eyeblinks as well as such minor neuroses 
", 
as shyness and phobias. The potential of self-modelling as a training 
(as opposed to treatment) technique can only be determined by further 
studies. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY OF THE STUDIES AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUMMARY 
This final section outlines briefly the methods, results, and general 
findings of the four experiments. " In addition, the evidence from the 
existing literature is considered in relation to the new findings. Of 
particular concern is the role of cognitive factors in self-modelling. 
Finally, the theoretical and practical implications of the present 
research are discussed. 
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7.1 THE FOUR STUDIES ON SELF-MODELLING 
The four studies were designed to examine two main aspects of self-
modelling: (a) the use of self-modelling in laboratory and field 
settings; (J;Y: a th~;'retical framewo;:k 'based on both cognitive and 
behavioural factors. This cognitive-behavioural theory provides' a 
fuller explanation of human imitation and particularly self-modelling 
than simple learning theory models do. 
Self-modelling is defined as a process by which the subject observes 
his/her own behaviour (and/or its consequences) directly as it happens 
(for instance by means of a mirror, a mirror-room, or a video system). 
Four stUdies were carried out each of which contributed directly or 
indirectly to the proposition that cognitive factors may be involved in 
self-modelling. In each study, the subjects' cognitions about the 
behaviour concerned (and/or its consequences) seem to be central to 
understanding self-modelling. Each of these stUdies and their main 
findings are outlined below. 
Following reports of previous studies· (mainly with children and 
mentally retarded individuals) on the effects of being imitated and 
, 
self-modelling, this study investigated whether self-modelling could be 
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used to suppress undesirable behaviours in adults. It was hypothesised 
that cigarette smokers would smoke less in a self-modelling situation 
than in a control condition. A repeated-measures experimental design 
was employed. In the' self-modelling condition, the subject watched 
himself/herself on a television monitor while smoking. In the control 
condition the subject watched a short cartoon film on the same monitor 
while also smoking. The following variables were measured: (a) the 
amount of tobacco consumed I (b) the amount of time subjects had lit 
cigarettes in their mouthsl and (c) the subjects' galvanic skin responses. 
These were compared between the experimental and control conditions. 
The data were-in the predicted direction - self-modelling inhibited the 
amount and duration of tobacco consumption. Furthermore, the subjects 
" 
were significantly more aroused (as measured by GSR) in the experimental 
condition. In this study, there was of course no direct evidence of 
the involvement of cognitive factors in self-mo?elling. The predictions 
were based on the assumption that cigarette smoking was generally 
deprecated by the SUbjects. 
Study One 
This investigated the role of cognitive factors in self-modelling 
directly. It was hypothesised that in a self-modelling situation 
cigarette smokers with negative attitudes to smoking would smoke less 
than those with positive attitudes to the habit. This applies equally 
to the amount of tobacco consumed and the amount of time that lighted. 
cigarettes stayed in their mouths. It was also hypothesised that the 
former group of subjects would be more emotionally aroused than the 
latter group of subjects. The subjects were also exposed to information 
about cigarette smoking that was either consonant or dissonant with their 
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existing attitudes. The results indicated that smoking was (a) least 
in those with negative attitudes to smoking who were given anti-smoking 
information and (b) greatest in those with positive attitudes to the 
habit who were given favourable information about smoking. Those with 
negative attitudes to smoking who received unfavourable information 
smoked less and those with positive attitudes to smoking who received 
favourable information smoked more in the self-modelling condition than 
in the control condition. Moreover, the subjects' physiological 
responses (as measured by GSR) in the experimental condition were in 
corresDondence with the kind of information they received. This study 
shows that cognitive factors mediate the effects of self-modelling 
"directly. 
Study Two _ 
This investigated the use of self-modelling as a mode of self-control 
in an eyeblink classical extinction experiment. An eyeblink response 
was conditioned followed immediately by extinction trials. Analysis of 
the results was confined to extinction trials. It was found that 
extinction was quicker with self-modelling than with the control condition. 
Extinction was quickest in the experimental female subjects. This 
study may be interpreted as providing support for cognitive involvement 
in self-modelling if it is assumed that frequent eye blinking is 
regarded as undesirable. It also demonstrates that cognitive factors 
are involved in the kinds of behaviour observed in classical conditioning 
experiments using human subjects. 
176 
study Three 
This was a field experiment into the use of self-modelling in the treat-
ment of overweight or obesity. Female subjects enrolled in a private 
slimming club volunteered to participate in this 10 week longitudinal 
study. The subjects' weights were recorded weekly. The data included 
pre-treatment weight, desired weight (or goal) accepted by the subject, 
weekly absolute weight loss, and net weight loss. The experimental and 
control subjects '1ere alike in their pre-treatment weights and desired 
weights. Towards the end of the study, the experimental group had more 
weight loss than the control groups. Follow-up data collected 6 weeks 
after the end of the study confirmed this finding. In this study all 
" 
the subjects were anti-fatness (as can be seen by the fact that they 
were all members of the slimming club) so that their cognitions would 
tend to be negative towards fatness. This study suggests that self-
modelling can be employed as a practical technique for weight control. 
study Four 
This compared self-modelling with other behaviour change techniques. 
These were negative modelling in which the observer is vicariously 
punished for the behaviour; and a fonn of biofee:dback. In the self-
modelling condition, the subject sat and smoked in a mirror-room. In 
the negative modelling condition, the subject watched a video of. 
models who coughed badly on inhaling cigarette smoke (Le. smoking was 
punished). In the biofeedback condition the subject was informed that 
his/her GSR was· an indication of how much smoke was being inhaled (an 
auditory tone was associated with the amount of inhalation). A pre-
test-post-testdesign was employed; and in order to manipulate 
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cognitive aspects of the situation so that all the subjects had negative 
cognitions about smoking, anti-smoking literature was given to the 
subjects 3 days before the second part of the experiment. The results 
showed that smoking was least in the self-modelling group. None of the 
other groups including a no-treatment (control) group differ~d 
significantly from each other in terms of reduction of smoking. This 
experiment seems to suggest that self-modelling, at least in the circum-
stances of this study, was rather more effective than the other fairly 
typical behaviour intervention techniques. 
The results and general findings of the foregoing studies clearly lend 
. support for (a) the effectiveness of self-modelling as a behaviour 
, 
intervention technique, and (b) the role of cognitive factors in self-
modelling. 
7.2 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Although cognitive factors were manipulated directly in only one of the 
studies, it is necessary to explain why behaviour should change in a 
-~-
particular direction. In general, in these studies, these changes seem 
to be in the direction of social norms (e.g. anti-smoking, anti-fatness, 
anti-facial mannerisms such as eyeblinks). Indeed, it is difficult to 
explain self-modelling without reference to cognitive variables since 
unlike normal modelling there is no inbuilt direction for change. In 
conventional modelling, the model exhibits behaviour (or responses) 
different from that of the observer. In self-modelling the behaviour 
of the model and the obse~er are identical so only motivating factors 
within the observer may change the observer's behaviour. 
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Existing literature, however, points to the view that being imitated (or 
self-modelling) has inhibitory effects on a person's behaviour because 
the modelled behaviour acts as an aversive stimulus. Hence studies on 
the inhibitory effects of being imitated and self-modelling have tended 
to be directive. That is to say, they tend to combine self-modelling 
(or being imitated) with instructions, thereby (perhaps inadvertently), 
highlighting to the subject the negative (or aversive) aspects of the 
modelled behaviour (e.g. Kauffman et al, 1977; Davis, 1979). 'Needless 
to say that the directive nature of these studies renders interpretation 
of their results problematic.. In other words, it is difficult to 
determine the true cause of the ch~nge in behaviour observed - whether 
the change is due to self-modelling or instructions or a combination of 
both. 
It has been suggested in chapter one that for an individual to respond 
to being imitated or self-modelling as an aversive stimulus, the behaviour 
concerned must entail negative connotations for him. Therefore a satis-
factory explanation of the effects of self-modelling needs to take 
cognitions into consideration. 'Non-directive' self-modelling (as used 
in the present research) makes such an allowance. 
In so far as the inhibitory effects of self-modelling are concerned, it 
seems that the more negative a person's cognitions about a behaviour are 
the more likely it is for the behaviour to be inhibited. This 
suggestion is made particularly plausible by the findings of Study One. 
In this study, it was found that subjects with positive cognitions about 
cigarette smoking who were given favourable information about the habit 
smoked more in a self-modelling situati-::m than in a control condition. 
Conversely, subjects with negative attitudes to smoking who were given 
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unfavourable information about cigarette smoking smoked less in the 
former situation than in the latter. Furthermore, the former group of 
subjects showed less emotional arousal (as measured by GSR) than the 
latter group of subjects in the self-modelling condition. 
As mentioned in chapter one, investigators with a bias towards learning 
theory propose that the irihibitory effects of being imitated are due to 
the aversive nature of being imitated (e.g. Miller & Morris, 1974; 
Kauffman et al, 1975, 1976, 1977). Cognitive-behavioural theory of 
behaviour change, on the other hand, proposes that the form which the 
effects of self-modelling (or being imitated) take ·(i.e. facilitatory 
or inhibitory) is determined by the cognitive contingencies (positive 
'-. 
or negative) governing the behaviour and/or its consequences. Evidence 
from study One directly lends support to this. It is not dissimilar 
from Aronfreed's (1969) argument that the learning of a model's responses 
and their subsequent reproduction by the observer are influenced by the 
emotional circumstances in which the responses are initially performed. 
According to Aronfreed, responses which have a positive emotional value' 
for the observer are more likely to be imitated. Conversely, it is 
proposed that responses which have a negative emotional value for the 
observer are more likely to be inhibited (as indicated by the findings 
of the present research). 
In the analysis of the role of cognitions in self-modelling phenomena, 
the present project has identified two main cognitive processes on the 
part of· the subject: (1) awareness and (2) evaluation. First of all, 
the subject must be aware, of the behaviour. Secondly, he must evaluate 
the behaviour and/or its consequences in accordance with some ideal 
(personal, social, or ideological). It is proposed that if the person 
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evaluates the behaviour and/or its consequences negatively, he will 
experience negative emotions. Because these negative emotions are 
psychologically uncomfortable, it is assumed that the person will 
attempt to modify the behaviour in order to reduce the discomfort where 
other modes of achieving this are not feasible. However, if the 
behaviour (and/or its consequences) is positively evaluated, then the 
behaviour is likely to be facilitated. The results of the present 
studies, particularly Study One, support the proposition that one of the 
consequences of a negative evaluation of one's behaviour· (and/or its 
consequences) is suppression or modification of that behaviour •. Thus 
it might be suggested that in a self-modelling situation, the extent to' 
which behaviour is suppressed (or facilitated) is an indication of the 
" 
involvement of cognitive factors in self-modelling. 
The cognitive-behavioural framework propounded in chapter two takes 
the subject's cognitions as central to understanding of .self-modelling. 
This runs counter to existing· reinforcement interpretations of the 
effects of self-modelling (or being imitated). Nonetheless, it might 
be contended that whilst the present conceptualisation relates to 
cognitive processes, it is also a reinforcement theory in that reduction 
of negative emotions (or dissonance) is presumed to be a positive 
experience, as suggested by Thelen et al (1981). On the ·other hand, 
any emotional experience (positive or negative) arising out of self-
modelling is a product of cognitive processes on the part of the subject. 
In other words, it is a product of cognitive consistency or inconsistency 
between the subject's cognitions pertinent to the behaviour rather than 
a product of self-modelling per se. Thus, a positive cognitive 
evaluation of the behaviour by the subject is likely to.result in a 
positive experience. In contrast, a negative evaluation of the behaviour 
is likely to result in a negative experience. 
181 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, studies on the inhibitory effects 
of contingent imitation and self-modelling have tended to be directive. ' 
The present studies employed 'non-directive' self-modelling; and 
although the results are similar to those of previous investigations, 
they can hardly be explained in simple learning theory terms. In each 
of the present studies, it is suggested that the subjects' cognitions 
influenced their behaviour in the experimental condition in a more 
significant manner than simple reinforcement principles would suggest. 
S'tudy Two is a case in point. In this study, it was found that the 
experimental paradigms had differential effects on the subjects" 
conditioned responses. That is, extinction of the conditioned response 
(eyeblink) was quicker in the self-modelling condition than in the 
, 
control condition. This was the case in spite of the fact that the two 
conditions were identical as far as conditionedstimulu~unconditioned 
stimulus interval, and the ,intensity and duration of the conditioned and 
unconditioned stimuli were concerned. All of the subjects received 40 
conditioning trials during the acquisition phase. These were followed 
by extinction trials during which the conditioned stimulus 
alone was presented. In this study (classical) learning theory would 
predict no difd:erences between the self-modelling and control groups. 
However, the experimental subjects differed significantly from the 
controls. It is suggested that the experimental subjects, unlike the 
control subjects, used the feedback (of their conditioned responses) 
provided by the experimental setting (i.e. the mirror) to control their 
negatively valued responses (eyeblinks). These findings indicate that 
cognitive factors influence behavi.our in a self-modelling situation. 
This seems to be the case even where an involuntary or autonomic response 
is involved. Thus, this highlights the important role the subjects' 
cognitions play in influencing his/her behaviour. This fact is often 
overlooked by learning theorists. 
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As well as raising theoretical issues, the present research has also 
practical implications for other areas of psychology. These include 
social psychology (e.g. interpersonal relationships), education, and the 
clinical field. It also raises methodological issues. 
Considering interpersonal relationships, there is a common fallacy that 
"imitation is the sincerest form of flattery". Some research evidence 
on imitation lends support for this. However, such evidence has been 
interpreted largely in terms of reinforcement or in terms of Byrne's 
(1971) theory of attraction. Even the latter is rooted in reinforcement 
principles. For instance, summarising studies on being imitated, ThelEm 
et al (1981) concluded (albeit with a caveat); " ••• being imitated is 
reinforcing; " it leads to attraction towards the imitator, increased 
imitation, increased reward to the imitator. Clearly the effects of 
being imitated ••• are positive effects, the kinds of reactions that 
people often solicit in their interpersonal relationships" (p. 410). 
Some of the studies supporting such interpretations as this have already 
been discussed in chapter one. However, the present research fails to 
support the simple reinforcement vie\~. 
Self-modelling and being imitated may not be identical in implications 
for behaviour, nonetheless, while not refuting the validity of existing 
evidence from. investigations into the effects of being imitated, the 
results and general findings of the present studies pose problems for 
the unqualified reinforcement interpretations of the effects of being 
imitated. A close examination of the results of the foregoing studies 
as well as existing investigations reveals that imitation (being 
imitated or self-modelling) produces differential effects as a function 
of individual as well as situational variables •. The most important 
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mediating individual variables are of course the subject's cognitions 
about the behaviour. It is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that 
imitation or being imitated will lead to positive consequences (e.g. 
reciprocal attraction) to the imitated and the imitator only when the 
behaviour concerned is positively valenced by both parties (or at least 
by the 'imitated'). If the behaviour is negatively valued by the subject 
(i.e. the 'imitated'), then the reverse of what Thelen et al (1981) have 
suggested are more likely to obtain, as the present research would seem 
to indicate. 
Evidence for the practical application of self-modelling or being imitated 
is limited. However, the few reported studies show self-modelling to be 
'. 
a potentially viable and useful tool for the training of motor skills, 
social skills, and cognitive skills (e.g. Wheman, 1976; Miklich et a1, 
1977; Kauffman et aI, 1976, 1978). Indeed, Kauffman et al (1976) have 
stressed the importance of being imitated in children's cognitive aware-
ness and cognitive control. Davis (1979) has likewise demonstrated the 
usefulness of self-modelling in social skills training. 
Although the results of existing investigations such as those mentioned 
above are promising, further research is needed to gauge the full potential 
of self-modelling as a practical technique. For instance, such harmful 
and socially undesirable behaviours as cigarette smoking, drug abuse, 
and aggressiveness are often learned during childhood or adolescence, 
that is, before school-leaving age. The use of self-modelling (perhaps 
combined with health education) in school settings may prove to be an 
effective tool in combating for instance cigarette smoking in the young. 
Evidence from the present research lends some support for this proposition, 
" 
though direct evidence of long-term effectiveness and ecological val.idity 
is lacki.ng. Nonetheless, Kopel and Arkowitz (1975) have noted that there 
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is reason to believe that behaviour therapies which produce cognitive 
orientation (as self-modelling presumably does) produce particularly 
enduring effects. Thus the use of self-modelling in school settings 
might be recommended tentatively. 
In the clinical field, some investigators have reported the successful 
use of self-modelling and contingent imitation in the modification of 
undesirable· behaviours and the training of desirable ones (e.g.· Creer & 
Miklich, 1970; h~eman, 1976; Kauffman et al, 1976, 1977; Miklich 
et al, 1977). The results and findings of the present studies sUpport 
these reports. They also highlight the need for further research in 
this area. The present studies together with existing investigations 
show how self-modelling can be used to alter a wide range of behaviour 
disorders. This applies not only in children or mentally retarded 
individuals, but also in relatively intelligent adults. Such behaviour 
disorders include addictive behaviours (e.g. cigarette smoking, over-
eating, alcoholism and drug abuse) and behavioural mannerisms (e.g. 
eyeblinks, tics, nail-biting and thumb-sucking). 
The practical usefulness and effectiveness of self-modelling relative 
to other typical behaviour intervention techniques is illustrated by 
Study Five. Its advantages over these fairly well-established techniques 
have been discussed in the preceding chapters. These include: 
(1) economy, (2) ease of· application, and (3) its relative freedom from 
the ethical problems which beset many behaviour intervention procedures. 
With respect to economy, the apparatus involved (mirrors) is relatively 
inexpensive both in terms of purchase and maintenance. It does not 
require expert and expensive personnel to maintain it. The procedure 
185 
is simple and easy to apply. A major advantage of self-modelling is 
that, unlike other therapy procedures (e.g. biofeedback and covert 
sensitisation), it does not require any lengthy or expensive training 
in order for the client to benefit from it. 
Some of the ethical objections that may be levelled against behaviour 
therapy techniques using (tangible) reinforcement practices include the 
following: 
(1) there is the fear that if a person is frequently and deliberately 
rewarded for responding, s/he will be inhibited from responding 
appropriately unless slhe is continually rewarded (or bribed) to 
" 
do so; and when the reinforcement contingencies are withdrawn 
slhe may cease to respond alt.ogether; 
(2) contingent reinforcement is also likely to interfere with the 
development of a sense of responsibility (for one's actions), 
intrinsic motivational systems, and other self-determined 
personality characteristics; _ 
(3) the deliberate use of reinforcement may also be considered as 
deceptive, manipulative, and an insult to the personal freedom of 
human beings. 
As can be seen, self-modelling as employed in the present research is 
relatively free from these ethical implications. 
Behaviour therapies which employ aversive or noxious procedures have 
ethical implications as well. They include the following: 
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(1) aversive therapies often use exceedingly noxious stimuli (e.g. 
electric shocks or emetic drugs) even though they do not (always) 
produce greater changes in behaviour than stimuli with weaker 
intensitiesl 
(2) besides the emotional and/or physical discomfort inherent in such 
, 
procedures, repeated aversive experiences often give rise to 
undesirable side-effects that can seriously impede progress. For 
instance, repeated administration of drugs often results in 
physical tolerance and the drug becomes less effective. Con se-
quently"the use of increasingly large dosages of the drug becomes' 
necessary. This may cause resentment towards the therapist and 
'-, 
the treatment procedure and eventually lead to the termination of 
treatment altogether. 
Again, self-modelling is virtually free from these problems. Furthermore, 
compared with drugs, self-modelling lacks physiological ill-effects, and 
requires no expensive'materials. 
A prj~ary purpose of treatment procedures is to provide the client with 
a means of exercising control over maladaptive behaviours. This means 
that it is necessary for the client to play an active role in' practising 
self-control techniques rather than serving as a passive recipient of 
rewards or stimulus pairing. Thus, for instance, in the treatment of 
smoking behaviour or over-eating, the, aim must be to encourage the 
client to develop self-control techniques. This is inherent in self-
modelling because it produces cognitive reorganisation (or orientation) 
on ,the part of the client, as indicated by the present research 
.l 
(especially Study One and Study T hree,l • 
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Studies into the effects of imitation and its derivatives have tended to 
concentrate mostly ondyads - a model and an observer. Consequently, 
such studies are characterised by a preoccupation with the effects of 
the model on the observer, as noted by Flanders (1968). This has been 
the conventional pattern of investigation in modern times beginning with 
the early works of l1iller & Dollard (1941) up to the introduction of 
self-modelling procedures (e.g. Creer & Miklich, 1970) and the concept 
of being imitated (e.g. Fouts, 1972). Even in these latter procedures, 
the tendency has been towards the employment of a second party to either 
contingently imitate the subject or to play a directive role in 
facilitating the desired behaviour change. 
The present research demonstrates that a second party is not necessary 
in self-modelling. The subject serves in the dual capacity of model and 
observer. The advantages of' omitting this second-party procedure have 
emerged out of the foregoing studies, and dealt with in the discussions 
of each experiment. However,. it should be stressed that it eliminates 
variability due to the second party which may confuse the interpretation 
of imitation studies. 
7.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECO~~ENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following conclusions and recommendations are offered on the basis 
of the present and previous stUdies: 
(1) Self-modelling can be used to alter the behaviours of adults, 
children and mentally retarded individuals. This suggests that 
self-modelling is a particularly viable and appropriate behaviour 
modification form of modelling in that the self-reference (or 
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feedback) of the modelled behaviour is ahlays ilnmediate and 
obvious. 
(2) Self-modelling appears to be superior to other forms of feedback 
techniques: (a) negative modelling, and (b) biofeedback in the 
modification of undesirable behaviours. However, further tests of 
this are needed and of the (suggested) superiority of self-modelling 
over other treatment procedures. 
(3) There is also a need to explore the variety of behaviour to which 
self-modelling is applied. All the foregoing stUdies involve 
ordinary behaviours (albeit socially undesirable) in 'normal' and 
relatively intelligent adults. It is unkno\qn whether this 
technique is also effective with psychopathological behaviours 
and patients such as neurotics, stutterers, and so forth; 
(4) Evidence provided by the'present research seems to suggest that 
cognitive processes mediate the effects of self-modelling. That 
is, the effects of self-modelling on a person's behaviour (facili-
tatoryor inhibitory) are largely dependent upon the cognitive 
contingencies (positive or negative) governing that behaviour (and/ 
or its consequences). A behaviour, which entails positive connotations 
for the individual is likely to be facilitated by self-modelling. 
Conversely, a behaviour which entails negative connotations for 
the individual is likely to be inhibited by self-modelling. 
Further research may elucidate the theoretical, issues raised by the 
present project. Such research is also needed to gauge the usefulness 
of (non-directive) self-modelling as a treatment procedure across a 
wide range of behaviour disorders. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: APPENDIX TO PI LOT STIIIlY 
APPENDIX l(a): FORMAT FOR THE SUBJECTS' CO~~NTS ON STUDY ONE 
Please use the format below to comment on the study you have just 
completed as a subject: 
L Film Condition: please briefly state in your own words how you felt 
watching the cartoon film: 
2. Self Condition: please briefly state, in your own words, how you 
felt watching yourself on TV: 
3. Self Image vs. TV Image: again, in your own words, state briefly 
whether or not your self image was different from your TV image; 
and if so, how? 
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N 
ex> 
APPENDIX l(b): OBSERVED DATA, BY SUBJECT, CONDITION AND VARIABLE 
AMOUNT CONSUMED (GRAMS) * TIHE (IN SECONDS) " MEAN GSR 
SUBJECT Film Self Difference Film Self Difference Film Self Difference 
1 .2192 .2023 .0169 39.9567 32.9533 7.0034 6.42 22.45 -16 
2 .1624 .1086 
.0538 22.3450 25.3450 -3.225 7.30 21.77 . -14 
'" , 3 .1979 .2394 -.0415 23.6200 22.1567 1.4633 11.22 29.08 -18 
- 4 .0815 .1488 -.0673 27.1933 28.5233 -1.3300 13.41 20.02 -7 
5 .1395 .1783 -.0389 , 35.4700 35.4233 0.0467 7.65 23.47 -16 
6 .2684 .3311 -.0627 27.9467 23.7133 4.2334 6.13 16.71 -11 
·7 .1002 .1807 -.0805 29.883 29.6500 0.2333 4.71 16.05 -11 
8 .0725 .1321 -.0596 3 5•6333 36.3800 
, 
-;0.7467 11.61 23.76 -12 
/ 
9 .1382 .2229 -.0847 32.5700 25.8200 6.7500 12.50 19.79 -7 
10 .1875 .3883 -.2008 22.9667 22.8700 0.0967 3.49 . 22.49 -19 
11 .1978 .2096 -.0118 30.4267 27.3433 3.0834 13.61 26.56 -13 
12 .0723 .1330 -.0607 30.86 18.9800 11.8800 3.27 21.56 -18 
13 .3303 .3754 -.0451 24.8933 19.8200 5.0733 - - -
14 .1379 .1429 -.0050 37;0350 30.9350 6.1000 
- - -
N = 14 
* Amount consumed equals weight of an unSmoked cigarette minus ~eight of the butt after the smoking episode. 
APPENDIX 1 (c) : 
(i) SummaPY of Comparison of Amount of Cigarettes Consumed (in grams): FiZm vs. SeZf (correZated t-test) 
Mea., Standard Standard Mean Standard Standard Degree of T-Value Two-Tail Deviation Error Difference Deviation Error Freedom Prob 
FILM 2.13.4. .• 908 .243 
.-
-0.4.91 .585 .156· 13 -3.14 .001 
SELF 1.642 .755 .202' 
The subjects consumed less cigarettes (as measured in grams) in the self-modelling condition than in the film condition. 
(ii) Summary of Comparison of Amount of Time (seconds) Cigarette was in Mouth: FiZm vs. SeZf (correZated t-test) 
.' Standard Standard Mean Standard Standard Degree of Two-Tail Mean Deviation Error Difference Deviation Error Freedom T-Value Prob 
FILM 30.05"71 6.012 1.607 
, 
~ 
2.4.63 3.317 .887 13 2.39 .000 
SELF 27.1522 5.475 1.4.63 
The amount of time cigarettes were in contact with the subject~ lips was less in the self-modelling condition than in 
the film condition. ., 
(iii) Summary of Comparison of the Subjects' EmotionaZ Response (GSR): FiZm vs. SeZf (correZated t-test) 
Mean Standard Standard Mean Standard Standard Degree of T-Value Two-Tail Deviation Error Differenc~ Deviation Error Freedom" Prob 
FILl1 7.3557 4..4.58 1.191 
-11.6071 6.216 1.661 13 -6.99 .007 
SELF 18.9629 8.326 2.225 
~ne subjects were more emotionally aroused (as measured by GSR) in the self-modelling condition than in the film 
condition. 
APPENDIX l(c): continucd 
(iv) SWmlary of Pearson Correlation Coeffiaients: Amount of Cigarettes 
Consumed. Amount of Time Cigarettea Stayed in the Subjects' Mouths 
and Subjeats' Emotional Response (GSR): Differonaes Between Film 
and Self 
N ,. 14 Diff. Diff. Diff. 
Amount Time GSR 
Diff. r ,. .0997 r ,. .1778 
-Amount P = .367 P ,. .272 
Diff. r = .0997 r ,. .4040 
-Time p = .367 p = .076 
--
Diff. r = .1778 r = .4040 
- -GSR P = .272 P = .076 
There was no significant relationship found between the amount of 
cigarettes consumed (as measured in grams) and the aoount of time 
cigarettes were in contact with the subjects~ lips, nor between the 
former variable and the subjects' level of emotional arousal (GSR). 
Note 1: 
(a) Diff. ~~ount denotes the difference between the amount of 
tobacco consumed by the subjects in the two experimental 
conditions. 
... -.. 
(b) Diff. Time denotes the difference between the amount of time ' 
cigarettes \~ere in contact with the subjects' lips in the two 
experimental conditions. ' 
(c) Diff-. GSR denotes the difference between the subjects mean GSR . 
in the two experimental conditions. 
For the purpose of the above statistical summaries, the subjects' scores 
were computed as whole numbers rather than decimals. 
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APPENDIX 1 (d): T110-mw ANOVA ON StJl3JI,crs' GSR DATA ny ATTITUDE 
(i) Observed Datal. 
Attitude Subject Film Self Total 
1 6.42 22.45 28.87 = P1 
2 7.30 21. 77 29.07 = P2 
(A1 ) POSITIVE (+) .. 
3 11.22 29.08 40.30 = P3 
4 13.41 20.02 33.43 = P4 
5 7.65 23.47 31.12 = PS 
6 6.13 16.71 22.84 = P6 
7 4.71 16.05 20.76 ~ P7 
.. 8 11.61 23.76 35.37 = P8 
(A2) NEGATIVE (-) .. 
9 12.50 19.97 32.47 = P9 
10 3.49 22.70 26.19 = PlO 
11 13.61 26.56 40.17 = P11 
12 3.27 21.56 24.83 ,: P12 
/ N = 12 101.32 264.10 365.42 = G 
(ii) +-(AB) Summary TabLe 
Film Self Total 
+(1\1) 52.13 133.50 185.63 
- (A2) 49.19 130.60 179.79 
Total 101.32 264.10 365.42 
. (iii) ComputationaL SymboZs 
. - . 2 
(1) = G2/npq = 365.422/6 x 2 x 2 = 355.42 = 133531.77 = 5563.82 
24 24 
222 22' (2) = Ex = 6.42 + 22.45 + •••••••• 3.27 + 21.56 = 6978.56 
--
(3) 2 (185.63) 2 +(179.79)2 34458.50 + 23234.44 5565.25 = (EAj )/nq = = = 6 (2) 12 
2 (101.32)2 + (264.10)2 10265.74 + 69748.81 
= 6667.88 (4) = (EBj ) /np = = 6 (2) 12 
(5) 2 52.13
2 
+ 133.502 + 49.192 + 130.602 
= 6669.30 = [E (AB) l/n = 6 
2 28.872 + 29.072 + 11562.7065 (6) = (Ep ) / q = =:':::":"-;;2:-=:':'='-=--':" = ==';"2;":::':::'::' = 5 781. 353 
1. . '. 
Because of technical difficulties, the GSR scores of. 2.subjects were 
excluded from this analysis. 
"'Positive' and 'Negative' denote subjects who expressed positive/ 
negative attitudes towards cigarette smoking. 
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(iv) Swrorary of a 'ruo-Way ANOVA on Subjects' GSR, By Attitude 
Source of Variation Computational Formula Sum of Squares DF Mean Square 
Between Subjects 5781.353 - 5563.82 = 217.533 11 19.776 
I (Calibration) A- 5565.25 - 5563.82 = 1.43 1 1.43 
Subjects ~Jithin I Groups 5781.353 ~ 5565.25 = 216.103 10 21.65 
Within Subjects 6978.56 - 5781.353 I 11972.21 12 99.768 = 
B .. (shape) 6667.88 - 5563.82 '= 1104.06 1 1104.06 
AB 6669.30 - 5565.25 - I, 6667.88 + 5563.82 = -0.01 1 0.0 
B x Subjects 6978.56 - 6669.30 - I Within Groups 5781.3~3 + 5565.25 93.157 93.157 i 10 
AS far as the subjects' GSR was concerned, the above analysis indicates the following: 
(1) there ~las no significant difference between 'positive' 'and 'negative' subjects 1 
(2) no interaction effect was found1 
F F-Prob 
.07 >.05 
118.5 <.01 
0.0 >.05 
" 
(3) however, a highly significant difference (main effect) was, found between the experimental conditions 
(F = 118; d.f. = 11 P = <0.01); indicating that the Subjects were more emotionally aroused in the 
self-modelling condition than in the film condition irrespective of their expressed attitudes towards 
cigarette smoking. 
" 
" 
APPENDIX 2:· APPENDIX TO STUDY ONE ." 
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APPENDIX 2(a) (i) 
SCIENTIFIC 
Established 1845 AMERICAN July 1962 Volume 207 Number 1 
.. 
The Effects of Smoking 
There is no longer any doubt that cigarette smokers have a higher 
death rate than nonsmokers .. New biological studies help to explain 
how tobacco smoke damages the lungs, heart and other body tis.sues 
ID 1500 Jean Nicot, the French am~ bassRdor to Portugal, wrote thllt an American Indian herb he had ac~ 
'lulred had marvelous curative powers. 
For a time his view was widely accepted. 
and in his honor the herb was given the 
generic name Nicotiana. The species N"-
"cotianIJ rustlca, first introduced Into En· 
rope (Of smoking in pipes. was harsh and 
rather disagreeable. Later it was sup-
planted by NicoHana labacum. whicb 
produces a'pleasanter smoke. N. ruttica 
is still grown in the U.S.S.R. and other 
parts of Asia, but N. tabacum is now the 
chief source of smoking tobacco and is 
the only species cultivated in the U.S. 
Skeptfcism about the medical value of 
tobacco developed near the end of the 
16th century; not long thereafter smok. 
ing wu condemned as a perniciow habit 
responsible for all manner of ills. This 
did not prevent smoking from becoming 
an almost universal habit among men in 
Europe and the American colonies. Ac-
tuo.lly there was no scientific evidence 
for any harmful effects of tobacco until 
tIle middle of the 19th century. 
It appears that M. Bouisson, an ob-
Sctne French physician. deserves credit 
for the first weU-docwnented clinical 
study of the matter. In 1859, reporting 
on patients in thehospital at Montpellier. 
he observed that of 68 patients with 
cancer of the buccal cavity (45 of the 
lip, 11 of the mouth,. seven of the tongue 
and five of the tonsil) 66 smoked pipes. 
One chewed tobacco and one apparently 
used tobacco in some form. He noted 
7~~ . 
-
by E. Cuyler Hammond 
that cancer of the lower lip ordinarily de-
veloped at the point where the pipe was 
held In the mouth. He further noted that 
Up cancer occurred more frequently 
among individuals who smoked short-
stemmed pipes (then called "mouth 
burners"") than among those who 
smoked tong.stemmed clay pipes or 
pipes with stems made of a substance 
that does not conduct heat. He sug. 
gested that the cancer resulted from hri-
tlltion of the tissue by tobacco products 
and heat. "', 
Bouisson's observations were con-
Srmed repeatedly over the next half· 
use tobacco. The effect was so great as to 
indicate that smoking must be nssoclated 
with diseases other than cancer. The· 
first experimental evidence for an asso-
ciation between tobacco and cnncer· 
came in 1939; when A. H. RoHo of Ar-
gentina reported that he had produced 
cancer by painting tarlike. tobacco ex-
tracts on the backs of rabbits. After 
World War II there was renewed in-
terest in the subject of smoking and 
health, due partly to trends in tobacco 
consumption and partly to trends in 
death rates. 
century. but since mouth cancer did not Before 1914 tobacco had been (:On. 
loom Q.I a major medical problem the sumed mainly in pipes. cigars. 
effect on smoking habits was insignifl. chewing tobacco and snuif [see illustra-
cant. Another statistically unimportant tWo on page 41). Cigarettes began to 
problem early recognized as being asso. be popular during World War I. In tile 
ciat~d 'vith smoking was Buerger's dis· period from the early 1920's to 1960 the 
ease, a rare affilctfon of the peripheral consumption of manufactured cigarettes 
arteries. It was found to occur exclu- in the U .5. rose from about 750 per adult 
si.vely -among smokers and to subside per year to 3,900 per adult per year. 
when the patient stopped. smoking. In During the same period the consumption 
1936, however, two New Orleans sur- of tobacco in all other forms declined by 
geons, Alton Ochsner and Michael E. about 70 per cent The net result was 
De Bakey, observed that nearly all their that consumption of all tobacco products 
lung cancer patients were cigarette rose about 30 per cent. 
smokers. Noting that lung cancer The changes in smoking habits are 
seemed to be on the increase and that it more signiflcant than the over-all rise in 
was paralleled by a general rise in ciga- tobacco consumption. Smoke from cigars 
rette smoking. they suggested a causal and pipes is heavy and as a rule sTightly 
connection between the two phenomena. alkaline. Few people can inhale it with-
In 1938 Raymond Pearl, the noted Johns out coughing or becom.lng dizzy or nau. 
Hopkins University medical statistician, seated. Cigarette smoke, on the other 
reported that smokers had a far shorter hand, is relatively light, nearly neutral 
life expectancy than those who did not . and can be inhaled readily. Most habit-
39 
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RISE IN LUNG CANCER DEATHS run, counter to the 6(}.year downlrend "in 10hll death 
rate. Imonl Us. men. In 1959 lunS un .. "r .(counted lor 29,3.r.; death •• CoJon 'Dd rectal 
"ncen. neKt in order 01 frequeDcy. taused }9.}29 m;lie death,. The nearly lIeo1ll1, death rate 
for heatt and eirculalory di~ed5e' eonce:lls •• ignilie:UlI rise in eoron.:uT artery disease. 
which i. off~d bra If)nS-lerm dedine in infllctiou. heart di",IU~. Curve. are age ... dju~ted.o 
thllt de:uh fill" .re not IPutioull,. .hilted brlhe chan,in, 'ie composition of the population. 
un1 cig.lrette smokers Inhale 10 some de-
gree. and heavy cigarette smokers tend 
to inhale deeply. III a recent shldy con-
ducted by Ihe American Callcer Society 
detaiJed information has been obtained 
on the smokillg habits of 43,068 men and 
women. Only 1 per cel'll of the cig:trette 
smokers nmong the men s::aid that they 
did not inhale, whereas noninhalation 
wru repOI"ted by 53 per cent of the pipe 
smokers and 11 per cent of the cigar 
smokel"5. Deep illhal::ation was reported 
by 24 per cent of the cigarette smokers 
compared with only 3 per cent of the 
pipe smokers and 1.5 per cent of the 
cigar smokers. Women who smoke in-
hale to a lesser degree than men smokers 
do. Furthermore, women over the age of 
40 smoke far fewer Cigarettes than men 
of the same age do, and few women 
over 55. smoke as much as a pack a day. 
Among current cigarette smokers now 
over 50, the m::ajority of the men started 
the habit before they were 20, whereas 
the majoTity of the women did not begin 
until they were over 35. 
During the pa.st half-century total 
death rates-including death rates from 
almost a11 inf.:ctioU5 diseases and some 
noninfectious ones-have declined rapid-
ly. Lung cancer is: a stril..-mg exception. 
Deaths from lung cancer in the U .S. 
have climbed from 4,000 in 1935 to 
11,000 In 1945 and to .16,000 in 1960. 
The toll in 1960 was appro:dmately 
equal to the number of deaths caused by 
traffic accidents. In 1960,86 per cent of 
those who died from lung cancer were 
meD. Between- 1935 and 1960 the age-
standnrdized death rate from lung cancer 
among U.S. men (the death rate ad· 
justed for age differences in the composi • 
tion of the population) increased 600 
per cent; among women it increased 125 
per cent. And for the past several years 
lung cancer has been the principal form 
of fatal cnncer among men. 
Painstaking studies have dearly dem-
onstrated that the increase in lung c::an· 
eer is reru and not attributable merely 
to Jmprovement in diagnosis. Lung can-
eer (that is. bronchogenic carcinoma) 
arises in the epithelium, or Jining. of the 
bronchial tubes. The incre:'lse seems to 
be confined to two closely related forms 
of the disease: epidermoid carcinom:'l 
and undiHerentiated carcinoma. There 
seems to be little, if any, incre;tse in 
another form of Ule disease: adeno. 
carcinoma. (In adenocarcinoma th(, 
diseased cells assume an arrangement 
resembling th:'lt of the cells in a gland.) 
Lung cancer accounted Ear about :: 
per cent of all U.S. deaths in 1960, and 
for about 6 per cent of deaths amoll:: 
men in their late 50's and 60's. The lead-
, 
'.'" r--,---,--,---,--,,--,----'----'" 12 in" cause of death in the U .S. is coronary 
nrtcl"\' disensc of the helirt, 'wllit:h Re- V 
L''Imnted in 11)60 for nearly 29 per cent ~ 
...r nll deaths, Ilnd for about 35 per cent· 
of d<.'tItbs among men still in their 40's'· I, ~ §' 
and 50',. As In the case of lung CIlncer, !""'_ ~ z 
coronary artery disense is less common :g; 3.0c0 1---I-~~I---jf---j---/J"'C=t---+==--+1? 0 g 
among women, accounting for only E ~ ~ ~ 
ahQut 16 per cent of the denths occurring ~ ~ ~ 0 betw~n tbe ages of 40 and 59. ~ ~ ~; 5 
In the Illte 1940's, when n number of )5 15 (; ~ ~ ~ 
in\'estigators became concerned with ~ l2 J .... tfJ 2 
k I Q< ' , ,:;:~ lung (:uncer, cigarette smo Ing was on Y .... j ~; , . " IJ' ',off! " '" (lnc of severnl factors suggested as possi- J' i7i ::{ 
ble causes for the Increase in the disease. ~ ~ ~ ~~ 
It \VIIS ruready well known that hmg u... ~ ~ i 
cancer could result from prolonged and ~ Cl ......... """'-- ..-'/1 ~ 
hen\'\' occupational exposure to certain ~ ~ ,_ ~ "'PF f'L ~ ~ 0 
indu;hial dusts and vapors. These in.. ~ NVV -t.. ~" j ~ 
dude chromatcs, nickel carbonyl and __ . I ---~cc . ..t., a: 
dusts containing. rndioactive particles. --...... I --- ."&. It! 
!lloreover, they result in epidermoid or I-· .... -!--,-=-~I---....... ~"--~:~-1--..:-~-~-::j.:-::::::::~ 
IIndifferentiated cnrcinomn of the bron- -. CIGARS --
(,binl tubes and not in the less common 
adenocarcinoma. 
'nlill led to the hypothesis that the 
i,~\Se in lung cancer was due to in .. 
t·reased exposure of the human poputn_ 
fielll to air (:ontaminntion of some sort. 
11Ie factor involved had to be wide-
spread and not confined to any particular 
t)(:ctlpational group. (In all countries 
with adequate mortaJlty statistics lung 
(~\Ilcer was found to have increased.) 
Three factors that met the requirements 
were: fumes from the combustion of 
sulid and liquid fuels, dust from asphalt 
ro.,ds and the tires of motor vehicles, 
:lI\d cigarette smoking. The 6rst two 
IlUve not been ruled out as possibly con-
tributing somewhat to the occurrence of 
lung cancer. It is the third that concerns 
"' h.re. 
~ a Rrst step a number of studies were' 
• mnde comparing the smoking habits 
of lung cancer patients with the SlOoldng 
hnbits of individuiW free of the disease. 
The results conll:nned the 1936 'observa-
tion of Ochmer and De Bakey. In every 
such study a far larger percentage of 
Cigarette smokers was found in the lung 
cancer group than in the control group. 
Indeed, virtually all patients with epi-
dermoid or undifFerenHated carcinoma 
of the bronchial tubes admitted to smok-
ing. There appeared to be less· assocla- . 
lion, if there was any at aiL between 
rrnoldng h.'Ibits and adenocarcinoma of 
the lung. . 
Cancer was not the only disease stud-
~ in relation to smoking hnbits. Know-
lIlg the acute efFects of nicotine on the 
~rculatory system, many physicians be--
IleVed that smol.ing might be bad for 
patients ,vith henrt disease. In fnct, a 
oL-__ ~ __ -L __ -L __ ~ ____ L-__ ~ __ -L __ ~O 
~ ~ - - - - - - -CHANGES IN TOBACCO USE produttd. fivefold rllle In ('iprelte ('on .. umpliol1 bellO'eea 
th. early 1920', and 1961, and a drop of nearly 70 per unl in ('on.amplion of 1111 otber to. 
bacee» product .. CI,arettet are plotted botb in uniu (~olo,.) and in (IOUndd of un.temmed· 
tobacco equivalent. Other toba«o product' are ebown only in pound .. Filter ('is"rettMo 
IO'llic:h uMlle" toboc!;o thin nonfiltet.I)'PMo have been srowllll.ln popularity .int'e 195-1-. 
study made at the Mayo Clinie in 1940 
by John P. English. Freilrick A. Willius 
and Joseph Berkson had indiulted a con-
siderable degree of association between 
smoking habits and coronary artery d15-
ease. Furthennore, many doctors were 
under the impression that smoking Jmd . 
a bad effect on patients with gastric nnd 
duodenal ulcers. 
A number of investigators, myself. 
among them, were uncertain IlS to the 
validity of these "clinical impressions" 
and· "'retrospective studies." A useful 
\vay to minimize bias and other difficul-
ties in looking for an association between 
a disease and its possible cnuSt.'1 is to 
employ the '"prospective," or "folJow 
up," method of investigation. TIle meth-
od consists of questioning a huge' num-
ber of presumably healthy individuals, 
keeping in touch with them for a num-
ber of years and Rna1ly nscertaining 
whether or not deaths in later vears are 
associated with habits reported by the 
subjects before they became ill. 
Two such prospective st\ldIes were 
undertaken in the fall of H)',)I, one .In 
Britain by W. Richard Doll and A. Brad. 
ford Hill and the other In the U.S. by 
Daniel Horn and me. Under the auspices 
of the British Medical Research Council, 
Doll and Hill initiated their in"estigation 
by mailing questionnaires on smoking 
habits to all British phYSicians. They ob-
tained Informntion .on n1l dcathll among· 
British physicians by .l·heddng dcnth 
certifkutcs. Their stud~' is still in prog-
ress. Several vears Inter simil~lr inv('sti .. 
gations were ·undert.'Iken by Harotd F. 
Dom, who studied U.S. veterans holding 
life insurance; bv E. \\'. R. Best, C. H. 
Josie and C. n. ;'Valker, who are study~ 
ing Canadian· veterans and pensioners; 
and by John Edward Dunn. Jr., Ceorge 
LJnden and Lester Breslow, who "re 
studying men employed in certain o(:(:u-
pations in California. In 1959 I started 
a new and more extensive prospective 
study in which smoking is included as 
only one of many factors under investi-
gation. 
The findings in an these investigations 
nre rell1lll'knbly similnr: indl--ed, they "re 
as dose as l.Quld llOssibly be expected 
considering that tile subjects were drawn 
from different populations and were of 
different ages. In the interest of brevity, 
therefore, I shall pl"CSC'nt data. only from 
two studies with which I am personally 
concerned. The Rrst of these was carried 
out as follows. 
After designing nnd pretesting n ques-
tionnairc In the fall of 1951, we trained 
more thnn 22.000 American Cancer So-
ciety volunteers as researchers for the 
study. Behveen January I and May 31 
of 1952 they enrolled subjects in 394 
counties in nine states. The subjects. 
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all men bet\vcen the ugcs ol 50 .\Ild GO. 
answered n simple confitlenti,,1 (j11estion. 
nllire on their smoking habits, both past 
nnd present. A total of 187,i83 men 
were enrolled. filled Ollt usable Iluestion. 
nnires nnd were successfully kept tntck 
ol for the next 44 months. De.lth certi-
fientes were obtained for nil who c1it"d. 
nnd additional medic:l1 inform.:ltion wns 
gathered for those who were reported to 
have died of cancer. An together 11.8iO 
dcaths wefe reported. of which 2.249 
were attrihuted to cancer. 
The most important finding was that 
the total death J:1.te (from nll cnu~es of 
denth combined) is far higher nmong 
men with a history of regular cig'lrette 
smoking than among men who never 
smoked. but only slightly higher among 
pipe and cigar smokers than among men. 
who nen~r smoked. TIlis is illustrated In 
the first of the series of charts on pages 
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44, 45 nncl46. TIle death rRtes luwe been 
ndjl1stcd for age, and for ense of COIll-
parison the death r:ote of men who never 
smokecl h,ls been set at one. 
~Ien who h.\cl smoked cigarettes regu-
larly and exclusivEly were c1assiRecl ac· 
cording to their cigarette collsmnptioll 
at the time they were enrolled in the 
study. It was round that death rates rose 
progressi\'ely with increasing numher 
of c-igarettes smoked per day. nS shown 
In the second chart in the series. The 
death rote of those who smoked two er 
more packs of cigarettes n day was" ap-
proximately to.yo and a qU;lrter times 
higher than the denth rate of men who 
never smoked. 
Being n hea.vy cigarette smoker myself 
at the time. I was curiou~ to know tile 
death r~te of ex-cigarette smokers. This 
is shown in the third chart in the series. 
The death rate of men who had given IIp 
cigar~tte smoking a year or more prior 
to enroIlment was conSiderably lower 
than that of men who were still smol.-ill,! 
cignrettes when they were enrol!ed i;~ 
the study. 
Next we analyzed the data ill ~lnti::1I 
to cause of death ;l5 reported on deatl 
certificates. Su.:h information is subjec-
to error, but on checking medica.1 reeonl 
we found that the diagnOSiS of c:tllce 
had been confinned by microscopic i.'S 
amlnation of tissue in 79 per cent of th 
deaths ascribed to this disease. Even i! 
some of these cases. however. the site (I 
origin of the roncer was un"i<nown 0 
open to question. This is because eancel 
unless s\lc-ces.~ful1v treated at an earl 
stage, spre;lds thr~ugh the body a<Id It 
source is often difficult to determin, 
There is another difficulty that has to ci 
with other causes of death. People iol tl'. 
older age groups not infrequent1;r suff. 
from two or more diseases, C:'le or :l1 
other of which could be fatal. Shl( 
dea.th can result from the combined (' 
feets of these dise.lSes, it is dimcult. :11 
perhaps illogical. to ascribe death to O! 
alone. These difficulties should be b 
in mind Jll evaluating the followil 
flndings. 
During the course of the study 7.3 
deaths occurred among subjects with 
history of regul:1.r cigarette smoki 
(some of whom smoked pipes and, 
cigars ns well us cigarettes). We cliviJ 
these deaths according to primary cal 
as reported on death certific-.ltes. Thi~' 
shown in the table on the opposite P;I 
under the heading "Observed death 
Only 4,6.1"51 of these cig<lrettc ~m(lk 
would h;"LYe died during the co\1l"se of 1 
study if their death mtes had eX<ll 
matched those of men of the same • 
who hnd never smoked. This is shown 
1he table under the heading "Expected 
.ac.lths." The difference of 2,66.'5 deaths 
(1,316 minus 4,651) can be considered 
the "Ex~s deaths" associated with n 
:history of regular cigarette smoking. Of 
these e:'l:ceSs deaths 52.1 per cent were 
2ttributcd to coronary artery disease of 
the heart, 13.5 per ,:ent to lung cancer 
and the remainder to other diseases. 
l'rom this it is apparent that as a cause 
(If death coronary artery disease is by 
:far the most important disease asso-
elated with cigarette smoking. 
From the standpoint of attempting to 
<1etennine causal relations, it is best to 
study the figures in the table under the 
'heading "Relative death rate." This is 
the obser\'ed number of deaths divided 
bv the expected number of deaths. 
,\:hich in essence is the death rate of 
<:igarette smokers divided by the death 
nlte of subjects who never smoked. 
Since coronary artery disease is the 
]c;lding cause of death among men in the 
u,s. today, it is not surprising that we 
found it to be the leading cause of death 
among nonsmokers as well as among 
cigarette smokers. But the rate was 70 
per cent higher among cigarette smok· 
ers. As shown in the fourth chart in the 
series OD the next three pages, the death 
rate attributed to coronary artery disease 
increased progressively with the amount 
of cigarette smoking, We also found that 
ex-cigarette smokers had a lower death 
nde from this disease than did men who 
were stm smoking cigarettes at the start 
of the study. 
Lung cancer Is an extremely rare 
cause of death among. nonsmokers, ex-
cept for those who have had prolonged 
and heavy occupational exposure to cer· 
tain dusts and fumes. Taking death. 
certificate diagnosis at· face value, the 
lung cancer death rate was more than 
10 times higher among cigarette smokers 
than am~ng nonsmokers. On obtaIning 
medical records we found that. of 448 
deaths attributed to this cause, the diag-
nosis of bronchogenic carcinoma was es-
tablished by microscopic examination in 
addition to other evidence in 327 cases. 
of which 32 were adenocarcinoma, The 
filth chart in the series shows age-stand. 
ardized death rates by amount of ciga-
rette smoking based on the 295 deaths 
from well-veri6:ed cases of bronchogeniC 
carcinoma other than adenocarcinoma. 
The rate was very low for men who 
had never smoked, it increased with the 
amount of cigarette smo1cing, and it was 
very high for men who smoked two or 
more packs of cigarettes a day. When 
standardized both for age and for the 
amount of smoking. the rate for ex-Ciga-
rette smokers who had given up the 
habit for a yeM or more was conSiderably 
lower thun the rate for men who were . 
smoking cigarettes regularly at the start 
of the study. The lung cancer death rate 
of cigar and pipe smokers was very low 
compared with thnt of cigarette smokers, 
although higher than the rate for non· 
smokers. 
All together 127 deaths were attrib.-
uted to cancer of other tissues (mouth, 
tongue, lip, larynx. pharynx and esoph-
agus) that are directly exposed to tobac-
co smoke and material condensed from 
tobacco smoke. In 114 of these cases the 
diagnosis was confinned by microscopic 
examination. Of these 114 men, no 
wcre smokers and only four had never 
smoked. nle figures suggest that pipe 
and cigar smoking may be more impor-
tant than cigarette smoking in relation 
to cancer of one or more sites Included in 
this group, but the number of cases was 
not sufficient for a reliable evaluation of 
this point. Nevertheless, these cancers 
were the only causes of death for which 
the death rate of pipe and cigar smokers 
was found to be far higher than the 
death rate of nonsmokers. 
Other reported causes of death show-
ing a fairly high degree of association 
with cigarette smoking were gastric and 
duodenal ulcers, certain diseases of 
the arteries, pulmonary diseases (In~ 
eluding pneumonia and inBuenza), eau-
cer of the bladder and cirrhosis of the 
liver. Many other diseases appeared to 
be somewhat associated with cigarette 
smoking. 
In 1959 1 stal"ted n new study consid~ 
ernbly lnrger thun the first one. By secur~ 
ing the services of some 68,000 volunteer 
workers of the American Cancer Society 
in 1,121 counties in 25 states, we en· 
rolled as subjects 1,019,000 men find 
women over the age of 30. Each of them 
filled out a lengthy confidential que .. 
tionnalre including questions on family 
history, diseases and physicul corn· 
plaints, diet, smoking and otl1er habits, 
residel1(.'e history, occupational expo-
sures and mnny other factors not in. 
eluded in previous studies. We plan to 
follow these subjects for six years, So far 
follow-up information is available only 
for the first 10" months of observation. 
The early findings on smoking are In 
close agreement with findings in all pre· 
vious studies, In this study smokers were 
asked the degree to which they inhaled 
the smoke. It was found that, in relation 
to totul death rates, the degree of inhula· 
tion is liS importnnt, and perhaps more 
impormnt, than the amount of smoking 
[8ee iUu8trotlon on page 47], 
The new study has also revealed a 
high degree of association between cign. 
rette smoking and a number of physicnl 
complaints, most particularly coughing. 
shortness of breath, loss of appetite and 
loss of weight [see illustration. on page 
491. These complaints were· related to 
the degree of inhalation as well as to 
the amount of smoking. They were re-
ported less frequently by cigar and pipe 
smokers (most of whom do not inhale) 
thun by cigarette smokers (most of whom 
CAUSE OF OEATH 06SERYEO EXPECTEO EXCESS PERCENTAGE RELATIVE Of:)!..THS OEATHS DEATHS OF EXCESS DEATH RATE 
TOTA~ DEATI-~S (A~L CAUSES) ·7.316 4.651 2.'" 100.0 1.5i 
CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE 3,361 "13 1.3&1 52.1 1.70 
OTHER HEART DISEASES 503 
'" 
78 2.' 1.18 
CEREBRAL VASCULAR LESIONS 
'" 
,,. 128 'B 1.30 
ANEURYSM ANO auEAGER"S 
" 
29 57 2.1 2.97 DISEAse 
OTHER CIRCULATORY DISEASES 87 68 19 0.7 128 
LUNG CANCER 397 31 300 13.5 10.73 
CANCER OF THE BUCCAl CAv. 
" 
18 13 2.7 5.06 ITY, LARYNX OR ESOPHAGUS 
CANCER OF THE BLAODER 70 os 35 1.' 2.00 
OTHeR CANCERS 
"'" '" 
2" . 9.4 1.39 
GASTRIC AND DUODENAL ULCER 100 25 75 2.8 '.00 
CIRRHOSIS OF THE LIVEA 83 ... 
" 
IS 1." 
PULMONARY OISEASE 231 81 150 ,.S 2.65 (EXCEPT CANCER) 
AU. on"ER DISEASES 
'" '" 
33 1.2 . 1.07 
ACCIDENT. VIOLENCE, SUICIDE 363 
'" 
-22 -0.8 0.94 
DEATHS AMONG REGULAR CIGARETTE SMOKERS.labeled '"Observed dellll"," are 
compared with the number of deatha "expected" if tbe delltb rate. for each .a,e sroup amons 
.moke" had been the same a. Ibo .. found amon, nonsmokers. Tbe table summarizes 
the relulu of the .tudr conducted by tbe author and Daniel Horn. The column "'ExceB' 
de.th," can ba considered •• the exee .. Dumber of de_tb, _'IOdated with eis_reua smokhalo 
"Relativo dealh fila" i, the obeeryed number of dealbs divided by the expected number. 
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Inhule either moderately or deeply). cancer death ra~es nre about twice ns 
. Two prospective studies of smoking in Mgh in Britnin as they are in the U.S.; 
relation to the occurrence of coronary chronic bronchitis is reported to be a 
artery di.lease have been carried out in common C:luse of death by British physi. 
Frilmingluun. M'lss., nnd Alb,my. N.Y. dUIS but is seldom mentioned as a cause 
The combined nndings from these stud. of death in the US.; death rates from 
les were published on April 19 in The coronary artery disense (as reported on 
Nelc ElIgla/ld JOllrll(ll of Medicille by denth certificates) nee r.ir lower in Brit· 
Joseph T. Doyle. Thomas R. D.iwbcr, ain than they are in the U.S. No one 
Willinm ,B. Kallnel, A. Sandra Heslin really knows the reasons for these dif· 
nnd Harold A. Kahn. On enrollment in ferences. Speculations on the subject 
these studies each subject was given a may be blieBy summnrized as follows. 
lnedical examination. No symptoms of Climnte, the method of hentmg 
coronary nrtery disease were initiillly houses. exposure to nir pollutants and 
found in 4,120 men. These men were re- occupational exposure to dusts and 
examined from time to time for a num· fumes have all been suggested as possl. 
ber of years. Symptoms of coronary ble reasons why both lung cancer and 
artery disease (as well as de:lth from chronic bronchitis appear to ~ more 
th~ disease) were found far more ire· fretJuently in Britnin than in this coun· 
quentty nmong those who smoked ciga. try. Differences in smoking hnbits have 
reUes regularly thnn among those who also been suggested ns a possible factor. 
did not smoke. The lot<11 death rate wus 0011 and Hill have studied the length of 
m~re tJ:!un twice ns high nmong men discarded cigarette butts in England and 
who smoked more than 20 cigarettes n Wales, and Emest L .. ~Wyn!3er of the 
.oay as among men who had n~ver •. _Sloan:KettennglnstitUte for Cancer Re· 
smoked. E1Nmokers and cigar p.nd pipe search and I have made similar studies 
smokers had, morbidity" nnd mortality on this side of the Atlantic. The average 
records similar to the records of those length of the butts was found to be 18.7 
who had never smoked. TIlUS the nnd. millimeters in England and Wales 
fngs in this study bnsed on medic.i) ex· (where cigarettes are quite expensh·e). 
amllll.ltion of subjects were in close compared with 27.9 mm. in Canada nnd 
ngreement with findings in the other 30.9 mm. in the U .S. Therefore British 
U.s. studies. smokers consume more of C'olch cigarette 
Although all the studies l1av8 shown nnd so receive a higher amour:t of nico. 
essentially the s.'\me results. there are tine and tobacco tar than Canadian and 
some interesting differences between the U.S. smokers do. 
results in Blitain and the U.s. Lung Diet has been suggested as a poSSible 
OBSERVED 1,644 
EXPECTED 1.644 
714 ~ 2.910 ... 
694 '2.623 2ma 
reason why death rates from coronal"), 
artery disease appear to he higher in 
the U.S. than they are ill Bdtahl. This 
apparent difference m,IY he ilt lellst part. 
ly due to difference ill diagnosis of the 
cause of death. Death ran result from 
the combined effects of heart disease 
and lung ailments. p.nticularly in older 
people. III the case of heart failure in a 
person suffering from a lung disease it is 
sometimes difficult to decide which to 
record as the principal cause of death. 
Thus the apparent high death rate re· 
ported ru due to chronic bronchitis in 
Britaill may be related to the comp:u"a· 
lively low de,lth rate reported as due to 
coronary nrtery disf'D.sC in that collntry. 
Be thnt as it may, the Dol! nnd Hill study 
showed less of a relation between smok· 
ing nnd coronnry artery disease than did 
our U.S: study (see lower ill".ytration Oil 
page 42]. On the other hand, Doll and 
Hill found a very high relation between 
smoking and denth from chronic bron. 
chitis. 
I n recent years considernble attention 
hus been given to the chemiClll COin· 
position of tobacco smoke. A great many 
compounds have been identilied. most 
of which are presellt in very small 
amounts. Some nre distilled out of the 
tobilCCO and others n.re products of com· 
bustlon. Included are num~rolJs poisons 
(such as nicotine). various agents thnt 
are highly irritnting to mammnlian 
tissues, several carcinogenic (cancer-
DEATH RATE FROM ALL CAUSES In Hammond .nd Horn ~tlld1 
""ular higher .mODI dSllreue .moken than .mORS men who never 
,moked. but only .li,htly hi;;her omon, pipe ond cilar lII1okert. 
DAILY CIGARETTE CONSUlIPTION showed 1lI .Ji~tt torre· 
blion wilh rtlaliye dealh rile ftom :all ('3IUU. Th~ Itudy fol-
lowed 181.78) men between the llIges 0150 and 69 fot ,,-I monlllS-
I, 
" 
, 
l'1"1ll1udng) compounds- lllld some C().o 
c,lrciuog('nic compuund!t (mnterials that 
increase the potency of carcinogens). 
~tost of thi!t material is suspended in 
small p3rt/des, which together with c:u-
I.Ion monoxide, air nnd other gases (;on-
stitute tohaceo smoke. 
Ernest Wyndcr and his ,'nriOU5 collub-
orators have shown that tobacco-smoke 
conden!Ulte, or "tar," produces cancer in 
mice nnd rabbits iE applied repeatedly 
to the skin over a long period oE time, 
A number of in\'estigntors ha\'e ('"OIl-
finned these findings. The cancers so 
produced in rodents are of It I)peknown 
as f'pidermoid carcinoma. (A synonym 
is sqnamous cell carcInoma, because the 
cells tend to be flattened, or squamous,) 
Different strains of animals vary in sus-
('Cptibility, some being highly suscepti-
ble and others highly resistant. 
Many i"':estigators who hll\'e tried to 
produce lung cancer in rodents by ex-
p(}~ing them to tobacco smoke hnve not 
succeeded in doing so. This may be be-
C;lIIse of two seriOlq difficulties. Whereas 
a human smoker takes In smoke through 
Ills mouth, mice and other small rodents 
breathe through their noses, and in 
rodents this organ has developed into 
a remarkably efficient filter for prevent-
ing parttculate matter from being drawn 
into the lung. Moreover, mice are sen-
sitive to the acute toxic cffects of tobacco 
smoke. 
Se\'eral years ngo I exposed mice to 
cigarette smoke under such conditions 
IQ 
that ther were fOl'(.'(·d to brf'athc smoke 
of npproximiltely the same cOII(.'entrntion 
as that of smoke blkl"1l in II\' lmman 
cigarette smokers, Unrurtunl\t~lr many 
of mv animals went into (,.'(IIl\'lllsioll! and 
died\\ithin a few minutes. The nm;lin-
ing unimals livcd nnl)' It short time. By 
reducing the concentration of !tllloke the 
animals can be kept alh"e, hut under 
sud, <:nnditions it is donhtful whetlwr or 
not their tung! are any more heavily ex~ 
posed to the particulate mutter of ciga-
rette smol.:e than are the lungs of a 
nonsmoker sitting in a small room with 
several heavy smokers. 
Ne\"ertheless. by subjecting mice to 
tolerableconcentmtions of tobacco smoke 
Cecilie and Ructolph Leuchtenberger 
and Paul F. Ooolon of the Children's 
Cancer Research Foundatioll in Boston 
have succeeded in prodm:ing variolls 
change! in the lining of the bronchial 
J:ubes of mice. TIle5e changes are similar 
to changes found in the bronchial tube! 
of human cigarette smokers, So far 110 
cancers have been produced in mice 
thereby. This is (.'Onsistent with the find_ 
ing that lung cancer rarely OCCUf!ll in 
human beings who are only slightly 
exposed to tobacco smol-e. 
During smoking the tissues flN!t ex. 
posed to tobacco smoke are the lip!t, the 
tongue and the mU(.'OU5 membrane of 
the mouth. Some of the components of 
tobacco smoke (including kno\\n car-
cinogens) 8uoresce under ultnwiolet 
light. Robert C. Mellors of the Comell 
!r{ ~~ ~ 
~g ~: i 
,. -----~~---8~--.....:~'---
aw &~ ~ ~; :;;~ 2,02 
Unh'ersitv ~Iedicul Cul1c\.!;e hus shown 
thut this' tnlltt'rio,11 pcnctr;l:l'~ th:! (;t'l1s 
of the lining of the mouth, The type tlf 
cam:er thut Ilrl~es in this tissue is- epi-
dermoid (. ..... rdunma-the same type of 
cal1(-er that is pl"fxlll(.-ed when tohac(.'o 
tur is applied to the skin of E'xperimeutnl 
animuls. Furlhennure, the amount of tnr 
required to prtxltl(.1! epidermoicl (.'Ilr-
cinoma of the ~kln in mice is roughly 
compl.lrnhle to the exposure of a heavy 
smoker who dE'velop-' cpidcnnoicl cnr· 
cinoma of the lip or mouth. 
[n study after study a high degree of 
association h.'1S lx-en found hetwccn 
smoking of all types (as well ns the 
chewing of tohn«'O) and the occ:urren(.'e 
of <:mwer of these tissues, It is hard to' 
escupe the condnslon timt thlll associa-
tion reflects 1\ dlr(.'t.'I (."ms;lll'dation. This 
does not preclude the possihility that 
otller factors (snch \\5 host SI1!i(."('ptibility 
or exposure to utlwr cnrdnogenic mate-
riab) nre in\'oked in ;li Ie;lst some ClIS(.'S. 
\\'hat has jllst h(.'en saicl of smllking in 
relation to ,",I11(.'('r IIf the lips. mouth nnd 
tongue also upplk'll to CUlU,"('r of the 
phnrynx and ("'Ul(.ocr of the larynx. 'nle 
situation 15 sli!l;htl\' different in call(''er 
of the esophllg~,s; this pllssagcway is ex-
po!iCd to inge!tt('(l toh;\('co-smoke con-
densate but not din·ctlv to .the smoke. ' 
The strong assO(.'iuticlIl betwt'cll smoking 
and epidermoid cnrcinomll of the esoph-
agus, however, would SCt'm to point to 
the snme conclusiun. . 
\Vhen inhaled, tobncco smoke travels 
1,61 
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AiII uraoldns. partlcularl,. I1 the, hod .moked fewer thaD 10 
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down the trachea to the brollchial tubes 
of the lungs. All but a few cases of lung 
cancer originate in the lining. or epithe. 
lium. 01 these tubes. This is rem'lrJ..J.ble , 
'tisslle, well worth descrihing hel'~. Nor-
. mally it consists 01 just two layers of cells 
that rest on a thin mat of tiny flbt':r5 
called the basement membrane. This 
membrane separutes the epithelium 
from the underlying tissue. Directly on 
top -0£ tIle basement membrane is a layer 
of small. round cells with relatively small 
nuclei. They are called basal cells. On 
top of the basal cells is n single layer of 
cells known as columnar cells (because 
from the side they look like columns) 
interspersed with a few goblet cells 
(which look like little wine goblets). The 
goblet cells secrete a sticky fluid onto 
the surface. This is augmented by fluid 
secreted by glands located below the 
bo.;;ement membrane. Protruding from 
the top of the columnar cells are sl1Ort, 
huirlike cilia. which eonst:mtly move in 
a whiplike manner. This causes fluid on 
the epithelium to move up through the 
bronchial tubes and the trachea into the 
mouth. where jt is either swallowed or 
expectorated. 
The cilia and the fluid perform an ex. 
tremely import:Ult function in cleansing 
the lungs. Small particles of dust or 
slnoh that settle 011 the surface of the 
bronchial tubes are trapped in the fluid 
Qnd~ together with the fluid. are moved 
up and out of the lungs. 
It has been,shC'wn by Anderson C. 
Hilding of St. Luke's Hospital in Duluth, 
~Iinn .• by Paul Kotin of the University of 
Southern California School of ~fedidne 
and by othe!'s that tobacco smoke in-
hibits the Inovement of the cilia to such 
a degree that the flow of fluid is slowed 
down. jf not stopped altogether. This 
allows nn accumulation of tobncco.smoke 
products and whatever other material 
happens to fait on the lining of the bron-
chilli tubes. Smokers and nQnsmokers 
alike-particularly those living in cities 
with polluted air and those engaged in 
certtlin occupations-inhale dust of vari-
ous types. and some of the dusts con-
tain carcino~enic substances. 
For a number of years I have been c0-
operating in an extensive study of hu-
man lung tissue with Oscar Auerbach, a 
pathologist at the Veterans Administra-
tion Hospit;ll in East .orange, N.]., and 
with Arthur Purdy Stout of the Columbia 
Unh'ersity College of Physicians and 
Surgeons. Some of our findings cnn be 
summarized os follows. 
At the East Orange V ~tertlns Hospital 
tmd at a number of hospitals in upstate 
);ew York the lungs are routinely re-
moved at autopsy. The trachea and 
bronchial tubes are dissected out of the 
lungs and systematically divIded ·into 
208 portions, each of which is tmbedded 
in paraffin. A thin section of tissue is cut 
from each of these portions. mounted on 
a glass slide nnd stained with a suitable 
dye for microscopic exumination. Inde· 
pendently, under tt.e supervision of 
Lnwrence C'lrfinkeI of my staff. an inter-
"jewel is sent to the home of each patient 
to obtain infonnation on his or her occu. 
poltion!ll history, residence history and 
smoking habits. We do not include a 
case unlcss this information can be ob-
tained. All told we have studied tissue 
from the bronchial tubes of more than 
1,000 individuals. 
In each of our studies microscopt" 
slides from a number of different pr~tietlts 
have bf'cn put in completely random 
order by the use of a table of random 
numbers. Thev are then bbeled with a 
serial number "that gives no clue to their 
identity, All the slides are studieJ micro· 
scopically by Auerbach and samples of 
them nre checked by Stout. After the 
slides are examined, the serial numbers 
are decoded so that the microscopic Rnd. 
ings can be analyzed in relation to other 
information noout the subjects. 
Three major types of change occur in 
bronchial epithelium: hyperplasia {tin 
inctetlse in the number of layers of 
cells}. loss of ciliated columnar cells and 
changes in the nuclei of cells [see ilItls. 
tration on page 50]. Hyperplasia is the 
usual reaction of surface tissue$ to al-
most any type of ilTitation, either chemi-
calor mechanical. A familiar eX3mple is 
the fonnation of calluses on the hands. 
We found some dcgree of hyperplasia' 
in 10 to 18 per cent of slides from non· 
smokers, in more than 80 per cent of 
slides from light cigarette smokers and 
in more than g:s per cent of slides from 
heavy cigarette smokers. Extensive hy· 
perplasia (defined as five or mote layers 
of cells between the bns~ment memo 
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brane and the columnar cells) was fre-
quently found in heavy cigarette smokers 
but rarely In other subjects. 
Loss of ciliated columnar cens was 
observed in nonsmokers but far more 
frequently In cigarette smokers, and the 
frequency 01 this observation Increased 
with the ammmt of cigarette smoking. 
The implication is that foreign material 
Itnds not to be removed. and thus can 
accumulate where .the cilia have been 
d_yed. 
An important GDding was the 0ccur-
rence of cells with atypical nuclei. The 
nuclei of cancer cells are usually large, 
irregular in shape and characteristically 
ha\'e many more than the normal num-
ber of chromosomes. A few cells with 
nuclei that have such an appearance are 
occasionally found in the bronchial epi-
thelium of men and women who have 
never smoked. Presumably they result 
from somatic mutation or some similar 
process. In nonsmokers the frequency of 
meh cells does not increase with age. 
Large numbers of cells with atypical 
nudei of this kind were found in slides 
from cigarette smokers, and the number 
increased greatly with the amount of 
anoking. In heavy cigarette smokers we 
found many lesions composed entirely of 
tenS with atypical nuclei and tacking 
cilia: Fewer such leslollf were found in 
Ught cigarette smok~ and none were 
found in nonsmokers. Among heavy 
cigarette smoken: the number of cells 
'I\'ith atypical nuclei increased markedly 
""ith advancing age. 
In our latest study of bronchial epi~ 
thelium we matched 72 ex-clgarette 
smokers, 72 men who had smoked ciga. 
rtttes regutarly up to the time of. their 
tennlnal illness and 72 men who had 
1le\'er smoked. None of the men had died 
of lung cancer. Within each of the 7.2 
triads. the three men were the same age, 
had similar employment histories and 
rimilar residence histories. Somewhat 
more changes were found in sUdes from 
a-cignrette smokers than in sUdes (rom 
Men who bad never smoked. The im-
portant .6ndJng. however, was that the 
~lIuJar changes., particularly the occur~ 
ltnce of cella with atypical nuclei, were 
fairly rare in ex-clgarette smokers com-
pared. with men who had smoked up 
to the time of their tenninal mness. The 
stud). indicated that the number of cells 
'I\~th atypical nuclei declines when a 
Cigarette smoker gives up the habit This 
probably occurs slowly over a period of 
-. The location of teslons is also signifi_ 
Cint and correlates with an observation 
one tan make by passing cigarette smoke 
through glass tubing. Some years ago I 
Eound tbat when smol.:e was passed 
through a tube with a Y-shaped bifurca-
tion, more tar preCipitated where the 
tube branched than elsewhere. Acting on 
this lead, we have studied changes in 
bronchial epithelium in relation to bl-
fureations. There arr numerous such 
points in the bronchial tree. because the 
tubes divide and redivide into smal1er 
and smaller tube!. We found that lesions 
composed entirely of cells with atypical 
nuclei occur far more frequently at bi-
furcatJons than elsewhere. 
In order to detennine the significance 
of these changes we studied the bron~ 
chiaI epithelium of men wbo had died of 
bronchogenic carcinoma. Carcinoma is 
de6ned as a tumor, composed of cellt 
'vith atypical nuclei. that originated in 
the epithelrum and. has penetrated the 
basement membrane and "invaded" the 
underlying tissue. Once such an inva~ 
sion has occurred, the turnor grows-
oEten to considerable size-and spreads 
to many parts of the body. In men who 
had died of lung cancer we (ound large 
numbers of cells with atypical nucleI. as 
well as many lesions composed entirely 
of such ceUs. scattered throughout the 
epithelium of the bronchial tubes of both 
lungs. In a few Imtances we found tiny 
independent carcinomas in which the 
turnor cells had broken through the base-
ment membrane at just one small spot. 
These carcinomas looked exactly lib 
many of the other lesions composed en-
tirely of cells with atypical nucleI. except 
that in the other lesions we did not .6nd 
any celts that had broken through the 
basement membrane. We are of the 
opinion that many, if not all, oE the lesions 
composed entirely of atypical cells rep-
resent an early. preinvasive stnge of car-
cinoma. This Is a well-known occurrence 
in the cervix of the uteri of women and is 
called carcinoma In .situ. 
Judging from experimental evidence 
as well as from our .6ndings in human 
beings. we are of the opinion that car-
cinoma of bronchial epithelium origi-
nate! ,vith a change in the nuclei of a 
few cells; that by cell division the num-
ber of such cells gradually increases; 
that finally lesIons composed entirely of 
atypical cells are formed; and that 00-
easionally cells in such a lesion penetrate 
the basement membrane, producing the 
disease known as carcinoma. Apparently 
the process is revemole up to the time 
the cells with atypical nuclei break 
through the basement membrane. 
Where does the inhalation of tobacco 
smoke fit into this picture? There appear 
to be three possibilities: 
1. It may be that exposure to tobacco 
smoke induces changes in the nuctel of 
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DEGREE OF INHALATION .mOD, dpo 
rette .moken I, charted again't relative 
death ram from .n elUlte .. Rate' are baled 
OD the author', Dew aud,. of 1.079.000 mell 
aDd WOl:DeDo whlcb 'Wll' he(UJl In 1959. 
cells. This would acc:ount for the in~ 
crease of such cells both with the amount 
of smoking and with the number of 
years of smoldng. It would not. however. 
in itself account for the finding of a de-
crease in the number of such cells when 
a cigarette smoker gives up the habit. 
2. It may be that exposure to tobacco 
smoke simply increases the probability 
of changes taking place in the nuclei of 
cells as a result of exposure to inhaled 
carcinogenic agents other than those in 
tobacco smoke. The inhibition of ciliary 
movement by tobacco smoke may be the 
major factor involved in such a relation. 
Again this would not in Itself account 
for the decrease in cells with atypical 
nuclei follOWing cessation of cigarette 
smoking. 
3. It may be that exposure to tobacco 
smoke produces a change in the local 
environment of bronchial epitheUum so 
as to Eavar the survival and reproduction 
of certain mutant cells that have atypical 
nuclei of the type observed, as opposed 
to the sUrvival and reproduction of nor-
mal cells. On this hypothesis the de. 
velopment of cancer resu1ts from natural 
selection under conditions of greatly 
altered environment. It is unnecessary to 
assume that tobacco smoke causes mu-
. tations, since a few cells with atypical 
nuclei are sometimes found in the bron-
chial epitheJium of nonsmokers. This 
hypothesis suggests that nonnal cells are 
best adapted to an environment free of 
tobacco smoke, whereas cells with atypi-
cal nuclei are best adapted to an en-
vironment that includes smoke. The 
hypothesiS thus accounts for the decUne 
in the nwnber of cells with atyplcal nu-
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HEART AND LUNGS are both a!fee-Ied Ly inhaled tobacco ,moke. 
wLI('h travel. down the trachea. through tbe hronC'hi~ltuhe. to the 
al'reoli. "'Tlln" depo4it Oh the epi!heJiulIl and leld 10 doggiD, of 
BRONCHIOLE 
.luolL Tb!!1 Ibd the C'lIplUanel Ire otlen ruptu"d by eougbin,. 
Tbe heart mon then pump blood tLrollsh 11 .mllller number 01 C'apo 
illarie ... ,.!lint( Ine-feued preuore. on • redorecl oJ:y,en .upply. 
ALVEOU of the lun;. are air 13C'1 'omled by lerminl) e:cp:msion C'apillnriPl embedded in the a)vt1;l):lr wnn .. De.lfortion 'of ll,ii 
.f lhe hrondliolet. Oxygen I. lupplied 10 d.e blood throu,b the lislue thus redu('e, the r:.te lit wllich the lunS' (':In t:lke up oxy;en. 
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· , 
dei ~n the cessation of cigllrctte smoking. 
I (avor the last of these three hypoth-
(-ses. It appears to account (or all the 
findings, whereas the other two hypothe-
ses account for only some of them. The 
three hypotheses are not, however, mu-
tuuITyexclusive. 
To account for the ossociation between dgnrette smokIng and certain other 
diseases. such as lung infections and 
t'Oronary artery disense, odlcr plausible 
mechanisms enst. On inhalation, air and 
lUlY smoke it may contain pnsses through 
bronchial tubes of decreasing diameter. 
which finally deliver it to the tiny sacs 
('illled alveoli. TIle nlvt'Oli have thin 
\\'lllls supported by Bbcrs of connective 
tissue. TbesewaIJs contain cnpiIJary tubes 
through which blood flows from the pul-
monary artcrie!J to the pulmonary veins. 
During its passnge through these cnpil-
luries the blood releases carbon dioxide 
and absorbs oxygen. At the same time 
(';Irhon monoxide, nicotine and other im-
purities that may be present in the air or 
smoke are absorbed into the blood. 
The small bronchial tubeB are subject 
10 being plugged with mucus. This fre-
(Iuently occurs in Infectious diseases of 
Ihe lung. with the result that secretions 
and bacteria. are: tmpped in the alveolar 
spaces, thereby produCing pneumonia. 
In cigarette smokers the interior diam-
toter of thf) smaU brol1chial tubes is con-
sitlembly reduced by hyperplasia, so that 
the opening is very small indeed. In ad-
dition we fl.nd that smoking results in in-
, creased activity of the glands that secrete 
mucus into the bronchial tubes. This 
combination almost certainly increases 
the likelihood of the tubes being plugged 
hy mucus. In my opinion this is enough 
to explain the finding that death rates 
from infectious dIseases of the lung are 
considerably higher among cigarette 
smokers than among nonsmokers. 
The occlusion of a bronchial tube by 
mucus (or bya spasm) often traps air in 
the alveoU to which that tube leads. If 
the person then happens to cougb, the 
pressure of the trapped air can be in-
creased to such a degree that the thin 
walls of the alveoli rupture. Coughing. 
excess mucus and reduction in the diam-
eter of the smaD bronchial tubes increue 
the likelihood of such rupture. 
Recently we have studied the nlveoli 
in relatioD to cigarette smoldng. We 
found extensive rupturing of the ,vnlIs 
of a great many alveoli in the lungs of 
heavy cigarette smokers, a considerable 
lInount in lighter cigarette smokers nnd 
very littJe in nonsmokers. The rupturing 
of the waDs Js usuany accompanied by 
8 fibrous thickening of the remmmng 
alveolar walls, together with a fibrous 
thickening of the wnlls of the small 
blood vessels in the vicinity. This prob-
ably results from the mechanism out-
lined above, since cigarette Bmoking pro-
duces coughing as wml as hyperplaSia of 
the bronchial tubes nnd increased secre-
tion of mucus. 
Ruptures in the walls of the alveoll 
destroy the capillary tubes locnted in the 
walls. If many are destroyed, far greater 
pressure is reqUired to force the same 
quantity of blood through the remain-
ing capillaries. All the blood must pass 
through them each time it circulates 
through the body, and the right venbicle 
of the heart has to supply the pressure. 
As a result the work load of the heart is 
Increased in proportion to the degree of 
destruction of the alveoli. 
Since oxygen is supplied to the blood 
through the capillaries in the alveoli, de-
struction of this tissue reduces the oxy-
gen supply on which all the tissues of the 
body dept'lld. In smokers this is com-
pounded by the inhamtJon of carbon 
monoxide, which combines with hemo-
globin more readily than oxygen does. 
This combination is enough to account 
Eor the shortness of breath often report-
ed by cigarette smokers. 
Because of Its great activity henrt 
muscle requires an abundant supply of 
oxygen. The inhalation of tobacco smoke 
increases the work load of this muscle 
and at the same time reduces the quan-
tity of oxygen available to the muscle. In 
addItion the action of nicotine on the 
nervous system produces n temporary in-
CTense in the henrt rntc and a constric_ 
tion of the peripheral hlood vessels, 
which in tunl prouuces a temporury in-
crease in blood pressure. This also puts 
an added stmln on the henrt. Since a 
nonnal heart has extraordinary reserve 
powers, it can probably withstand 
these effects of smoking. A diseased. 
heart may not be able to do so. 
Autopsy studies (including n study of 
young men killed In the Korean war) 
have shown that the great majority of 
American men have at least some degree 
of atherosclerosis of the coronary arter-
ies that supply blood to the muscle 
of the heart. Atherosclerosis conslsb of 
the progressive development of plaques 
(composed largely of cholesterol) with-
in the walls of these relntiwly smaU 
blood vessels, which thereby reduces 
their interior diameter. This in tum re-
duces the supply of blood. to the henrt 
muscle. Eventually it may completely 
cut oH the supply of blood to a portion 
of the heart muscle. nnd this portion dies. 
Moreover, blood clots often form In dis-
eased coronary arteries. This cnn also 
shut off the blood and cause the death of 
heart tissues. The common symptom of 
a stoppage in coronary blood How is a 
heart attack. 
As described above, cigarette smoking 
decreases the quantity of oxygen per 
unit volume of blood. Atherosclerosis of 
the coroniU}' arteries tends to reduce the 
volume of blood delivered to the heart 
muscle per minute. Therefore if a person 
with atherosclerosis of the coronary 
CIGARETTE NONSMOKERS RATIO {SMOKERS COMPLAINT SMOKERS (PER CENT) (PER CENT) TO NONSMOKERS) 
COUGH 33.2 5.6 5.9 
lOSS OF APPETITE 3.3 0.9 3.7 
SHORTNESS OF BREATH 16.3 4.7 3.5 
CHE$T PAINS 7.0 3.7 1.9 
OIARRHEA 3.3 1.7 1.9 
EASILY FATIGUED 26.1 14.9 1.8 
ABDOMINAL PAINS 6.7 3.8 1.8 
HOARSENESS 4.5 2.5 1.8 
LOSS OF WEIGHT 7.3 4.5 1.6 
STOMACH PAINS 6.0 3.8 1.6 
INSOMNIA 10.2 6.8 1.5 
OIFFICULTY IN SWALLOWING 1.4 1.0 1.4 
PHYSICAL COMPLAINTS are more fnquenlamon, people who Im.okeal"ldt of eI,aretcH 
or more a da,. tNll amon,llonlmoker.. The fi,aret al'O from lhe aathor'a larce Ilew Iludy. 
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arteries is also a cigarette smoker. his 
lu~art muscle receives far less than the 
nom1al supply of oxygen per minute. At 
the same tinte, because of the effects of 
smoking. a heavy work load is placed on 
his heart muscle. In my opinion this com-
biJl11tion of conditions is sufficient to ac--
count for the finding that the death rate 
from coronary artery disease is higher in 
dgarette smokers than it is in men who 
ne\'er smoked. that" the mte increases 
witb the amount of cigarette smoking. 
and tbat it is lower in ex-cigarette 
smokers than it Is in men who continue 
10 smoke cigarettes. 
Not only the heart but also all other . 
organs of the body require oxygen air 
tained through the alveotl of the lungs 
:md distributed by the blood. Thus a re-
duction in o:.:ygen supply resulting from 
smoking may have a serious effect OD 
any diseased organ, and in some in-
stances it can make the difference be-
tween tiEe and death. Perhaps this ac. 
rounts for .the finding that death rates 
from a multiplicity of chronic diseases 
Ire slightly higher among cigarette 
smokers than among nonsmokers. 
I shull touch only briefly on two other 
diseases that appear to be significantly 
associated with cigarette smoking: gas-
tric and duodenal ulcers and cancer of 
, the bladder. In our first study cigarette 
smokers, compnred with nonsmokers, 
1~1d four times the relative death rate 
from the two Idndt of ulcer and twice 
the death rate from cancer of the 
bladder. Doll and his associates in Eng. 
hnd recently performed a controlled 
dinicaJ experimerit demonstrating that 
smoking is Indeed hannful to patients 
wilh gastric ulcer. Eighty patients who 
were regular smokers were divided at 
random into two groups, one allowed to 
continue smoking. the other advised to 
IIop. Among the 40 patients who con. 
BRONCHIAL EPI'I'HELIUM It the orip. 
l1li1 .ile of .Imos' .D Junl eaneer, whieh 
.llen deft]op. .. .hown on the oPPollte 
pr"e. The photollllerolNPh, (J throup 5), 
~.de )), OKar Auerbub of Ihe East 01" 
. anre. N.] .. Vetenm. AdmJnilln.lioD HospJ. 
bl, lnlpUf,. h1JQQla eplthelill tluue 325, 
:10.250. 7S and lID diameten re.pectivel,.. 
~ of the fint effttdt of .mokinr oa DOl" 
-I epitheliuna (1) i. hyperpI.ria (Z). aa 
bw-re ... in the number of ba .. l cells. Tbe 
tpitheUom la 1011 and the cen. become tq1lIto 
"Oil" or ftattened (3). When the cell. de-
"top Itlypltalnucleland become diaordered 
~ the resull it called earclnoma I,. ,itg. 
n the!. eelt. break througb the b .. e-
:;"t II:If'IIIbrane (5). the "Deer Ml1 Ipread 
rou,h IllIIp and to the re.t of the bod,.. 
tinued to smoke, the ulcers healed at a 
significantly slower rate than they did 
among the 40 patients who cut down on 
their smoking or stopped altogether. 
The mechanism by which smoldng evl· 
dently retnrds recovel')' is unknown. It 
may be due to indirect effects, such as 
the effect of nicotine in the bloodstream, 
or to direct action of ingested tobacco 
smoke 00 the lining of the stomach. 
As for cancer of the bladder, it is weU 
known that exposure to carcinogenic I 
agents can produce cancer In parts of 
the body remote from the tissue to which 
the agent is applied. For example, pro. 
longed exposure to beta.oaphthylamine 
often produced cancer of the bladder in 
workers in aniline dye plants. Conceiv. 
ably some agent iD tobacco smoke works 
in the same way, but until the problem 
fJ thoroughly investigated judgment 
should be deferred. 
)lter reviewing the evidence, the mild. 
est statement I can make is that, in 
my opinion, the inhalation of tobacco 
smoke produces a number of very hann~ 
ful eHects and shortens the life span of 
human beings. The Simplest way to 
avoid these possible consequences is not 
to .smoke at aU. But one can avoid the 
most serious of them by smoking cigars 
or 8 pipe instead of cigarettes, provided 
that one does not inhale the smoke. An 
individual who chooses to smoke ciga· 
lette! can mfnimi:te the risks by restrict~ 
fng his consumption and by not inhaling. 
The individual solution to the problem 
apparently requires more will power 
than many cigarette. smoker! have or 
are inclined to exert. I am confident, 
however, that more generally acceptable 
solutions can be found. There is good 
reason to suppose. that- the composition 
of tobacco smoke, both qualitative and 
quantitative, is a matter of considerable 
importance. Until several years ago the 
mainstream smoke of most U.S. ciga· 
rettes contained about 35 milligrams of 
"tar" per cigarette, of which about 2.5 
milligrams wu nicotine.' The smoke 
from filter~tfp cigarettes now on the 
market ranges in tar content from as low . 
as 5.7 milligrams per cigarette to nearly 
30 milligrams and the nicotine content 
from .4 to 2.5 milligrams. It fJ apparent 
that by selection of tobacco and by 
means of an effective filter, the nicotine 
and tar content of cigarette smoke can be 
markedly reduced. Some filters are se-
lective in their action. For example, 
Wynder and Dietrich HoHmann have 
recently found that a certain type of 
filter, which passes a reasonable amount 
of smoke, removesaLnost all the phenols. 
ThLs may be important, since the same in. 
RUPTURE OF ALVEOLAR WALLS I •• 
prol1'e .. h'e proeell, from the normal .tat. 
(top) lO lhe rupture of .ome waD. (middl.) 
to the dIllppearanee In eertaia area. of an 
the tlveolar tiu.e (bouom). Thele pho' ... 
mierorrapb .. made b,. Auerbaeh, malDUy 
the tiNue approximately 120 diameten., 
vestigators have reported that the phe. 
nols in cigarette smol(e strongly inhibit 
the action of cilia in the bronchial tubes. 
and that some phenols increase the ac-
tion of known carcinogenic agents. Fur· 
thennore, by various processes it is pos· 
slble to alter the chemical composition 
of the smoke before it reaches the BIter. 
Considering this, I believe that exten· 
sive research should be undertaken to 
determine the effects of various constit· 
uents of cigarette smoke and to find 
means of removing those that are most 
hannful. Until this has been accom· 
plished it seems advisable to reduce the 
total tar and nicotine content of cigarette 
smoke by the menns now available. 
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APPEUDIX 2 (ai (ill 
IS THERE ANY CAUSAL Rr.LNrIONSIlIP BETWEEN 
CIGAr:ETTE SmKING AND LUNG CANCER? 
KOO:,!SON, R. T. & ZASOVSKY, P. A. 
Inst! tute for Cancer and Pulmonary Reseal'ch, Hamburg. 
(Extl'act from The 1979 Geneva Conference 
on Health-Related Habits.) 
Most studies on the effects of cigarette smoking conclude that cigarette 
sreoking leads to an early death as a result of the nTh~erous diseases 
purported to be associated with the habit. These diseases include: 
lung cancer, coronary heart disease, circulatory diseases such as hyper-
tension (high blood pressure), and respiratory disease such as bronchitis 
etc. 
The bias in such conclusions can be seen in the manner in which anti-
smOking agencies present their data, 1. e. they underplay the importance 
of other factors closely associated with all these dioeases. These 
factors include industrial pollution, carbonmonoxide from traffic; 
chemical pollution, e.g. exposure to asbestos and certain pesticidca, 
environmental stress, etc. So far· no study has reported conclusively 
that lung cancer is exclusively the cause of cigarette smoking. In 
other words no study into the relationship between lung cancer, for 
instance, and cigarette smoking has been able to eliminate all the other 
variables associated with the· disease. Similarly, no study done on the 
relationship between cigarette smoking and heart diseases or circulatory 
diseases has been able to control for such variables as emotional stress, 
homo environment, genetic make-up, amount of physical exercise taken by 
subjects, etc. which are also very closely associated wj.th these and 
similar diseases. 
It seems therefore that the dangers of Cigarette smoking to health are 
over-emphasized. For instance it is claimed by varicus studies and 
agencies that in anyone of the Western nations more than 1,700 people 
die each year from lung cancer chiefly callsed by cigarette smoking. 
About the same number of people, in fact if not more, die from road 
accidents each year; and these accidents claim more young lives than 
cigarette smoking does. However, this fact is often concealed· by anti-· 
cigarette smokers when they talk of cigarette smoking and early death. 
Perhaps, in this sense, every motor vehicle should carry a govel'nment 
warning sign: "/.lot or Vehicles can kill you or, at best, seriously 
damage your health". 
Onc can put forward aa many arguments in favour of cigarette smoking as 
thore are against it. Obesity,.for eXillnple, is as dangerous to health 
as cigarette smoking. If a cigarette smoker prone to cbesity gave up 
the habit, a/he would have better appetite and would tend to eat more 
and consequently put on weight. This would result in the substitution 
of one b~d habit for another • 
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In short, one should ·ta1w little notice of the despondency mon~ers. 'fho 
results of the studies on the effect!l of cigal'et~e smokinr, only sugr,est 
statistical relationships between cir,arette smoking and lung cancer, 
heart diseases, circulatory diseas~s, etc., i. e. they do not show that 
cigarette smoking is the cause of these diseases, let alone early 
deaths. It is a well-known epidemiological fact that the Cause of every 
disease is multi-factorial in nature, hence one cannot say conclusively 
that any disease, be it lung cancel' or coronary heart disease, etc. is 
the cause of one specific factor, e.g. cigarette smoking. 
That cigarette smoking is not the sole cause of lung cancer can be 
demonstrated by the f3Ct that: 
(1) not everyone who smokes cigarettes dies of lung cancer; 
(2) not every lung cancer victim is a Cigarette smoker; 
(3) there are many people in their 70s and 80s in most l~estern 
countries, who have been smoking on average 20 cigarettes or 
more per day since they were about 13 years old and are still 
enjoying their smoke. 
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Subject 
(N = 9) 
1 
2 
3 
.' 
4. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
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St.:biect 
(N = 9) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6. 
7 
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l.FPENDIX 2(b): OBSERVED DATA BY SUBJECT, ATTITUDE AND INFORMl\TION 
(i) Amount of Tobaooo Consumed Nn qrama) 
CONSONAN"l' SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO DISSONMfl' SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO 
CONSOK;t.NT INFORl1ATION CONSONANT INFORHi\TION 
pre-Test Post-Test Difference Subject Pre-Test Post-Test Difference (N - 91 
-
.6715 .7351 .0636 1 :5844 .6105 .0261 
.5437 .5426 -.0017 2 .6814 .• 4562 -.2252 ! 
.7238' . .7328 .009 3 .6689 .6589 -.01 
.6445 .6822 .0377 4 .6JGO .6733 .0373 
.7020 .7521 .0501 5 ;6995 .7149 .0151:. 
.6913 .7541 , .0628 6 .3905 .4677 .077'2 
.7184 .7446 .0262 7 .6724 .6889 .0165 , 
.3107 .3758 .0651 8 .2946 .• 4G65 .1719 I 
.5698 .6485 .0787 9 I .5595 .6841 .1246 , 
- I 
CONSON&~T SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO I .DISSONIINT SUBJECTS ;~Xl'OSED TO I I DISSONANT INFOR¥~\TION DISSONt.lll' INFOHM'::'ION , .. 
Pre-Test I PO!lt-Test Difference Subject Prc-Test I Post-TGst Difference I (N = q\ 
.6057. .7351 .1.2S4 1 .66l.7 .7089 .0472 I .6489 .5937 -.0552 2 .6720 .5655 -.1065 .5296 .4654 -.0642 . 3 .6233 .5189 -.10,14 
.6807 .6640 -.Ol,67 4. .5389 .~'~89 -.09 I .5252 .3746 -.1506 5 .7941 I .7022 -.on9 
.7358 ~7345 -.0013 6 .n36 .7397 .0161 I 
.7679 .6548 -.1131 7 .5548 .4488 -.106 
.4998 .4306 - .• 0692 a .. .5716 .4870 -.OS"6 
.6206 .4742 -.14.64 9 
, 
.4439 .2909 -.145 , 
(ii) Amount of Time (seconds) Lit Cigarette Stayed in Subjects' Mouths 
I 
'CONSONANT SUBJECTS EX?OSED TO DISSONF.NT SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO 
COHSONAl''IT INFORHATION CONSONANT INFORI"JlTION 
Subject Pre-Test Post-'!'est Difference Subject Pre-Test Post-Test Difference 
(N = 91 rN = q\ 
I 1 39.71 58.69 , 18.98 1 37.79 38.67 O.SS 
2 32.46 38.00 5.54 2 38.49 37.25 -1.24 
3 3S.26 41.32 3.06 3 39.85 41.00 1.15 
4 29.64 34.10 4.66 4 20.08 16.93 -3.15 
5 34.1? 34.19 0.02 5 45.69 58.38 12.69' 
6 29.11 40.29 11.18 6 30.47 33.38 2.91 Ll 23.53 I 26.43 2.9 7 27.34 41.40 14.06 15:82 ' 21.92 6.1 8 ~O 43.64 3.84 32.61 I 38.05 5.44 9 26.63 30.09 3.46 I 
CONSONANT SUBJEC'l'S EXPOSED TO DISSONJlNT SUll,]ECTS EXPOSED TO 
DISSO!"IANT INFOR:-~"TION DISSONANT INFOR:t,1\TION 
Subject i Pre-Test Post-Test Difference I Subject Prc-T&st Post-·f€st Difference (N = 9) (N = 9) 
1 29.09 24.49 -4.6 , 28.18 32.32 4.14 ... 
2 41.37 39 .. 61 -1.56 2 34.27 I 33.71 -0.56 I 3 29.31 28.00 -0.33. 3 30.00 , 30.42 O.~2 
t 
4 18.90, 18.69 -0.21 I 4 24.31 2~.65 0.34 '5 38.84 36.00 -2.84 5 30.00 28.45 -1.55 
~ 43.49 29.06 -14.43 I 6 4S.42 43.2l -5.21 0 
7 30 .. 03 23.23 -6.7.5 ' 7 31.19 34.01 2.82 
t 8 41.95 40.01 -1.94 8 29.98 23.04 -6.94 
L 9 38.53 39.91 1.38 9 22.76 21".13 -1.03 
" ' 
(iii) Subjects' EmotionaZ ArousaZ n1~an GSR) 
CONSONANT SUBJEC~S EXPOSED TO DISSON~NT SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO 
CONSONANT INFOR.'f1r"loTION CONSONANT INFOIU-lATION 
Subject:. Pre-Test Post-Test Difference Subject Pre-Test Post-Test I Difierence IN = 9\ (N = 9) 
1 3.14 2.00 1.14 1 3.62 1.14 2.48 
2 4.00 2.29 1.17 2 1.14. 0.29 0.85 
, 3 8.29 2.136 . 5.43 3 6.29 3.14 3.15 
4 2.00 . 1.14 0.86 4 8.00 0.71 7.29 
5 4.29 1.14 3.15 5 2.86 0.57 2.29 
6 
.. 
5.7.1 2.57 3.14 5.43 
-
6 2.86 2.57 
7 4.29 0.86 3.43 7 4.86 2.00 2.86 
8 4.57 2.57 , 2.00 8 4.86 2.86 2.00 
9 4.29 4.57 -0.28 9 3.43 4.00 -0.57 
I CONSONANT SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO DISSONANT SUBJECTS EXPOSED TO 
I DISSONANT INF01U1..'ITION DISSONA!IlT INFORlI.ATION 
Subject Pre-Test Post-Test Difference Subject Pre-'I'est Post-Test Difference (N = 9) IN = 91' 
1 4.57 4.00 0.57 1 l.00 2.43 -1.43 
2 1.57 3.14 -1.57 2 3.1t; , 3.71 -0.57 
3 <1.29 6.57 . -2.28 3 3.43 8.29 -4.86 
4 '4.57 4.43 . 0.14 4 2.00 6.68 -4.86 
5 4.57 5.71 -1.14 5 3.14 5.43 
-2.29 
6 5.43 8.57 -3.14 6 2.29 3.14 -0.85 
7 2.57 5.71 -3.14 7 4.29 7.14 -2.85 
8 6.CO 5.71 0.29 8 4.00 5.71 -1.71 
L 9 3.43 6.86 -3.43 9 5.71 7.43 -1.72 
APPENDIX 2(c): SUMY.ARY OF 2-NAY ANOVA ON DATA: BY VARIABLE 
(i) Amount.of Cigarettes Consumed 
SOURCE OF V~~IA~rON I SUM OF sQu~ns DEGREE OF FREEDOM I "D.N SQUARE F-!UI.TIO EXPECTED F PROB. . 
I A (Category of S) .0024 1 .0024 .3934 >.05 
B (Information) .• 0876 1 .0876 14.3607 >4.15 <0.01 
AB (Interaction) .0001- 1 .0007 .1148 : >.05 
Hithin cell .1957 32 .0061 
Total .2865· 35 .0082 
(U) Amount of Time Cigarette Stayed in Mouth 
so:mCE C.' VARIATION SUM OF SQUARES DEGREE OF FREEDOM MEAN SQUARE F-RATIO EXl'ECTED F PR03~ , 
A (Category of S) 
- 1 - - >.05" I 
B (Inf C rIlla tion) 483.4135 1 483.4l35 19.1969 ~.15 <0.01 I 
AB (Inter<lction) 59.7538 1 59.7538 2.37289 , >.05 
J 
Nithin cell 805.8213 32 25.1819 
Total 1348.9.886 35 38.542431 
NU) GSR 
SOURCZ OF VIJRIATICN SUH OF SQUARES DEGREE OF FREEDOM MEAN SQUARE I F-RATIO EXPBCTED F PR03. 
f---
. 
A (Category of S) .4512 1 .4512 .1516 I >.05 B ( Information) 173.4371 
' .. 
1 "173.4371- 58.2903 >4.15 <.O!. 
AB (Interaction) 3.2868 1 3.2868 1.1046 >.05 
l'li thin cell 95.2125 32 2.9754 
I To'Ca1 272.3876 35 7.7825 
E'.!~ 2 (d): SUM.'IA.~Y OF UNRELATED 'I'-TEST ON PRE-TEST DA'rll: CONS WANT SMOKERS VS. DI SSONANT S:·:CKSRS 
(i) I'Jllount of TOhaceo Consumed (in gmms) 
-
~TANDl;lUl STANDARD DEGREES OF ! T-VALUE 2-TAIL MEr~ DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROB. 
t Consol,;:nt Smokarc (N = :L8) .6217 .111 .026 
34 .59 .557, I Dissonant Smokers (N, = 18) .5984 .124 .029 
Ni) Amount of Time (Seconds) Subjects Left Lit Cigarettes ill Their Mouths 
[~Em ST.".NDARD S'lI;J~DARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TA!L 
. DEVIATION ElU'~OR FREEDOM PROS. 
.-
I 
~nsonant Smo~<ers (N = 18) 32.7122 7.515 1. 771 I I I 34 .07 .942 Dissonant Smokers (N = 18) 32.5250 7 .• 766 I 1.830 , 
-
! 
(iii) Subjects I Emotional. Arousal. (as maasured by G51/) 
STA.\'DI'pJ) STANDARD DEGREBS OF 1 2-TAIL I MEAN. DEVIATION ERROa FREEDOM T-VA!.UE PROB. I 
I I , I Co",.,., ,,"k •• , (N = 18) 4.1989 1.591 .375 I I 34 .60 .554 
Dissonant Smokers (N = le) 3.8606, 1.800 :424 
. , 
APPENDIX 2 (e): SUl'.MARY OF UNRELATED 'l'-TES'l'S: INTERGROUP C011PARISONS 
Consonant Subjects Exposed to Consonant Information Vs. Consonant Subjects E:r;posed to Dissonant Inforrr,ation 
(i) Difference in amount of tobacco conswned (in grame.) between pre- cuzd post-test conditions 
STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF 2-TAIL MEAN ERROR FREEDOM T-VALUE PROS. DEVIATION 
Consonant Subjects Exposed , 
to Consonant Information -.0435 .028 .009 
(N = 9) 16 -3.24 .005 Consonant Subjects Exposed 
. 
to Dissonant Informati~ .• 0541 .086 .029 
(N = 9) 
~ (i.i) Difference in amount of time (seconds) Ut cigarettes stayed in subjects' mouths betlMen pro- and post-test conditions 
... 
I STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL MEAN DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROB=_ 
Consonant Subjects El:posed 
to Consonant Information -6.0978 5.701 1.900 
(N = 9j 16 -3.86 .001 Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information 3.4733 4.779 1.593 
(N = 9) . , 
(iii) Difference in subjects I emotiona~ al'ousaZ (GSR) between pre- and post-test conditions 
STANDARD STA.'lDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL MEAN DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROS. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed 
t.O Consonant Information 2.2867 1.696 .565 
(N = 9) 
16 5.41 .000 Consonan'c Subj ects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information I -1.7444 1.455· .485 (N = 9) 
• 
APPENDIX 2(f): SUMMARY OF UNRELATED T-TESTS: INTERGROUP COHPARISONS 
Consonwzt Subjects Exvosed to Consonant Information Vs. Dissonant Subjects EXposed to C~lsor~nt Information 
(i) Difference in ~ount of tobacco consumed (in grams) between pre- and post-test conditions 
. 
-
. . 2-TAIL STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF MEAN DEVIATION ERROR ~'REEDOM T-VALUE. PROB. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information -.0435 .028 .009 
(N = 9) 16 -.20 .778 Dissonant Subjects Exposed .~ 
to Consonant Info~ation -.0260 .111 .037 
(N = 9) 
. 
';:! (ii). Difference in amount of time (seconds) Zit cigarettes stayed in subjects'mouthsbetvJeen pre- and post-test conditions 
V> 
'. STANDARD STANDARD' DEGREES OF 2-Tl'.IL MEAN DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM T-VALUE PROB. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information -6.0978 5.701 1.900 
• (1'1 = 9) 
16 -.83 .420 Dissonant Subjects Exposed , 
to Consonant Information -3.8444 5.857 1.952 
(N = 9) 
(iii) Difference in subjects' emotionat arousat (GSR) between pre- and post-test conditions 
STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF 2-TAIL MEAN DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM T-VALUE PROB. 
Consonw,t Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information 2.2867 1.696 .565 
(N ;. 9) . 
16 -.29 .778 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information 2.5467 2.119 .706 
(N '" 9) 
. , 
N 
.... 
'" 
• 
~~PENDIX 2(g), SUMMARY OF UNRELATED T-TESTS, INTERGROUP COMPARISO~S 
Consonant Subjeats Exposed to Consonant Information Vs. Dissonant Subjeats EXDosed to Dissonant Information 
(i) Differenae in amount of tobaaao aonsumed (in grams) between pre- and post-test aonditions 
MEAN STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF· T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROB. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information -.0435 .028 .009 
(N = 9) 16 -5.15 .000 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information .0739 .063 .021 
(N = 9) 
(U). D:ifferenae in amount of time (seaonds) Ut aigarettes stayed in subjeats' mouths between pre- and post-test aonditio"ns 
MEAN STANDARD STANDARD I DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION . ERROR FREEDOM PROB. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed 
·to Consonant Information -6.0978 5.701 1.900 
(N = 9) 16 -3.15 .006 Dissonant Subjects Exposed , 
to Dissonant Information '.9078 3.512 1.171 
(N = 9) 
(iii) Differenae in subjeats' emotionaZ arousaZ (GSR) between pre- and 'post-test aonditiolls 
MEAN 
STANDl'~ STl',NDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROB. 
r-consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information 2.2867 1.696 .565 
(N = 9) 
16 6.04 .000 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information -2.3289 1.543 .514 
(N = 9) 
.. ' 
APPENDIX 2 (h), SUMMARY OF lllREL.l'.TED T-TES'rS, INTERGROUP COHPARISONS 
Consonant Subjects Exposed to Dissonant Information Vs. Dissolmnt Subjects Exposed to Consonant Injormation 
(i) Difference in amount of tobacco conswned (in grams) between pre- and post-test conditions 
MEAN STA.lIIDAIID STA.lIID1\.,.'m DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOH PROE. 
Consona:1.t Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information .0541 .086 .029 
(N = 9) 16 1.71 .106 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to COl1.S0nant Information -.0260 .111 .037 
(N = 9) 
(U) Difference in amount of time (seconds) Ut cigarettes stayed in subjects'mouthsbetween pre- and poot-test conditions· 
MEAN I STA.1IIDARD . STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL ) DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROB. 
r Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information 3.4733 4.779 1.593 
. (N = 9) 16 2.90 .01, Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information -3.8444 5.857 1.952 I (N = 9) " 
(iii) Diffel'ence in subjects I emotionaL arousaL (GSR) between pre- and post-test conditions 
-I MF.AN STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OJ:' T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDO:1 PROE. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information ,-1.7444 1.455 .485 
(N = 9) 
Dissonant Subjects Exposed 16· -5.01 .000 
to Consonant Information 2.5462 2.119 . .706 
(N = 9) 
, 
APPENDIX 2 tj): SU/If.M2\RY OF UNRELATED T-TESTS: INTERGROUP COMPARISONS 
Dis/Jonant Subjeats Exposed to Consonant Information Vs. Dissonant SubjeatB Exposed to Dissonant Inforr..ation .-
(i) Differenae in amount of tobaaao consumed (in grams) betu'ee11 pre- and post-test conditions 
i MEAN STANDARD Sl'ANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROE. 
Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information -.0260 .111 .037" 
(N = 9) 16 -2.35 .032 Dissonant Subjects Expose~ . 
to Dissonant Information .0739 .063 .021 
(N = 9) 
N (iiJ ~jrference in amount of time (seaonds) Zit cigarettes stayed in subjects' mouths between pre- and post-test cor-iitions 
..,. 
0) 
... 
MEAN STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROB. 
Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Conson~~t Information -3.8444 5.857 1.952 
"(N = 9) 16 -2.09 .053 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information .9078 3.512 1.171 
(N = 9) .' 
-(iii) Di.fferenae in subjeats I emotionaZ a2'ous"aZ (GSR) between pre- and post-test aonditions 
MEA.~ STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VAWE 2-T],IL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROD. 
Dissonan.t Subjects Exposed 
to Consonant Information 2.5467 2.119 .706 
(N = 9) 16' 5.58 .000 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information -2.3289 1.543 .514 . . 
(N '" 9) 
(ii) 
• 
APPENDIX 2 (k1: SUMHARY OF UNRELI\.TED T-TESTS: INTERGROUP CmlPARISONS 
Consonant Subjeots Exposed to Dissonant Information Vs. Dissonant Smokers E.-cposed to Dissonant Information 
(i) Differenoe in amount of tobaoao aonsumed (in grams) between pre- and post-test aonditions 
MEAN STANDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM PROE. 
: Consonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information .0541 .086 .029 
(N = 9) 16 -.56 .586 Dissonant Subjects Exposed 
to Dissonant Information .0739 .063 .021 : 
(N = 9) . 
Difference in, amount of time (seaonds) Zit aigarettes stayed in subjeats'mouthsbetween pre- and post-test aonditions 
MEAN ' STANDA.'<D STANDA.'1D DEGREES OF T-VALUE I 2-TAIL , DEVIATION ERROR FREEDOM, PROE. 
Consonant Subjects Exposed: 
to Dissonant Information 3.4733 4.779 . 1. 593 
. (N = 9) 16 1.30 .213 
. Dissonant Subjects F~posed 
to Dissonant Information .• 9078 3.512 1.171 
(N = 9) 
(iii) Differenae in subjcats' emotionaZ arousaZ (OSR) between pre- and post-test aonditions 
MEAN STJI.NDARD STANDARD DEGREES OF 'l'-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION . ERROR FREEDOM PROE. 
Co~sor!a,nt Subj (lets E:<posed I to Dissonant Information -1.7444 1.455 .485 (N = 9) 16 . .83 .421 Dissonant Subjects Exposed . 
to Dissonant Information -2.3289 1.543 .514 .. 
(1'1 = 9) 
.. 
APpgNDIX 2 (t.): PEl\RSO~<.!:Er..l\'1'ION CO[,FFIC}}':N'I'S ON _ J\t.l0UNT OP 
0GiIRE'l'l'ES ( ItI GPM1S) COnSUI·lED, 'i'HIE (IN 
SECONDS) CIGiIRET'l'ES \~EHE IN BOUTHS rum 
SUBJECfS' 'GSR 
AMOUNT TIME GSR 
****** r = .3525 r = -.5223 Al~OUNT 
P = .035 P = .001 
r = .3525 '****** r = .3725 TUIE 
.035 .024 p.= p= 
r = -.5223 r= -.3752 ****** GSR 
.001 .024 • P = P = 
, . 
. . 
" 
.' 
" 
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APPENDIX TO STUDY 'TWO 
APPENDIX 3 (0. ) : OBSERVED DATA BY CWDITION, SUD.meT A.lffi SEX 
(i) Experimental Subjects (N = 28) 
SUBJECT SEX No. OF TRIALS TO EXTINCT lOa 
1 M 36 
2 M 39 
3 M 23 
4 M 12 
5 
..-
M 25 
6 M 21 
7 M '. 18 
8 M 27 
9 M· 25 
10 M 25 
11 M 26 
12 M 11 
13 M 13 
14 M 13 
15 F 32 
16 F ; 38 
17 F 29 
18 F 20 
19 F 27 
20 F 22 
21 F 22 
22 F 4 
23 F· 13 
24 F 21 
25 F 2'8 
26 F 12 
27 F 4 
28 F 8 
~ 594 
X 21.21h 
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APPE~IX 3(a): Continued 
(ii) Control Subjec~s (N 0 28) 
Subject Sex No. OF TRIALS TO EXTINCTIO~r 
1 M 21 
2 M 19 
3 M 11 
4 M 12 
5 M 4 
6 M 22 
7 M 27 
8 M 52 
9 M 27 
10 M 47 
II M 40 
12 M 17 
13 M 11 
14 M 23 
15 F 16 
16 F 38 
17 F 26 
18 F 63 
19 F 53 
20 F 23 
21 F p 39 
22 F 18 
23 F 15 
24 F 24 
25 F 24 
26 F 41 
27 F 39 
28 F 41 
~ 793 
X 28.312 
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N 
\J1 
W 
Exnerimental 
Haies (N ",14) 
Experimental 
Females (N = 14) 
control 
Females (N =14) 
APPENDIX 3(b): SUMMARY OF UNRELATED T-TESTS 
(i) Experimental male subjects vs. 
11EAN 
22.429 i 
I ' 
. "': t _ • 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
8.55 
14.00 
DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM 
26 
., 
, ' 
" 
control male subjectsl " 
T-VALUE 2-TAIL 
PROB 
-0.309 '> .05 
(ii) Experimental female subjects vs. Control female subjects2 
20.00 
32.857 
STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
10.5 
DEGREES OF 
FREEDOM / 
26 
" 
T-VALUE 2-TAIL 
PROB 
4 .05 
APPENDIX 3 (b) : Continued 
(Hi) Experimental male subjects vs. Experimental female subjects3 • 
J·lEAN STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVIATION FREEDOM PROE 
Experimental 22.429 8055 ¥.a1es (N = 14) 26 0.670 > .05 
Experimental 
Females (N = 14) 20.00 1005 
. (iv) Control male subje.cts vs; Control female subjects4 • 
}IEAN STANDARD DEGREES OF T-VALUE 2-TAIL DEVl11TION FREEDOM PROE 
23.786 14.00 
26 ,':/ -1.692 > .05 
lJontrol 
Males (N .. 14) 
Contro! Females (N .. 14) 32.857 14.3 
NOTES 
1. 
2. 
3. 
·4. 
There ,ras no significant:; difference between male subjects of both experimental 
conditions in their rate of extinction. 
Female experimental subjects extinguished quick than their c~~trol counterparts. 
Tnere ~'TaS no significant difference between the experimental male subjects compared 
with their female counterpart.s. 
There was no significant difference between the control male subjects and tr.air 
female counterparts. " 
APPENDIX 4: APPENDIX '['0 STUDY THREE 
APPENDIX 4(a): PRE-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
P.teMe ·c.omp.tcte :t.hU quu:UonncU.!!.e M hone.&.t.e.y M pOM'<'b.te and Itct((/tIt .u 
next week.. Any .<.nooltma:Uon g.<.ven will. be :tJr.eated M .6:tJt.<.cfty c.onn·i.den-
:Ua.e.. 
NAME: 
1. which of the following reasons made you decide to lose weight? 
(Please tick which is applicable.) 
(a) personal 
(b) health 
(c) physical appearance 
(d) family or marital pressure 
(e) pressure from friends 
2. What is your desired weight? 
3. What is your present we.ight? 
4. What was your weight before you joined the slimming club? ________ __ 
5. What kind of image did you have of " yourself before you decided ~n 
weight loss? (Underline which applies.) 
(a) positive (satisfied with yourself) 
(b) negative (dissatisfied with yourself) 
(c) ambivalent (neutral) 
6. How much satisfaction do ·you think you will derive from your desired 
we.ight when you have achieved it? 
(a) a.lot 
(b) a fair amount 
(c) a little 
7. How would you describe your self-image now? (Underline which 
applies.) 
(a) positive 
(b) negative 
(c) ambivalent 
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8. When you were an adolescent, would you describe yourself as being: 
(a) overweight 
(b) cuddly 
(c) thin 
9. At what age, as far as you can remember, did you become aware of 
your weight problem? 
10. Please describe briefly the circumstances leading to your weight 
problem, e.g. loss of a job, boredom, always been oven/eight. 
11. Since joining the sli~ming club, would you describe your resistance 
to temptations to eat big meals or rich foods, such as ice cream, 
cakes, chocolates, etc., as: 
12. 
(a) very good 
(b) . good 
(c) poor 
(d) very poor 
(Underline which applies.) 
Since you joined the slimming club, have you lost, gained, or had no 
change in weight? 
.. 
13; To whom or to what would you attribute this loss or gain or 'no 
change' in weight, e.g., through dieting, eating less than you used 
to, exercise, still eating too much, or your own efforts? 
14. Since you joined the slimming club, have you gained·or not lost 
weight? 
YES / NO 
15. If the answer to Question 14 is YES, do you get upset about it? 
(a) never 
(b) sometimes 
(c) often 
(d) most of the time 
(e) all the time 
(Underline which applies.) 
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16. If you do get upset about it, what do you think the cause might be? 
17. Before you joined the club, did you use to get upset apout your 
weight? 
YES / NO 
18. If YES to Question 17, did you do so: 
(a) sometimes 
(b) often 
(c) most of the time 
(d) all the time 
(Underline which applies.) 
19. If you have lost some weight since you joined the sli~~ing club, do 
you get upset less' frequently than you used to? 
YES / NO 
20. If YES to Question 19, why? 
21. During the year before joining the slimming club: 
(a) would you walk to the store rather than drive? 
YES / NO 
--
.~ ... -
(b) would you take the lift rather than walk up the stairs? 
YES / NO 
(c) would you get up and take something from another part of the 
house rather than ask someone else to fetch it for you? 
YES / NO 
(d) hOlf often did you go for J.ong walks of at least three miles? 
(i) 
(H) 
(iil) 
(iv) 
never 
once a week 
twice a week 
once a .montli .' 
(Please specify.) 
257 
(e) did you take part in any exercise or sports, e.g. badminton, 
netball,' cycling, etc? 
YES / NO 
If YES, how often? 
22. Before joining the slimming club, did you or your family possess a 
car? 
YES / NO 
23. Since you joined the slimming club: 
(a) do you walk to the store more often than you used to? 
YES / NO 
(b) do you walk up the stairs more often than you used to? 
YES / NO 
(c) would you rather ask someone else to fetch something from 
another part of the house for you rather than fetch it 
yourself? ", 
YES / NO 
.. 
(d) how often do you go for long walks of at least three miles? 
(i) 
(H) 
(Hi) 
(iv) 
never 
once a week 
twice a week 
once a month 
(Please specify.) 
(e) do you take part in any exercise or sports, e.g. badminton, 
swimming, cycling, etc? 
YES / NO 
If YES, how often? 
24. How long have.you Or your family possessed a·car? 
25. How long ago did you join the slimming club? 
26. Before joining a slimming club, would you describe your resistance 
to temptations to eat big meals or rich foods such as cakes, 
chocolates, ice creams, etc., as: 
(a) very good 
(b) good 
(c) poor 
(d) very poor 
(Underline which applies.) . 
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27. Before you joined the slimming club, how did you use to feel 
emotionally after eating a big meal or rich foods, such as ice' 
cream, cakes, puddings, etc? 
(a) happy 
(b) sad 
(c) neutral 
(Underline which applies.) 
28. Since you joined the club, how do you feel emotionally after eating 
a big meal or rich foods, such as chocolates, cream biscuits, etc? 
(a) happy 
(b) sad 
(c) guilty 
(Underline which applies.) 
29. Why do you think you feel happy, sad or guilty? 
30. How old are you? --
31. Do you think you could lose weight through your own efforts, without 
the help of a slimming club, friends or relatives? 
YES / NO 
32. Before joining a slimming club, did you ever look at your body 
either in the nude or half-clothed in a full-le,ngth mirror?, 
YES / NO 
33. If YES to Question '32, how often? 
(a) occasionally 
(b) every day 
(c) once a week (Underline which applies.) 
(d) more than once a week 
34. If YES to Question 32, what were your feelings about yourself? 
(a) positive (pleased with yourself) 
(b) negative (ashamed of yourself) 
(c) neutral (did not care) 
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(Underline which applies.), 
APPENDIX 4 (b): SUm1ARY OF' sun.JEers· RESPONSES TO 
PRE-EXPERIHENTi\J, QUESTIOtlNAIRE 
PET,C)-:N'rll.GE REsrONSE, In' EXP1::RIMEN'l'Ar.. CONDITlON 
QUESTION J\lol~WER Experimental Control Group Control Group Subjects I Subjects It Subjects 
. 
(N B 12) (N - 9) (N • 11) 
1 Personal 
- - -Health 
-
22 
-Physical Appearance 100 78 100 
Family/Na.rital 
- - -Friends 
- - -
5 Positive 8 
- -Negative 84 78 73 
Neutral 8 22 27 
6 A lot 75 66 82 
A fair aJllO'..mt 25 34 18 
A little 
- - -
7 Positive 50 45 36 
Negative 50 22 36 
Neutral 
-
33 28 
11 Very good 8 
-
9 
Good 67 , 67 64 
Poor 25 22 27 
Very poor 
-
11 
-
17 Yes 83 78 82 
No 17 22 18 
. 
18 Sometimes 70 72 56 
Often 
-
14 22 
Most of the timo 20 14 11 
All the time 10 
-
11 
21(d) Never SO 11 .9 
Once a week 25 4S 55 
Twice A week 
-
22 18 
Once a month 25 .. 22 18 
21(e) Yes 50 56 64 
No 50 ~4 36 
. 
23 (d) Never 41 11 7 
Once a week 25 33 42 
Twice a week 17 33 22 
Once a month 17 23 29 
23(e) Yes 67 78 65 
No 33 22 3S 
27 nappy 25 11 18 
Sad 25 11 20 
Neutral So 78 62 
28 l!appy 
- - -
Sad 8 
- -Neutral 72 100 100 
29 I only cheat myself 46 60 62 
I'll never lose w~19ht 
if I eat too much 50 40 30 
Other rColsons 4 
-
8 
32 Yes 75 n 90 
No 25 28 . 10 
33 Occ<.Isionally 67 56 60 
Evel'yday 33 
-
20 
Onco a week '. 
-
33 20 
More tha.n once a week 
-
11 
-
34 I"oaitivQ 9 11 20 
tzng.l.t.ivQ 67 70 60 
Ncutr,'ll 25 11 20 
-
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APPENDIX 4 (c): POST-EXPERINllNTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
Plea..6e eomplete :tlU.6qu.e~Uonl1a.Vte a..6 honute.y a..6 YOu. ean. Be a..6.6Ulted 
tha.t a.ny pVU>OI1a£. '('116o!UllaUof! you. g/.ve. if! the. que,~UOIlfl(U.lte. will be 
vLea.te.d a.6 .6:trvi.c.te.y eOIl6/.de.nUa.£.. 
ThanR you. 6o~ yOUlt eo-op~aUol1. 
1. Name: 
2. Occupation: 
3. How many serious attempts have you made in the past to reduce your 
~reight? (Please tick ~lhich applies.) 
(a) one attempt 
(b) two attempts 
(c) more than two attempts 
4. Do you still attend >Teekly meetings held by the slimming club? 
(Please tick >Thich applies.) 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
5. lIow long have you been or were you with the club? 
6. If you don't attend weekly meetings any more: 
(a) ~lhat was your welght >Then you started 
(b) what is your welght now (please. give welght to the 
nearest pound 
(c) please state briefly why you stopped attending meetings 
7. Would you describe your body image now as: (please tick which 
applies): 
(a) satisfactory 
(b) unsatisfactory 
(c) neutral 
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8. During the past 10 weeks, would you describe your resist.ance to 
temptations to eat big meals and unessential fattening foods such 
as chocolates, ice cream, etc. as: (please tick which applies) 
(a) very good 
(b) good 
(c) poor 
(d) very poor 
9. Have you lost some we,ight during the past 10 weeks? (Please tick 
which applies.) 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
10. If you have lost some weight during the past 10 weeks, which of 
the following do you think is or are responsible for your ,~eight 
loss: (please tick which applies) 
planned dieting (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
eating less than you used to' 
physical exercise 
eating less and physical exercise 
11. If you have gained weight or have not lost weight during the past 
10 weeks, which of the following do you think is or are responsible 
for your weight problem: (please tick which applies) 
(a) eating too much 
(b) lack of physical exercise 
(c) eating too much and lack of physical exercise 
(d) not motivated enough to reduce weight 
12. If you have gained or have not lost weight during the past 10 weeks, 
do you get upset about it? (Please tick which applies.) 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
13. If answer to Question 12 is yes, how often do you get upset about 
it? (Please tick which applies.) 
(a) sometimes 
(b) often 
(c) most of the time 
(d) all of the time 
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14. During the past 10 "eeks, how oftcn do you go for walks of at least 
onc mile or take part in exercise or sports such as cycling, _ 
swimming, squash, tennis or badminton, etc.? (Please tick which 
applie5.) 
(a) never 
(b) once a week 
(c) twice a week 
(d) more than twice a week 
15. Which of the following emotions applies to you after eating a big 
meal or chocolates, cakes, etc.? (Please tick "hich applies.) 
(a) happy 
(b) guilty 
(c) neutral 
16. Do you look at your body, at home, either in the nude or half-
clothed in a full-length mirror? (Please tick "hich applies.). 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
17. If answer to Question 16 is yes, how often do you do so? (Pleas~ 
tick which app~ies.) 
18. 
(a) occasionally 
(b) everyday 
(c) once a week 
(d) more than once a week 
If answer to Question 16 is yes, would you 
after viewing yourself in the mirror, as: 
applies) -
(a) positive (pleased I~ith your body) 
(b) negative (ashamed of your body) 
(c) neutral (don't care) 
describe your feelings, 
(please tick which 
19. Were you one of the club members who looked at themselves in the 
mirror-room weekly? (Please tick which applies.) . 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
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20. If you visited the mirror-room weekly, which of the following best 
describes your emotional reaction on your first visit? (Please 
tick which applies.) 
(a) surprised that you looked more overweight than you thought 
(b) surprised that you looked less over"eight than you thought 
(c) no reaction (you' looked the same as you thought any\>ay) 
(d) other: 
21. On your first visit to the mirror-room, "hich of the following 
best describes your feelings about your body image: (please tick 
which applies) 
(a) happy 
(b) upset 
(c) frightened 
(d) neutral 
22. If you visited the mirror-room, do you think that you have benefited 
from it, as far as your weight is concerned? (Please tick which-_ 
applies.) 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
23. If answer to the above question is yes, which of the following 
reasons applies to you? (Please tick which applies.) 
(a) because it has helped you to come,to terms with your body 
(b) because it offered you the opportunity of seeing your entire 
body from all angles 
(c) because it enabled you to see for yourself which parts of 
your body you were losing or putting on weight 
(d) other reasons: 
24. As a result of your visits to the mirror-room, did'you-become more 
motivated to lose weight2 (Please tick which applies.) 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
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25. 1\s a result of your visits to the mirror-room, do you think that 
you have a mental picture of your entire body as reflected in the 
mirrors? (Please tick which applies.) 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
26. If you viewed yourself in the mirror-room, please describe briefly 
what you think or how you feel about the experiment, especially 
the mirror-room. 
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1\PPENDIX 4 (d) SUMM11RY OF SUB,JECrS I FESPor~SES TO 
pOS'r-EXl'ERH1EN'l'l\L QUESTIONNl\IRE 
, , Rt$~ONSE, BY EXPFJUHENTl\L CONDITION 
QUESTION IINSWEa Expcrimc-ntal Control Group Control Gt'CI,lP Subjects I Subjects II Subjects 
(N • 12) (N " 9) (N - 11) 
7 Satisfactory 19 . 22 9 
Unsatisfactory 27 67 64 
Neutral SS 11 27 
9 Very good 
-
11 
-
Good 19 56· 36 
Poor 73 21 SS 
Very poor 9 12 9 
10 Planned dieting 
- - -
Eating less than 
used to 30 90 4S 
Physical Exercise 
- - -
Eating les3 and 
physical exercise 70 10 35 
Other 
- -
20 
14 Never 
-
11 
-
Once a week 29 11 36.5 
Twice a .... eek 36 33 27 
Morc than twice a week 36 45 36.5 
15 Happy 
- - -
Guilty 73 79 82 
Neutral 27 22 18 
16 Ye. 100 H 86 
No 
-
26 14 
17 Occasionally 37 60 71 
Everyday 18 
-
29 
Once a week 9 40 
-
~fore than once a month 36 
- -
18 Positive 64 40 
-
Negative 36 60 71 
Neutral 
- -
29 
20 •• more overweight .. 64 
- .' -
.. less overweight .. ·9 
- -
no reaction 27 
- -
other ,-
- -
21 Happy 
- - -
Upset 45 
- -
Frightened 
- - -
Neutral SS 
- -
22 Ye. 64 
- -
No 36 
- -
23 .. come to terms 
. with. body 
- - -
.. seeing entire 
body 29 
- -
•• parts of body .. 71 
- -
losing/putting on 
weight 
- - -
other 
-
-
-
24 Ye. 64 
- -
No 36 
- - . 
25 Ye. 90 
- -No 10 
- -
continued on next ~age 
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APPENDIX 4(d): continued 
The following are some extracts from the Experimental Subjects' 
responses to Question 26: 
"The use of mirrors is a very good idea, but it would be more effective 
if cor.lbined with dieting." 
"The mirror-room was a good idea because you could see your body all 
round." 
"In general, I suppose the mirror-room is a good idea but .i.t is not 
enough as a motivator for losing we.ight." 
"1 did not like the mirror-room too much because 1 always looked fatter 
in it than I actually was. I also looked distorted every time 1 went 
into it. It did not make me lose much weight anyway." 
"1 enjoyed taking part in the experiment. 1 did like going into the 
mirror-room, although it I~as frightening at first, because it enabled 
me to see the parts of my body which needed shaping up. 1 think the 
mirror-room is a good idea because it helped me in my effort to lose 
weight." 
"It was embarrassing to see myself 
mirror-room but I. got used to it. 
1 realise that I look at myself in 
the'first·time 1 was in the 
It did not make me lose weight 
the mirror more at home." 
but 
"1 think the experiment was OK. 1 did not mind going into the mirror-
room but those forms we had to fill in were a nuisance, next time try 
to do without them." 
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'" ex> 
SUBJECT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
lO 
II 
l2 
1: 
-x 
APPENDIX 4 (e): INDIVIDUAL WEEKLY ABSOLUTE WEIGHT LOSS/GAIN (IN POUNDAGE), BY EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
(i) ExperimentaZ Subjects (N = 12) 
-TREATMENT WEEK PRE-TREATMENT (TREATHENT) GOAL WEIGHT TOTAL LOSS/GAIN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
l22 136 133 131 l31 l29 
-
131 
- - - -
-5 
l50 164 l6l· l57 l58 l57 156 - l54 154 15l - -13 
ll9 l3l 128 130 129 128 128 l3l l30 132 133 131 0 
l33 l44 142 142 .143 142 143 l42 
-
l42 l44 l42 -2 
133. l67 163. 160 158 
-
158 
-
l60 l57 - - -10 
, 
133 l49 l49 146 145 145 l43 l42 145 l43 l43 14l -8 
. ll7 134 133 l31 131 l3l 129 l28 l27 128 129 128 -6· 
140 l58 155 156 l5l l45 l45 l44 
- - - -
-l4: 
l33 l45 142 142 140 l49 140 14l - - - - -4 
ll2 120 . ll9 ll8 
- - - - - - - -
-2 
140 166 163 l64 l66 168 166 l64 167 l56 16B 167 . 1 
140 157 154 l53 
- - - - - - - -
-4 
1572 1753 -67 
. 
13l 146.08 -5.58 
" 
APPENDIX 4(e): continued 
(ii) ControL Group I SUbjects (N = 9) 
. TREATMENT WEEK 
SUBJECT GOAL PRE-TREATMENT TREAT!I'.ENT WEIGHT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOTAL LOSS/GAIN 
1 154 163 163 161 159 158 159 159 156 161 - - -2 
2 110 114 .. , 114 115 - 115 113 116 112 - - 113 -1 
3 126 168 166 163 159 159 158 
- - - - -
-10 
·4 140 176 170 171 168 168 163 164 161 161 160 
-
-16 
5 112 128 125 124 124 123 124 123 - 126 125 125 -3 
6 126 145 143 142 144 146 
- - - - - -
+1 
7 140 148 147 148 148 148 150 149 147 147 - - -1 
8 119 127 125 122 ).24 123 
-
122 
-
120 120 119 -8 
9 147 176 174 177 175 177 177 ·177 176 
-
-. 
-
0 
1: 1174 1347 -40 
-x 130 149.66 -4.44 
.' 
APPENDIX 4(e): continued 
(iU) Contro~ Group II Subjeats (N ~ 11) 
PRE-TREATMENT TREATMENT WEEK TREATHENT SUBJECT GOAL WEIGHT TOTAL LOSS/GAIN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10. 
1 129 140 144 151 152 140 139 139 142 140 
-
143 +3 
2 107 . 122 !l8 116 116 116 116 116 - - 118 - -4 
3 147 156 156 157 
- - -
157 158 
- - -
+2 
.' 
105 135 ' -5 4 130 130 129 130 
- -
130 130 
-
. -
5 147' 175 172 165 , 168 166 166 163 163 161 - - -14 
6 126 136 136 132 135 133 135 133 133 
-
133 
-
-3 
7· 112 126 125 130 128 - - - - . - - - +2 
8 112. 125 121 121 120 122 - 121 121 .. - - - -4 
9 161 182 178 178 179 179 182 178 
-
179 177 178 -4 
10 147 195 191 190 189 188 181 
-
180 177 177, 
-
-18 
11 108 122 120 
-
118 
-
117 115 115 113 
- -
-9 
. 
1: 1399 1614 -54 
. 
-x 127 146.72 , -4.91 
APPENDIX 4(f): SUMMARY OF ONEWAY ANOVA ON WEEKLY lIBSOLUTE DATA (WEEK 7-WEEK 10) 
(i) Week '? 
. Source ·D.F. Sum of S:I!:!ares Hean Ssuares F. Ratio F. Prob. 
Between Groups 2 29.4444 14.7222 7.6408 .0043 
Within Groups 17 32.7556 1.9268 
Total 19 62.2000 
(ii) fleek 8 
Source ~ Sum of Squares Hean SSluares F. Ratio F. Prob. 
Bebleen Groups. 2 18.7159 9.3579 2.2801 .1366 
.N Within Groups 15· 61.5619 4.1041 
.... Total 17 . 80.2778 
(iii) Week 9 
Source 
----
~ Sum of Squares Hean SSluares F. Ratio F. Prob. 
Between Groups 2 3.1667 1.5833 . .9194 .4332 
Within Groups 9 15.5000 1.7222/ 
Total 11 18.6667 
(i7)) Week 10 
Source .~ Sum of Sguares Hean SS\uares F. Ratio F. Prob • 
Between·Groups 2 . 19.0222 9.5111 10.9744 . .0099 
Within Groups 6 5.2000 .8667 
Total 8 24.2222 
i 
I 
'. 
APPENDIX 4(g): FOLLOW-UP INDIVIDUAL DlI'r/\ (IN POUND/\GE) 
(i) ExperimentaL Subjeats (N = 11) 
Pre-Treatment Fo11ow-U/2 I\bso1ute % /\booo1ute 
Weight Weight Difference Difference 
Subject 1* 136 126 10 -7 
2 164 153 11 -7 
.3 131 126. 5 -4 
4 144 140 4 -3 
5 167 152 15 -9 
6 149 142 ,7 -5 
7 134 124 10 -7 
8* 158 133 25 -16 
9 145 140 5 -3 
1O*' 157 156 1 1 
11 166 168 -2 1 
l: 1651 1560 -91 59 
x 150.09 141.81 -8.27 -5.36 
NOTE: *Represents drop-outs at follow-up (excluding pregnant 
Experimental Subject). 
(ii) ControL Group I Subjeats (N = 9) 
Pre-Treatment Follow-Uo Absolute % Absolute', 
n 
Weight Weight . Difference Difference 
Subject 1* 145 147 +2 1 
2* 163 162 -1 -1 
3 114 112 -2 -2 
4 168 163' -5 -3 
5 176 158 -18 -10 
6 128 126 -2 -2 
7 148 151 +3 2 
8 127 123 -4 -3 
9 176 178 +2. 1 
l: 1345 1314 -27,: 17 
x 149.44 146 -3 -1~9 
, 
(iU) ControL Group II Subjeats (N = 11) 
Pre-Treatment Fo11ow-U/2 Absolute % Absolute 
Weight Weight Difference Difference 
Subject 1 140 142 -2 1 
2* 122 124 -2 2 
3)' 156 163 -7 -4 
4 135 128 7 -5 
5 175 167 8 -5 
6 136 133 3 -2 
7 126 134 -8 6 
8 125 126 -1 1 
9* 182 180 2 -1 
10 195 
.: . 178 17 -9 
11* 122 117 5 -4 
l: 1614 1578, . -22 -20 
x 146.73 144.72 -2 -1.82 
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'APPENDIX 4(9): continued 
(iv) Swnmary of OnelJJay ANOVA on FoUoUJ-up AbsoZute Difference Datal. 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
D.F. Sum of Squares 
2 251.9400 
28 1377.7374 
30 1629.6776 
Mean Squares 
:J.25.97oo 
49.2049 
F. Ratio 
2.5601 
(v) . 2 Sv.rrunar:y of OnelJJay ANOVA % AbsoZute Difference at; FoUoUJ-up 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
~: 
D.F. 
2 
28 
30 
" 
SU!!l of Squares 
125.1421 
521.2937 
646.4359 
Mean Squares .. F. Ratio 
62.5711 
18.6176 
3.3608 
F. Prob. 
.0953 
F. Prob. 
.0492 
1 Represents the net difference between Subjects' pre-treatment weights and'their 
weights at follow-up •. 
2 Represents the percent difference between Subjects' pre-treatment weights and their 
weights at follow-up. 
" 
APPENDIX 5: APPENDIX TO STUDY FOUR 
APPENDIX S(a): ANTI-SHaKING LITERATUHE GIVEN TO SUIlJJ;:crS 
THREE DAYS BEFORE POST-TEST SESSION 
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF CIGARETTE SMOKING'" 
The applied significance of smoking behaviour is hard to overestimate. 
·Cigarette smoking has been found to be responsible for roughly 325,000 
premature deaths each year from cancer of the lung, bladder and oral 
cavity, cardiovascular disorders including coronary heart disease (CIID) 
and hypertension (high blood pressure), and pulmonary diseases such as 
bronchitis, and pneumonia. Smoking is directly linked to approximately 
90% of all lung cancer, 75% of all bronchitis, 80% of all heart diseases 
(CHD), and 85% of all respiratory disorders. Further, it is closely 
associated with a decrease in exercise tolerance, especially in angina 
patients (Jones & Johnson, 1979). 
The economic costs of smoking are equally staggering. It is estimated 
that smoking is related to over one-fifth of the total hospital and 
medical expenses in the United States, and one-third of the total 
National Health Service expenses in the UK, with the combined cost of 
smoking-related sickness and decreased productivity (lost work output 
and absenteeism) raising this total into billions of dollars. In 
addition, the health risk to smokers as well as non-smokers (passive 
smokers) such as fetal damage, sudden death from coronary heart disense 
(CHD), and impaired survival rate in smokers with cardiovascular disor-
ders (e.g. high blood pressure) cannot be evaluated in monetary terms. 
Taking these, and other facts into account, the World Health Organisa-
tion has concluded that the life expectancy of the average cigarette 
smoker is ten years shorter than his/her non-smoking counterpart (WHO, 
1978), and hence has suggested that the control of smoking is the single 
most important preventive health measure that the developed nations can 
take. 
The Expert Committee (VrnO) realises that while there may be moral or 
aesthetic objections to smoking, it is clear that the overwhelming 
problem with this behaviour is one of health risk. The heulth risks 
associated \Vi th Cigarette smolcing are due mainly to two classes of 
elements in cigarette smoke: particulate matter and gases. The most 
harmful particulate substances are "tar", the most probable carcinogen 
and compound most responsible for lung tissue damage (lung cancer), and 
nicotine, a contributor to cardiovascular diseases (e.g. hypertension). 
However, 90% of tobacco smoke consists of a number of gases, the most 
harmful of which is carbon monoxide (CO). This gas which results from 
incomplete combustion of the tobacco has been identified as the agent 
roost responsible for the various heart diseases associated with srooking. 
Smoking risk is intimately related to the dose of these harmful elements, 
that is, the greater amount of tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide (CO) 
* Excerpt from the Report of a World Health Organisation Expert 
Committee on Smoking: Geneva, Switzerland, 1980. 
introduced into and retained by the body, the greater the health risk 
assumed by the smoker. Dosage is typically assessed by counting the 
number of cigarettes smoked, e.g. per day. This alone is not enough to 
calculate dosage accurately. Tobacco products differ widely in their 
yields of tar, nicotine, and harmful gases such as carbon monoxide. 
Furthermore, the way in which a person smokes is just as important when 
assessing dosage. For instance, two smokers may smoke the same brand of 
cigarettes, at the same rate, but differ significantly in the way of 
consumption. One smoker may take four times as many puffs, each of 
which are three times as long and inhale deeply. These two smokers, 
assuming they are of the same or similar constitution, would clearly not· 
suffer the same health risks. 
The IVorld Health Organisation (WHO) on the basis of the conclusive findings 
of the Expert Committee, has suggested that the developed nations could 
improve the health of their citizens and increase their average life 
expectancy by at least ten years by abolishing the tobacco industry. The 
individual smoker, on the other hand, can improve his/her own health and 
life expectancy tremendously by kicking the habit completely. Failing 
this, the cigarette smoker may achieve a relatively good health and 
longer life expectancy by reducing dosage in terms of the amount of tar, 
nicotine and other harmful gases such as carbon monoxide introduced into 
the body, e.g. by smoking low tar brands of cigarettes, or by taking 
shorter puffs, or inhaling less deeply. However, it must be noted that 
total abstinence is the ultimate answer to all the health risIts closely 
associated with cigarette smoking such as cancer of the lungs, throat;. 
bladder, and heart diseases, respiratory diseases, etc., etc., all of 
which combined account for over 90% of all the premature deaths that 
occur each year in developed nations. 
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APPENDIX 5(h): OBSERVED DATA, BY SUBJECT AND CONDITION 
(i) Se~f-mode~~ing Subjects (N = 9) 
AMOUh'T OF 'I'OBACCO AMOUNT OF TIME (SECONDS) CIGA!~ETTES 
CONSUNED (IN GRAMS) IIERE IN: SUBJECTS' 110YTHS SUBJECT SEX 
Pre-Test Post-Test Difference Pre-Test Post-Test Difference 
. 
1 m .6294 .3081 .3212 , 31.20 20.60 10.60 
2 m .5758 .4118 .1643 20.01 24.28 -~~27 
3 m .6833 .5845 .0988 38.03 37.86 0.17 
':I m' .6443 .6716 -.0273' 27.38 39.75 -12.37 
*5 It1 1. 2238* .5700 .6538 '100.23* 49.35 50.88 
6 f .4652 .3019 .1633 25.53 
, , 20.09 5.44 
7 f .5680 .4109 .1571 29.63 20.49 9.14 
8 f .5302 .5012 .0290 56.12 49.56 6.65 
9 f .5053 .6100 -.1047 27.61 30.60 -2.99 
\ 
1: 5.8302 4.3697 1.4661 355.77 292.58 .63.16 
-x .6478 .4855 .1629 39.53 32.51 7.0178 
* Note: subject smoked two Cigarettes in the pre-test session. 
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APPENDIX 5(b): continued 
(ii) Negative ModeZZing Subjeats (N = 9) 
"'.MOUNT Or' TOBACCO AMOUNT OF TIHE (SECONDS) CIGARETTES 
CONSUMED (IN GRAl1S) , I'1ERE IN SUBJECTS' NOUTHS 
. 
Pre-'l'est Post-Test Difference Pre-Test Post-Test Difference 
. 
• 6118 .6424 -.030G 24.03 27.91 -3.88 
.6654 .6966 ' -.0279 23.98 28.35 -4.37 
'.7531 .7416 .0115 23.66 23.30 0.36 
.6682 .68S0 -.0176 28.30 33.35 -5.05 
.5096 .6960 -.1004 22.51 23.39 -0.88 
.6637 ' .• 5890 .0747 25.65 23.09 2.56 
.7008 .6787 .0221 20.07 27.70 -7.63 
.6424 .5742 .0682 31:75 34.56 -2.81 
-
.7091 .6591 .0500 32.14 38.44 -6.30 
-
6.0039 5.9541 0.05 232.09 260.09 ' '-28.00 I 
. 
.6671 
.6617 .0056 25.79 28.90 -3.1111 
APPENDIX 5(b): continued 
(iii) Biofeedbaak Subjeats (N = 9) 
N'.OUNT OF TOBACCO Al>lOUNT OF TU!E (SECONDS) CIGARETTES 
" 
SUBJECT SEX CONSUHED (IN GRAMS) WERE IN SUBJECTS' MOUTHS 
, Pre-Test Post-Test Difference Pre-Test Post-Test I Difference" 
1 m .5876 .5775 .0101 31.65 27.14 4.51 
2 m .5558 .5953 -.0395 33.05 30.79 2.26 
3 m ;6602 .7209 -.0607 34.06 60.27 -26.21 
4 m .5587, .3613 .1974 29.56 23.69 '5.87 
5 . m .7747 .6846 .0900 30.g8 40.89 -9.91 
6 f .6103 , .4585 .1523 . 27.61 16.80 10.81 
7 f .5475 I .6018 -.0543 ' 24.69 29.23 -4.54 
8 f .6476 c, .690B -.0430 35~92, ' 24.62 ' 11.30 
9 f .·5279 .5000 .0279 36.04 ,34.41 1.63 
'1: 5.4711 5.1907 .2802 283.56 287.84 -4.28 
-x .6079 . .5767 .0311 '31.51 31.9822 -.4756 
, " 
" 
., . 
APPENDIX 5(b): continued 
(iv) Contro~ Subjeats (N = 9) 
&~Ol~ OF TOBACCO AMOUNT OF TIME (SECONDS) CIGARETTES 
SUBJECT SEX CONSUMED (IN GRAMS) , WERE IN SUBJECTS' MOUTHS 
Pre-Test Post-Test Difference Pre-Test Post-Test Difference 
1 m .5912 .5321 .0591 26.81 22.24 4.57 
. 2 m .8381 .6515 .1866 49.80 60.27 -10.47 
3 m '.5527 .5894 -.0367 34.70 38.72 -4.02 
4 m .6553 .6856 .0303 32.63 20.65 11.98 
5 f .6924 .6954 -.0030 39.41 42.79 -3.38 
6 f .5500 .6586 . -.1089 .. 34.24 50.99 -16.75 
7 f .7009 .7017 -.0008 50.87 58.91 -8.04 
8 f .5078 .5465 -.0387 20;99 20.06 0.93 . 
9 f .6661 .7197 -.0536 21.50 . 30.19 .. 8.69· 
, 
.!: 5.754·5,- 5.7805 - .• 026 310.95 344.8197 -33.8697 
.... . 
-
-.0029 • x .6394 .6423 34.55 38.3133 -3.7633 
• 
1IPPENDIX 5 (c!..: SUMMl\RY OP A ONE-NAY i\NOVA ON OBSERVED DlITI\~ 
VARIABLE ; ... 
(1..) Amormt of Tobacco Cum:umcd (ITe-Tl!Dt Con.JitiO~l)l 
SOUHtE or V;\RIATION DEGREES OI-' su,., OF MEAN 
f'I'1£EDOM SQUARES SQUl\RES F-RATIO F-PROB. 
Between Groups l .0164 .0055 .3091 .8186 
Within Groups 32 .5675 .0171 
TarAL 35 .5840 
fii) Amount of Tobacco Consumed (Post-Tf'!st Conditicn)2 
SOURCE OF VARIATION DEGRF.ES OF SUM OF MEAN FREEDOM SQUARES SQUARES F-RATIO F-PROB. 
Between Groups 3 .• 1715 .0572 5.7311 .0030 . 
Within Groups 32 .3192 .0100 
TOTAL 35 • 4908 . 
(iii) Amount of Time Cigarettes were in subjects' Mouths (Pro-Test Condition)! 
SOURCE OF VARIATION DEGREES OF SUM OF MEAN FREEDOM SQUARES . SQUARES F-RATIO F-PROB. 
Betweer. Groups 3 892.3248 297.4416 1.5382 .2236 
Within Croups 32 6187.7390 193.3668 
TOTM. 35 7080.0637 
({..o) Amount of Time Cigarettes ~cpe in Subjects' Mouths (Post-Tcst Condition)' 
SOURCE OF VARIATION I DEGREES OF SUM OF ME"" F-AAT.IO F-PROB. FREEDOM SQUARES SQUARES ....... 
Between Groups 3 416.7511 138.9170 .9385 .4334 
Within Groups 32 4736.4297 148.0134 . 
TOTAL 35 5153.18<:>8 
(v) Difference in Amo~t Consumed (Pre-Test-Po8t-Te8t)~ 
SOURCE OF VARIATION DEGREES OF SUM OF MEAN F-RATIO F-PROB. FREEDOM SQUARES SQUARES 
Between Groups 3 .1607 .<:>536 3.<:>791 .0413 
Within Groups 32 .5566 .0174 . 
TOTAL 35 • 7173 
(vi.i Difference in Time (Pre-Test-Post-Test) 5 
SOlmCE OF VARIATION DEGREE9- OF SUM OF MElIN F-RATIQ F-PROS. fREEDOM SQUARES SQUARES 
I 8<!tween Groups 3 
. 
659.6051 219.0604 1.6039 .,2078 
Within Groups 32 4306.6685 137.0834 
'!""Ol'AL 35 5046.2736 . 
280 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
lIPPENDIX 5(c): continued 
Notes to Appendix 5(a) 
There "as no significant difference between the group means in the 
amount of tobacco the subjects consumed in the pre-test condition. 
There "as a statistically significant difference bet"een the group 
means in the amount of tobacco the subjects consumed in the post-
test condition. 
The groups did not differ significantly frcm each other in terms of 
the amount of time lit cigarettes stayed in the subjects' mouths in 
the pre-test condition nor in the post-test condition. 
There was a significant difference between the group means "ith 
regard to the difference between the amount of tobacco consumed in 
the pre-test and post-test conditions. 
There was no significant difference between the group means as far 
as the difference between the amount of time lit cigarettes stayed 
in the subjects' mouths in the pre-test and post-test conditions WaS 
concerned. 
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• lIPPFNDIX 5 (d): SUMW\HY OF PEl\HSON~CORRF.r,JI:l'ION COE~~ 
AMTPRE, AM'fl'OST, DIPFAMT. and IJIE'z.'TIMS 
N1TPRE ANTPOST DIFFAMT 
r 
" 
.7069 TUlEPRE 
P " .001 
TlMEPOST r " .41 
P " .007 
r 
" 
.7172 DIFFTlME 
P " .001 
NOTES 
, .' 
'1. AMTPRE denotes amount consumed in pre-test condttion. 
2. TI~£PRE denotes amount of time lit cigarettes stayed in subjects', 
mouths in ,pre-test condition. 
,3. A}ITPOST denotes amount consumed in post-test condition. 
" 
4.TI/1EPOST denotes amount of time lit cigarettes' stayed in the 
subjects' mouths in post-test condition.,: 
5. DIFFAMT denotes the difference between the amount consumed in the' 
pre-test and, post-test conditions. 
6. DIFFTUlE denotes the difference bebleen the amount of time lit 
cigarettes stayed in the subjects' mouths in the p~e-test and 
post-test conditions. 
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APPENDI X 6 : APPENDIX TO APPARA1'US AND 
EXPERI IENTAL SITUAT IONS 
DIAGRAM l: DIAGRIIMS OF STUDY ONE AND STUDY TWO 
Diagram 1 (a) 
.' 
Diagram l(a) shows the Observation Room and the f ollowin g apparatus 
(from left to right) : 
(1) Timer Counter; 
(2) Time Counter p ush button control ; 
(3) Galvanometer (,dth t he electrodes passed through the wall into 
the Experimenta l Room); 
(4) Vi deo console with 4 TV monitors; 
(5) TV monitor (top right) attached t o the console ; 
(6) Reel-ta-reel video r ecorder (botto n right ) . 
Diagr am a l so shmls part of one-way screen (top left) between the 
Observation Room and the Experimental Room , 
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Diagram 1 (b) 
Diagram 1 (a) 
Diagram l(b) shows the same Observation Room with the following appa r atus : 
a U-matic video cassette recorder with an attached TV monitor. 
Diagram l(c) shows a subject in an experimental situati on (in the 
Experimental Room) being ubserved on the TV monitors attached to the 
video console in the Observation Room . 
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Lr~agram led) 
Diagr am l( d ) shows a subject (a cigarette smoker) i n a self-modelli ng 
condition. The subject i s enclosed in a cubicle situated inside the 
Experimental Room . On two fingers of the subject ' s l eft hand a r e 
attached electrodes . The electrodes are connecte d (through the wall 
between the Observation Room and the Experimental Roore) to the 
gal vanometer s i tuated inside the Observation Room . Also attached to 
the wall is a video camera focusing on the sub ject (through a smal l 
gap between the screens) . In this c ondition , through the video system , 
the subject is watching himself on a TV monitor while smoking . 
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DIAGRAJ>l 2 : DIAGRAHS OF STUDY TllREE 
Diagram 2(a) 
Diagram 2(a) shows the subject (on the left) and the experimenter (on 
the right) . The experimenter and two i tems of the apparatus used are 
out of the subject 's sight · by means of a screen enclosing the subject . 
In front of the experimenter are the follmling apparatus (left to 
right): (1) oscillograph and (2) Birbeck Laboratory Time r and Signa·l 
Source . Facing the subject are: (1) a mirror (~lith a white c ircular 
spot in the centre of it a nd the subject ' s reflect i on in it; 
(2) a flash unit (just above the mirror) mounted on a tripod ·. The 
subject is wearing headphones. 
The flash unit which provided the UCS and the headphones through "hich 
the CS was presented to the subject were connected to and controlled by 
the Timer and Signal Source. The oscillograph recorded CS-UCS 
presentations as events . 
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Diagram 2(b) 
Diagram 2(b) shows the same subj ect in the same experimental s ituation 
as Diagram 2(a) . The electr odes attached t o appropriate areas of t he 
s liliject are a l so connected to the oscillograph which r ecorded the 
subject ' s responses (eyeblinks) . 
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DIAGRAH 3: DIAGRA!>1S TO STUDY' FIVE 
Diagram :3 (a) 
Diagram 3(a) shol1s a subject in the biofeedback condition lighting up a 
cigarette . Attached t o t he subject ' s l eft hand fingers are two electrodes 
f r om the ga lvonomet er. On the table next to the subj ect are: 
(a ) a galvanometer with audio and visual outputs 
(b) a microphone 
(c) a packet of cigarettes (Benson and Hedges Special Filter King Size) 
(d) an ashtray 
(e) a gl ass sample tube for the cigarette butt. 
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Diagr am 3(b) 
DiagraJn 3 (c) 
Diagram 3(b) shows a subject in the biofeedback condition taking a puff 
ou't of a cigarette. 
Diagram 3(c) nhows a subjec t dropping a cigare tte butt (still burning ) 
into a glass sample tube. 
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Diagram 3 (d) 
Diagram 3(d) shows a subject in a self-modelling condition s mok ing i n 
a mirror room .. 
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